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ABSTRACT
This thesis presents an investigation into methods for predicting and improving the reliability 
of electronic subsystems on low cost small satellites [LCSS]. Current methods for predicting 
the reliability of electronic systems were identified and the feasibility of these methods for 
predicting the reliability of electronic systems on LCSS were analysed. Trends in satellite 
failures and satellite design methodologies were studied. It was identified that, highly 
capable, LCSS have became possible due to the existence of advanced commercial-off-the- 
shelf (COTS) very large scale integrated circuits (VLSI) components. Typically, a large 
number of these components are employed on these satellites and the effect of space radiation 
on these components is a significant source of risk to their reliability.
This research program therefore concentrated on addressing the effects of space radiation on 
the reliability of COTS VLSI components. In particular, traditional methods for predicting the 
rate and effects of radiation induced spontaneous logic state changes (Single Event Upsets 
(SEUs)) in satellite on-board microprocessors were critically examined. Problems associated 
with these methods were identified, and two new models to enable more accurate predictions 
were proposed, developed and tested. One of the models, a duty cycle prediction model, 
enables a better prediction of the “observable SEU induced error rate” in satellite 
microprocessor systems; and the other model, a SEU simulation model, enables the nature of 
SEU induced errors observed at microprocessor system level to be studied. The practical 
applications of both models were demonstrated by analysing a real satellite application 
system. These models will be particularly useful to engineers in the selection and application 
of reliable COTS microprocessors for satellite onboard computer intensive tasks without 
jeopardising reliability.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
1.1 M o t iv a t io n
The problem of accurately predicting the reliability of complex satellite electronic systems 
has been a fundamental issue in the space industry since the early 1960s [WOL-63, CON-63]. 
However, from the early eighties, the space industry has been exploring the use of smaller, 
faster, cheaper but very capable satellites technologies [SWE-92]. One of the biggest 
challenges of reducing the high cost of space missions while sustaining their capabilities is 
maintaining high reliability. Thus, the task of accurately predicting and improving the 
reliability of state-of-the-art small satellites is essential.
Since 1981, the Centre for Satellite Engineering Research (CSER) and Surrey Satellite 
Technology Limited (SSTL) at the University of Surrey (UoS) have established themselves 
as pioneers in low cost, small satellite technology. Eleven microsatellites of which seven are 
still operational, have been designed, built and tested by this team. These satellites carry a 
variety of experimental payloads, examples of which include: CCD cameras for earth 
observation, digital store-and-forward communications payloads, GPS receivers, space 
science payloads, digital signal processing payloads, etc. Figure-1.1 shows an exploded view 
of a typical UoSAT microsatellite. The internal part of the satellite consists of stacked 
aluminium trays. Each tray supports an electronic system whose reliability can be crucial to 
the success of the whole mission. The typical characteristics for these microsatellites include:
1. They are manufactured mostly from commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components which 
are very complex and capable but for which failure rate data typically does not exist. For 
example, they employ a large number o f  advanced very large scale integrated circuits 
(VLSI) microprocessors and memory components for on-board data processing and storage.
2. They are designed to allow new versions o f  software to be uploaded onto the satellite whilst 
already in operation.
3. They are flown in Low Earth Orbit (LEO).
4. There are about thirty thousand components per satellite.
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5. Typical flight mass is around 50kg.
6. Each mission costs ~£2.0 million.
7. The average manufacture and development time from start to finish is 12 months.
Figure-1.1: An exploded view o f  a UoSAT microsatellite.
Despite the fact that most of the microsatellites designed and built by the UoS team have 
performed their missions quite satisfactorily, it is still a difficult task for engineers at SSTL to 
convince potential customers of the reliable operation of COTS components (with no flight 
heritage) in space, and hence the reliability of these satellites.
1.2 Su m m a r y  O f  R esea r c h
After identifying the characteristics of low-cost small satellites (LCSS), current methods for 
predicting the reliability of electronic systems were examined. The aim was to investigate the 
applicability and accuracy of these methods for predicting the reliability of electronic 
subsystems on LCSS and to identify any limitations associated with them. It was found that 
the reliability of electronic systems depends predominantly on the reliability of their 
components. Two approaches for predicting the reliability of electronic components were
2
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identified: an empirical methodology such as those of MIL-Handbook-217 [MIL-217] and a 
science-based theoretical method known as the Physics-of-Failure (PoF) approach [PEC-90]. 
However, it was found that none of these methods can be used to accurately predict the 
reliability of electronic subsystems on LCSS. Existing empirical reliability prediction models 
are out-of-date and inaccurate due difficulties in obtaining sufficient failure statistics on 
modem components to update them or develop new ones [JEN-95]. The PoF method is too 
specific and hence, it is very complex and expensive to apply it to modem components [SEY- 
93].
An analysis of satellite failures which occurred between 1954 and 1983 [HEC-85] was then 
undertaken in order to identify past, present and future trends in satellite failures. It was 
revealed that earlier failures were dominated by design, environmental, and quality related 
problems in components. However, as technology has evolved, the nature of failures and 
satellite design methodologies have changed. An investigation into the failures that have 
occurred in modem (post 1983), small satellites was also undertaken. The data obtained 
suggested that the highest percentage of failures in these satellites are due to design problems 
which are not exposed during testing. It is however believed that, these design problems 
could be eliminated if the ‘stress-strength’ approach to design and design tools such as 
Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Sneak 
Circuit Analysis (SCA), etc. [O’CO-85], are properly implemented during the design process. 
Also, provided sufficient bum-in and good quality control procedures are administered to 
identify and eliminate sources of human errors and early failures.
The failure trends also revealed that, a high percentage of anomalies (partial failures) in 
LCSS were caused by ionising radiation. Examples of such anomalies include: degradation in 
solar cells such as observed on Fuji-1 (Japanese Radio Amateur satellites) [YAM-96] and on­
board computer (OBC) crashes observed on AMSAT OSCAR-10 and UoSAT-5. Although 
space radiation can damage fibre optic systems [WES-97], photovoltaic cells [MON-92], etc. 
the effects of space radiation on semiconductor components is of greater concern to the 
reliability of LCSS. Radiation can cause gradual degradation in the electrical properties of 
semiconductor components which can eventually lead to failure or instantaneous change of 
logic states (SEUs) which may result to catastrophic failures [BAR-96].
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Presently, design methodologies for LCSS continue to promote the role of on-board software. 
In some cases, traditional hardware circuits are being replaced by software to achieve more 
compact, flexible, and cost-effective designs. For example, there is much interest in replacing 
ground operations with automatic on-board data handling and decision making systems using 
artificial intelligent techniques [ELL-97]. This implies more software processing on the 
satellite thus, the need for greater computational power. State-of-the-art COTS 
microprocessors offer an attractive solution to this problem. Compared to traditional military 
specified microprocessors, COTS microprocessors are very capable, cheap, have short 
development and procurement times, and are available in small packages. They also consume 
less power, a characteristic that is highly desirable for space applications. Unfortunately, 
COTS components are usually not radiation hardened and are therefore susceptible to single 
event upsets (SEUs) from space radiation.
A literature review on the effects of ionising radiation on VLSI components revealed that the 
concerns regarding the use of COTS VLSI components in space have been earlier identified 
and partially addressed in publications such as [KIM-94, KOG-85, ELD-88, VEL-92, UND- 
96]. From these publications and statistics from UoSAT microsatellites, it was apparent that 
one of the challenges facing the space community today is the lack of an accurate 
methodology for predicting the observable single event upset induced error rate in 
microprocessor systems. A single event upset (SEU) induced error in a microprocessor 
system is said to be observable when it affects the external state of the system. By accurately 
predicting the expected observable SEU induced error rate for a microprocessor operating in 
a particular system, engineers can judge whether the microprocessor will operate reliably 
during a particular mission.
From the literature, it was found that the observable SEU induced error rate in a 
microprocessor systems does not only depend on the radiation environment and VLSI 
hardware characteristics but also on the software that the microprocessor is executing. 
However, the current method for predicting this error rate does not take the influence of 
software into consideration. To do this, the duty cycle for each register1 (as the
1 The term “register” in this thesis generally refers to a memory location within a microprocessor with 
the exception o f  the internal RAM. This may include registers used to define the microprocessor’s
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microprocessor executes software) must be determined. The duty cycle of a register is defined 
as the total time for which a register is holding useful information expressed as a percentage 
of the total program execution time. As a microprocessor executes real satellite application 
software, the task of calculating each registers’ duty cycle is extremely difficult (if not 
impossible) and time consuming to accomplish manually due to complexity of the software 
[ELD-88]. With the number of COTS microprocessors per satellite increasing due to increase 
use of software, it was identified that a flexible, inexpensive method of predicting registers’ 
duty cycles was highly desirable.
A model was proposed, developed and tested for undertaking this task. The 8051 
microcontroller was treated as an example. To test the model, the software which operates the 
telecommand system on several of the UoSATs was analysed. The results obtained indicate a 
significant improvement in the observable SEU induced error rate prediction accuracy. This 
model, however, only gives a gross indication of the susceptibility of a microprocessor 
system to SEUs. To get a better understanding of the response of a system to SEUs, it is 
helpful to understand the nature of SEU induced errors that are observed. For example, will 
an SEU lead to a complete or temporary loss of a mission?
The current method of predicting the nature of observable SEU induced errors in 
microprocessor systems as it executes software simply extrapolates from the register in which 
the upset has occurred. For example, it is commonly assumed that upsets in control registers 
such as the program counter and status registers will lead to more severe errors that upsets in 
data registers [OBE-94], [LI-84]. It was shown that this method is inaccurate since it ignores 
the effect associated with the propagation of the SEU induced error during execution. The 
effect of an SEU observed at microprocessor system level is not only a function of the 
particular bit changed but also of the software that the microprocessor is executing. An 
effective method to determine this effect is to expose the microprocessor as it executes the 
software to energetic ion beams, during which the output of the system is monitored. 
Unfortunately, the cost involved in conducting radiation test experiments is very high. Hence, 
this method becomes unsuitable for LCSS for which new software is being continuously 
uploaded onto the satellite while in operation. As an attempt to overcome this problem, a new
mode o f  operation; registers that define the status o f  the microprocessor; counters, data registers, 
address registers, etc. They can either be user accessible or user inaccessible.
5
Chapter 1 : Introduction
software simulation model for studying the nature of SEU induced errors at microprocessor 
system level was also developed. The response of the UoSAT telecommand system to SEUs 
was simulated and the results are encouraging.
Both the duty cycle prediction model and the SEU simulation model discussed in this Thesis 
are believed to be cost-effective tools to aid in the selection of advanced COTS 
microprocessors which will operate reliably in the space environment. Considering the fact 
that the latest generation of microsatellites such as those designed by SSTL (FaSAT-Alfa, 
TMSAT, FaSAT-Bravo, PICO-SAT and Tiung-SAT), employ at least eighteen COTS 
microprocessors each, the reliable operation of these microprocessors is crucial to the 
reliability of each mission.
1.3 O utline  O f  T h e sis
In Chapter 2, reliability is defined and a brief history of the reliability of electronic 
components is presented. System reliability modelling techniques are examined, followed by 
the empirical and PoF methods for predicting the reliability of electronic components. The 
limitations associated with both methods are fully examined. The trends in satellite failures 
since the early fifties are reviewed and the chapter concludes with statistics that show the 
exponential growth in the number of VLSI components employed in LCSS [WAR-95]. The 
space radiation environment and the effects of ionising radiation on VLSI components are 
described in Chapter 3. Emphasis is placed on how SEUs are induced in semiconductor 
devices by radiation. Technology evolution in COTS semiconductor components is reviewed 
to show that the number of SEUs expected in COTS microprocessor is likely to be increasing.
Chapter 4 examines the current method used for predicting the underlying SEU rate in VLSI 
components. The concept of critical charge is discussed, followed by models used for 
describing the space radiation environment. Techniques used to determine parameters that 
describe the interaction of a device with ionising radiation (such as ground based radiation 
test methods) are also presented. Chapter 4 concludes by examining how radiation test data 
are interpreted to determine the underlying SEU rate in VLSI components (memories and 
microprocessors). Some of the problems associated with these interpretations are briefly 
discussed. Engineers in the past have assumed that the underlying SEU rate in 
microprocessor systems is equivalent to the observable SEU induced error rate. Chapter 5
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discusses problems associated with this interpretation. It identifies why this leads to an 
overestimation of the observable SEU induced error rate in microprocessor systems thus, 
giving a pessimistic view of the reliability of a microprocessor for a particular satellite 
application. Operation of the 87C51 microcontroller on the UoSAT telecommand system is 
analysed to illustrate the degree of inaccuracy inherent in this interpretation.
To obtain a better prediction of the observable SEU induced error rate in microprocessor 
systems, the duty cycles of the microprocessor registers associated with the execution of 
particular software need to be determined. A novel duty cycle prediction model for the Intel 
8051 microprocessor is presented in Chapter 6. The model is developed using an 8051 
simulator and information from the 8051 architecture and instruction set. Results from 
analysing the software that executes on the UoSAT telecommand system are discussed at the 
end of the chapter. Chapter 7 examines the current method used for predicting the effect of an 
SEU as observed at microprocessor system level and problems associated with this method. 
A new SEU software simulation model developed for this purpose is presented. The nature of 
SEU induced errors at the UoSAT telecommand system’s level was studied using the model 
and, the results are discussed. Conclusions and implications of this research are discussed in 
Chapter 8 together with recommendations for future work.
1.4 A c h iev em en ts
At the close of this research study a number of important findings and novel contributions 
were made. These include:
•  An extensive and comparative study o f  the literature on reliability prediction o f  electronic 
systems. Current reliability models were analysed and shown that they are inadequate when 
applied to LCSS.
•  A new cost-effective tool was developed for calculating the duty cycle o f  microprocessor 
registers as the microprocessor executes real satellite application software, thus enabling 
more accurate prediction o f  the rate o f  observable SEU induced errors in microprocessor 
systems.
•  The practical application o f  this tool was demonstrated by analysing the UoSAT  
telecommand software and improvement in prediction accuracy was achieved.
•  A cost effective model was also developed to enable the nature o f  SEU induced errors 
observed at system level to be determined through Monte Carlo simulations.
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•  A  practical application o f  the model was also demonstrated by simulating the SEU response 
o f  the UoSAT telecommand system.
A list of the publications that resulted from this research is given in Appendix D.
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CHAPTER 2 
PREDICTING THE RELIABILITY OF ELECTRONIC 
SYSTEMS ON LOW-COST SMALL SATELLITES
2.1 In t r o d u c t io n
Reliability is defined as the probability that components, products, or systems will perform 
their required functions without failure in specified environments for desired periods at a 
given confidence level [KEC-91].' Reliability is considered as a quantitative measure of the 
integrity of an equipment. With the world increasingly dependent on the successful operation 
of complex machinery, there is the necessity for high reliability of this equipment. Reliability 
is therefore a global issue. However, in the aerospace industry there is more pressure for 
higher reliability because of the high costs involved.
Reliability assessment is beneficial both to a satellite designer and a customer in many ways 
[O’CO-85].
•  It enables a forecast on maintenance costs, marketability, insurance policy, etc.
•  It serves as a valuable tool for comparing alternative design options and highlighting critical 
reliability issues in a design. This enables designers to make formal reviews to meet 
customer requirements while staying competitive in the market.
•  By comparing reliability values a customer can make decisions as to the best option 
available in terms o f  cost, safety, risk, etc.
The reliability of a satellite depends on the reliability of its electronic, electromechanical and 
mechanical equipment. This research study is concerned with the reliability of electronic 
equipment on low-cost small satellites (LCSS) only. Factors affecting the reliability of non­
electronic equipment such as attitude control and optical equipment, propulsion devices, etc. 
are not examined. Trends in electronic equipment technology suggest that future satellites 
will utilise a higher proportion of electronic equipment with fewer mechanical and 
electromechanical parts [WER-92]. Thus, the number of problems arising from electronic 
equipment and related failures are likely to increase.
11
Chapter 2: Predicting the Reliability of Electronic Systems on Low-Cost Small Satellites
2.2 E lec t r o n ic  E q u ipm en t  - C la ssific a t io n
Electronic equipment can be classified into two broad classes: systems and components. The 
reliability of systems depend upon the reliability of its components, the design and the usage 
environment (see Figure-2.1).
System _________
*  reliability
Component 
reliability 4
System design 
techniques
System
manufacturing
procedures
Usage
environment
Component Component Component 
design manufacture storage
Figure-2.1: Factors Affecting the Reliability o f  a System
2.3 H ist o r y  o f  E l ec tr o n ic  E q u ipm en t  r e lia b il it y
Progress in the field of reliability began during the Second World War (KEC-91], 
[MIL-338 ], [O’OCO-85 ], [PEC-94]) driven by the high cost both human and non-human 
incurred as a result of the unexpected failure of complex military equipment. The failure rate 
of vacuum tubes, which were of primary importance to the reliability of electronic equipment 
at this time, was very high due to extreme environmental stresses (shock and vibration) in 
battle grounds. At this point, the need for highly reliable equipment to operate in military 
environments became apparent. This led to the formation of an Advisory Group on the 
Reliability of Electronic Equipment (AGREE) in America in 1952. Subsequently, a report 
was published on the specification and testing of electronic equipment which was adopted by 
the US Department of Defence. Soon after that, more reliable components than vacuum tubes 
(e.g. transistors, integrated circuits) were invented. The benefits of adopting the new 
specifications and testing methods were soon realised as high levels of systems’ reliability 
were attained and maintenance cost dropped.
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With the development of satellites and other very costly, complex systems (most of which 
cannot be repaired once in service) there was increased necessity for even more reliable 
equipment. This initiated more research in the field, and new methods of predicting and 
improving the reliability of electronic systems were proposed. Since then, this has been an 
active area of research as electronic component technology continues to progress rapidly. For 
example, recent development of advanced VLSI components introduces new reliability 
problems which need to be identified and addressed.
2.4 Sy st e m  R e l ia b il it y  M o d ellin g
In order to predict the reliability of a system, a reliability block diagram (model) of the 
system must first be developed. The appropriate modelling technique depends on the 
characteristics of the system. For example, whether the system is repairable or non­
repayable, redundant or non-redundant, required to operate in multi-environments or not, etc. 
The reliability model of a system with no redundancy (a “series ” system) is obtained by 
simply multiplying the reliability values of its components. For systems with redundancy the 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) method and Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA) are useful tools for constructing their reliability models [O’CO-85]. Generally, 
electronic systems on satellites can be considered as non-repairable systems but they are 
usually built with a lot of redundancy.
2.4.1 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
A fault tree (FT) is a graphical representation of the logical interconnection between various 
component and events within a system. The idea of constructing a fault tree was developed 
from the analysis of networks in the late sixties [JEN-69]. In the seventies, techniques for 
reducing the fault tree into minimal cut sets (minimal combination of basic events which 
cause a defined event to occur), were developed [NEL-70]. The present method of 
constructing fault trees is very simple but requires a good understanding of the system design. 
It starts by considering the "top events or undesirable events" of the system and proceeds by 
determining how these events could be caused by a combination of lower level failures. 
Details of the main steps involved are described in many reliability texts [O’CO-85]. Figure-
2.2 shows the FT for the power system used on several of the UoS microsatellites. The top 
event in this example is when the system fails to deliver the correct voltage.
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Figure-2.2: Fault Tree of Power Subsystem on UoSAT
The power conditioning modules and battery charge regulators are redundant while the solar 
panels, batteries and power distribution modules are considered as single point failures. The 
minimal cut sets can be evaluated using rules of Boolean Algebra. They can then be used to 
develop the reliability model of the system. Today, FTA is employed for the:
•  identification o f  critical paths and design weaknesses in a system,
•  comparison o f  alternative design configurations,
•  allocation o f  critical failure mode probabilities o f  subsystems,
14
Chapter 2: Predicting the Reliability of Electronic Systems on Low-Cost Small Satellites
•  evaluation o f  alternative corrective approaches,
•  development o f  operational test and maintenance procedures to recognise and accommodate 
unavoidable critical failure modes.
Research has also been done on how fault trees could be applied to evaluating different 
classes of failures in complex systems [ALL-81], [NAH-92], and for fault identification 
[KIS-83].
FTA is not without problems:
•  it cannot be properly performed without a good understanding o f  the system design.
• it is not very practical since a different fault tree has to be constructed for each “top event” 
and failure mode defined.
Identifying failure modes is therefore quite important. A standard method has been developed 
to aid engineers in this task.
2.4.2 Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis
Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) [O’CO-85], [MIL-1629A] is the 
process of searching for, and identifying the various modes in which an equipment can fail, 
and ascertaining the effect(s) on system operation for each mode. It also classifies these 
failure modes according to their frequency of occurrence and severity of their effect(s). 
FMECA is similar to the fault tree analysis approach in that it is also best performed by an 
engineer who has a thorough knowledge of the system's design and its application. The uses 
of FMECA can be summarised as follows:
•  for identifying safety or reliability critical failure modes and their effects on the performance 
o f  a system,
•  for preparation o f  preventive maintenance requirements in repairable systems,
•  for the design o f  built-in test and failure indication mechanisms,
•  for developing system reliability block diagrams.
MIL-STD-1629A "Procedures for Performing A Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality 
Analysis" [MIL-1629A] and PSS-01-303 "Requirements for FMECA and Associated 
Activities" [PSS-303] are the industry standard guides to performing FMECA.
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2.4.3 System reliability modelling - Summary
FTA and FMECA are generally accepted by the reliability community as valuable tools for 
developing reliability block diagrams for systems. Computer programs have been developed 
which can be used to perform FTA (e.g. “FTAP” developed by the University of California, 
Berkeley and “RESULTS” developed by Management Sciences Inc. in Albuquerque, NM), 
and FMECA (e.g. “PREDICTOR” also developed by Management Sciences Inc. and 
“RELEX”, developed by RELEX Software Corporation, Greenburg PA.). The main inputs 
into the reliability model of a system are the reliability values of its components.
2.5 P r e d ic t in g  Th e  R e l ia b il it y  Of E lec t r o n ic  C o m po n e n t s
The two main methodologies for predicting the reliability of electronic components; the 
empirical failure rate methodology and the physics-of-failure methodology are discussed in 
this section.
2.5.1 Empirical Method : MIL-HDBK-217
MIL-HDBK-217 contains the most widely used empirical methods for predicting the 
reliability of electronic components. The first version of the handbook (MIL-HDBK-217A) 
was published in 1965, followed by updated versions in subsequent years to reflect changing 
technology. MIL-HDBK-217F is the latest version. Basically, models in MIL-HDBK-217 are 
developed by fitting curves into historical failure data gathered from field operation or from 
laboratory tests. The content of MIL-HDBK-217 includes failure rate models for nineteen 
groups of electronic components which range from microcircuits and discrete semiconductors 
to passive components such as resistors and capacitors. The handbook contains two methods 
for performing predictions: the parts count and parts stress methods [SEY-90].
The parts stress method requires detailed information on the system design thus, it can only 
be applied in the late design stages of a system. The information required includes parameters 
describing the stresses experienced by the component while in operation such as 
environmental and temperature stresses. Also, parameters describing the quality and
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complexity of the component are considered. A typical example for the failure rate (Ap) of a 
microcircuit is given in equation 2.1 [MIL- 217F].
Xp =(C] 7ur + C2 tie) tiq np Failures/106 Hours (2.1)
where:
C] = Failure rate of die, based on circuit’s complexity (e.g. number of gates).
C2  = Package failure rate, based on package type and complexity (e.g. number of functional pins).
7Tf = Temperature acceleration factor for different failure mechanisms of the die e.g. electromigration. 
x £  -  Environmental factor which accounts for all environmental stresses except for ionising radiation.
7z q  -  Quality factor which accounts for component’s screening and processing differences.
XL = Learning factor which accounts for the maturity of the component’s manufacturing line.
Using Ap, the reliability (R)  of the part at time t can be calculated using the equation
R (t) = e Failures/Unit Time
Part stress models for other parts are similar in format to the example presented above.
The parts count method requires less information than the part stress method. It can therefore 
be applied in the early design stages. Normally, default values are assigned to some 
parameters of the part stress models which cannot be determined at this stage. For example, 
for the microcircuit model given in equation 2.1, default values are assigned for rrp, C2, and 
up, and estimates are made for the other factors which are not well defined [SEY-90].
Although the models in MIL-HDBK-217 are widely used, their credibility has been an issue 
of debate over the last decade. Several authors have raised criticisms against the models, 
some of which include:
•  The models do not address all the possible causes o f  failure [WON-90], They assume that 
fundamental parts design is perfect and that failures are caused only by manufacturing 
defects which are accelerated by operational stresses [ SEY-93].
•  The reliability o f  any electronic equipment depends on how it is designed, manufactured, 
stored, transported and used. These processes vary from company to company and as such,
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introduce large variability in the failure rate data collected from different companies [O’CO- 
88]. MIL-HDBK-217 does not account for these differences in its models. It is also possible 
that the failure data used to develop m odels is affected by external failure mechanisms and 
flawed reporting techniques.
•  Where sufficient data are unavailable, new models are interpolated or extrapolated from 
available data.
•  There is no statistical confidence associated with MIL-HDBK-217 models. A s a result, one 
is never sure o f  any analysis done using the models. Wrong results can mislead a designer to 
select a less reliable part over a more reliable one [PEC-94].
•  Since MIL-HDBK-217 models are empirically derived, they do not identify the actual origin 
o f  failures and therefore cannot be used for identifying potential reliability problems in a 
device.
•  Models are developed with an assumption o f  a constant failure rate for the components. This 
implies that the reliability o f  a component is independent o f  its age. Although this 
assumption is made on the basis that equipment w ill start its mission after the early failures 
have been eliminated and completes the mission before wear-out sets in (as defined by 
“bathtub curve” [KEC-9]), evidence has shown that this is not usually the case [HEC-87].
•  It is assumed that failure rate and reliability are related by the Arrhenius relationship. That is, 
the tendency for the component to fail increases with temperature. Evidence has also shown 
otherwise [O’CO-88], [LEO-88].
•  Finally, most o f  the models are out o f  date and do not reflect existing technology. They are 
therefore not applicable to state-of-the-art components [BRE-88].
Despite these criticisms, MIL-HDBK-217 models are still the most widely used models for 
making reliability predictions and comparing design options. The main reason being that it is 
the only flexible tool available for predicting complex system reliability. The handbook 
models are also well documented and software packages (e.g. RELEX-217 from RELEX 
Software Corporation, Greenburg, PA) for applying the methods are available. Thus, 
manufacturers of complex systems such as satellites do not have any choice but to use MIL- 
HDBK-217 models when reliability analysis are requested by a customer. Other handbooks 
[JEN-95] [HRD-94], [CNET-83] and [NTT-82] exist with empirical reliability prediction 
models but similar controversies surround them.
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The likelihood of updating existing empirical models or developing new ones that are 
applicable to existing technology is unlikely. Since reliability improvement initiatives were 
launched, the reliability of both military (government) and industrial parts have been 
increasing as shown Figure-2.3. As a result, it has become extremely difficult (if not 
impossible) to collect enough data on components’ failure rates to enable statistically 
significant predictions. This problem is further aggravated by the evolutionary developments 
of electronic component technology which renders components obsolete within a short period 
of time. Thus, before enough failure rate data are collected for a particular component it may 
no longer be in use.
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Figure-2.3: Quality/Reliability Evolution in Government & Industrial Parts [KIN-93].
2.5.2 The Physics of Failure (PoF) approach
Most of the critics of empirical reliability prediction methods encourage the application of 
the physics-of-failure (PoF) approach [WAT-92]. In [CUS-93], this approach is defined as 
“an approach to design, reliability assessment, testing, screening and stress margins that uses 
knowledge of root-cause failure processes to prevent product failures through rigorous design 
and manufacturing practices”. The steps involved are [CUS-93]:
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•  Identifying failure sites; potential failure mechanisms (e.g. chemical, electrical, etc.), and the 
failure modes (shorts, opens, electrical deviations) which may result from these failure 
mechanisms.
•  Developing a model describing the failure mechanism at each site using knowledge o f  
physical, chemical and the mechanical properties o f  the materials at the site. Input 
parameters o f  these models usually include the material characteristics, geometry at failure 
sites, manufacturing flaws, defects and environmental and operating loads.
•  Analysing every potential failure mechanism at each site, to determine its mean time to 
failure (MTTF). The mechanism with the shortest life is the weakest link which is then 
evaluated for potential reliability improvement.
•  The MTTF for a system is taken as the MTTF o f  the weakest component making up the 
system.
An example of a physics-of-failure model developed by Pecht & colleagues [SEY-93] of the 
University of Maryland for the fifty percent life of a Brittle Die Fracture is given as
5^0 ( i V n
(n-2)A  — I l x  10~6k\jis - x) V2\ (m k)h n"12
V J J
2.4 1 1
where
tso -  Mean time to failure(hours)
A = Material dependent coefficient for die 
n = Material dependent exponent for die 
mi = Die crack tip geometry factor 
Mfc = Free surface correction factor 
aQ = Initial die crack length (m) 
af=  Final die crack length at fracture (m) 
k = Die geometry dependent coefficient 
/js = Substrate thermal coefficient of expansion (^C) 
Die thermal coefficient of expansion (Oq 
Es = Substrate tensile modulus (Pa)
(»»-2 )/2 ( » - 2)/2  
u o u f
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Ea = Die attach tensile modulus (Pa)
L = Diagonal length of die (m)
x  = Die attach thickness (m)
AT = Temperature change in die(OC)
a/ = instantaneous crack length during crack growth(m)
From this example, it can be seen that the PoF approach is very complex since many 
parameters need to be determined. It requires detailed understanding of the properties of the 
material and their behaviour in different environments. It will therefore be extremely difficult 
and expensive to apply this method to predict the reliability of a complex system. It is 
thought that the cost of applying is likely to be more than the hardware cost. Other 
disadvantages of the POF approach include the following:
•  Like the M IL-HDBK-217 models, this approach does not address all the possible causes o f  
failure. Models focus on basic component design and ignores real world handling during 
manufacture and use [SEY-93].
•  The validation o f  each failure mechanism is very expensive and demanding, since the 
process is very specific. For example, if  a microcircuit has ten failure sites then ten different 
models need to be developed, one for each site [McC-95].
•  It requires a lot o f  expertise and machinery to conduct the necessary tests required to 
determine the parameters in each model.
•  It has never been properly co-ordinated in a document that includes all components.
However, there are many advantages, although most of them will be of interest to particular 
component manufacturers [SEY-93], [WAT-92], and [KLA-95]. Examples include:
• Since PoF models explicitly address the design parameters, which are found to strongly 
influence component reliability such as the effects o f  electrical, thermal, mechanical and 
chemical stresses on the component’s material properties, it is a useful tool for designing 
reliable components.
•  Since it evaluates the reliability o f  materials from a scientific point it can be used to predict 
the reliability o f  components from both old and new technologies.
•  By identifying and modelling potential failure mechanisms it provides information which 
enables the manufacturer to design tests plans that are more effective in screening electronic 
parts. It also allows the determination o f  electrical and thermal-mechanical stress margins.
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2.5.3 Summary
Two methods that can be used to predict the reliability of a component have been identified. 
Empirical models such as those in MIL-HDBK-217 tend to be erroneous and misleading 
when applied to modem components. The reason being the lack of sufficient statistical failure 
data to update existing models or develop new ones. The quality and reliability of modem 
components is so high that failure rates are extremely low. The PoF approach is too specific, 
complex and, therefore, costly. It is therefore not suitable for low-cost missions employing 
complex state-of-the-art components. From these findings it was concluded that neither the 
empirical nor the physics-of-failure methodology will be practical for accurately predicting 
the reliability of components such as COTS VLSI components used on LCSS. Thus, 
predicting the reliability of the satellite with component reliability values obtained from these 
methods will not yield the expected benefits.
The findings so far agree with authors like Jensen [JEN-95], who states that “achieving high 
reliability is a question of sound design and manufacturing practices. Using handbook 
predictions for design comparisons is rarely a good idea”. For example, one method to 
achieving high reliability will be to use a top down approach (from system to component 
level) together with engineering judgement and tools such as FMECA and FTA to identify 
and weigh the critical areas of a design. Critical areas could be identified to include:
•  single point failures,
•  areas in which design changes have been implemented,
•  areas that have used new components o f  non-space qualified parts.
Comparisons can then be made on the number and relative weights of critical areas identified 
for each design and more stringent testing and quality verification can then be implemented
in these areas to improve system reliability [O’CO-96].
Another method used to identify critical areas in a system is to review past failures 
experienced by similar systems operating in similar environments. The next section therefore 
summarises results from a study on the history of spacecraft failures. It highlights areas
where failures have been predominant and predicts future trends.
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2.6 P r e -1983 Sp a c e c r a f t  F a il u r e s
In a study o f  over 3 000  an om alies w hich  occurred on approxim ately 3 0 0  sa tellites launched  
b etw een  1960 and 1984 [H E C -85, H E C -87], failures w ere d iagnosed  and cla ssified  into the 
fo llo w in g  categories:
1. Design failures: Failures caused by the selection o f  parts that do not possess sufficient 
perform ance margins or are not capable o f  surviving for the entire duration o f  the mission.
2. Environmental failures: Failures caused by unanticipated environm ental effects.
3. Operational failure: Failures caused by sending im proper com m ands to the spacecraft or 
some faulty ground software.
4. Random part failures: Failures identified as arising from a particular group o f parts but there 
was no evidence o f  design deficiency, excessive environm ental stress or any quality related 
problem. Also, there were no patterns o f  sim ilar failures am ong parts.
5. Quality failures: Failures that arose from repeated failures in the same part or assembly that 
could not be attributed to environm ental causes or which correlate with quality defects found 
in other sim ilar parts.
The cau ses o f  failure is som e cases (unknow n cau ses) could  not be traced and in som e cases  
(other cau ses) the cause o f  the failure could  not be c la ssified  in any o f  the above categories. 
Figure-2 .4  sh ow s the percentage o f  failures to the total num ber o f  reported failures in each  
category.
H Percentage of failures 
associated with the different 
causes
Figure-2.4: Percentage Distribution o f Failures by Causes Observed Between 1954 and 1983.
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T o determ ine the failure trend assoc ia ted  w ith  each cause, the failures in each  category w ere 
further cla ssified  into tw o m ain groups:
•  failures from spacecraft launched before 1977 (early program s) and
•  failures from spacecraft launched after 1977 (late programs).
Figure-2.5 represents the percentage o f  failures o f  the total num ber o f  failures reported due to 
different cau ses for the tw o  categories.
</)
o>1—
_3
35.00%
>2
*—o
30.00%
L.a>
■Q
25.00%
E
3
C
■o
v
■co
20.00%
05
£
a
05 15.00%
**—o
<D
05ro
10.00%
c
Q)
O
5.00%
a>
£L
0.00%
IPre-1977 Programs 
Hate Programs
Cause
Figure-2.5: D istribution o f  Failures by Causes for Pre- and Post 1977 Programs.
From F igure-2 .5 , it can be seen  that there w ere m ore failures due to part and quality problem s  
in the early program s than in the late program s. This is as exp ected  sin ce the reliab ility  o f  
com ponents has been increasing as dep icted  in F igure-2 .3 . D esign  and environm ental failures 
are higher in the late program s. A lthou gh  there have been ad vances in d esign  m ethods and 
techniques used to prevent failures from  environm ental cau ses, the con tinu ous dem and for 
new  com p lex , h igh ly  capable and co st e ffec tiv e  m issio n s exceed  th ese  advances. N e w  
m ission s, applying n ew  d esign  m eth od o log ies and tech n o lo g ies  are con stantly  being  
introduced and design  problem s associated  w ith them  are yet to be elim inated . Environm ental 
failures are com m on ly  due to the rapid evolu tion  in com ponent tech n o logy  w hich  leads to the 
use o f  a high percentage o f  new  com p onents in the late program s for w hich  no exp erien ce o f  
operating them  in the space environm ent ex ists . For exam p le, environm ental e ffec ts  on large 
sca le sem iconductor m em ories w hich  w ere first used in the late program s w ere not know n. 
In effic ien cy  in human reliab ility  associated  w ith  pressures o f  tim e lim itations and
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competition, in particular with small low-cost missions which are usually carried out within 
the shortest time possible may also introduce design problem. Also, there is slight increase in 
the number of operational failures in the late programs which can be attributed to fact that 
there was more use of software in these programs than in the early programs. Finally, number 
of reported failures from unknown causes was lower in the late programs probably due to the 
introduction of new, improved instruments for observation and analyses.
Although it is over ten years since this study was conducted, current trends in satellite 
failures are predicted to be identical to those of the late programs. A literature search was 
undertaken on the internet and in prominent small satellite journals to obtain data on the 
failures that have occurred in small (<100kg) [SWE-92] spacecraft since 1983. 
Unfortunately, because of the commercial interests involved, most of the organisations are 
very reluctant to make these data available. However, the statistics obtained suggest that 
design shortcomings, failures arising from unanticipated environmental effects on modem 
COTS components, and operational failures due to the increased use of software, are the 
major areas of concern for LCSS. Similar trends have also been predicted by Larson and 
Wertz [WER-92], and more recently by Fleeter [FLE-97].
As stated earlier, operational failures are increasing, probably because the role of software in 
satellite systems is increasing. More on-board software implies greater system complexity as 
the functionality of spacecraft operating systems increases. Although on-board autonomy 
could decrease human command error, complete automated systems are not yet in common 
use. This is currently an active research area [MON-98].
Although design failures are predominant, it is thought that these failures could be minimised 
if traditional design practices are well implemented during the design process. Traditional 
design practices include techniques of fault prevention and fault tolerance [RAG-91]. Fault 
prevention consists of two aspects: fault avoidance and fault removal. Fault avoidance is 
concerned with the proper selection and application of components. This involves selecting 
components of sufficient strength for a particular mission using the “stress-strength” 
approach. Fault removal is concerned with testing a design to discover and eliminate failures. 
Fault tolerance (or redundancy) gives the design more robustness. That is, being able to 
operate successfully after the failure of some of its parts. A detailed discussion on fault
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prevention and fault tolerance techniques as applied to spacecraft design and manufacturing 
is given in Appendix A.
The primary concern in the remainder of this thesis is to identify suitable methods for 
predicting the rate of failures in satellites arising from unanticipated environmental effects 
such as the effects of space radiation on modem COTS VLSI components. Since the number 
of VLSI components per satellites has been increasing, failures arising from radiation 
induced anomalies are likely to increase. The first microsatellite (UoSAT-1) constructed at 
Surrey had two on-board embedded microprocessors and practically no data memory. FAsat- 
Alfa, the tenth microsatellite, completed in 1995 has eighteen embedded microprocessors 
(CPUs) and over three hundred Megabytes of RAM. This evolution is shown on Figure-2.6 
and Figure-2.7 respectively [WAR-95].
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Since 1995 the University of Surrey Satellite (UoSAT) team has been working on a further 
five microsatellite missions and a MiniSatellite (-400 kg in weight), all of which will be 
launched in the period 1998-1999. The number of on-board embedded processors and 
memory on each of these satellites is comparable to or much higher than on FAsat-Alpha. 
Considering the fact that these microprocessors and memory components are almost entirely 
COTS components, the effects of space radiation on the reliability of these components and 
consequently the reliability of these satellites must be addressed. The increasing use of 
microprocessors reflects an increasing dependency on software [ELL-97]. Therefore, the 
correct execution of the software is of paramount importance to the reliability of these 
satellites. Thus, the platform on which its executes must be error free.
Most advanced COTS VLSI components used in spacecraft are based on the complementary 
metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) technology of which the basic building blocks are field 
effect transistors (FET). The effect of space radiation on FETs is detrimental. Single 
energetic particles from space radiation can lead to transient or state changes in VLSI 
components. This phenomenon is known as single event upset (SEU). Although SEUs are 
transient effects, their effects on the execution of software and subsequently the whole 
spacecraft can be very damaging. SEUs can affect data stored in memory and the 
microprocessor program execution sequence, etc. This can lead to faulty commands being 
sent to some satellite subsystems, resulting in a partial or even complete failure of a mission 
[BAR-96]. Currently, methods for predicting and coping with SEUs in the memory
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components are reasonably well understood [UND-96]. Unfortunately, many controversies 
still surround the methods used to carry out similar tasks in processors. To identify why these 
controversies exist, it is necessary to understand the fundamental mechanisms by which space 
radiation induces SEUs in VLSI components. Thus, the space radiation environment and its 
effects on VLSI components are examined in the next chapter.
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CHAPTERS
THE SPACE RADIATION ENVIRONMENT & ITS 
EFFECTS ON VLSI COMPONENTS
3.1 T h e S p ace R a d ia tio n  E n v iro n m en t
Satellites orbiting the Earth will encounter ionising radiation from three primary sources:
•  The Sun known as Solar Cosmic Rays,
•  Deep space (outside the solar system) known as Galactic Cosmic Rays, and
•  Trapped radiation within the Earth magnetic field lines.
3.1.1 The Sun
The Sun is the nearest star to Earth and lies at the centre of the solar system. It fuses millions 
of tons of hydrogen per second releasing by-products in the form of ionising radiation into 
space [SEL-94], [UND-95], [NOR-94], [HOL-93] . These by-products are released as Solar 
Winds or Solar Flares collectively known as Solar Cosmic Rays.
The Solar Wind
The Solar Wind consists of protons, electrons and a veiy low percentage of alpha particles 
and heavier nuclei travelling from the Sun at a velocity of -400 km/s. The energy level for 
these particles is low (<= 100 keV) but their flux level is high, approaching 10^2 particles 
cm'^s"! just before it interacts with the Earth’s magnetic field lines. Solar wind particles are 
electrically charged, thus, the wind is an electrically conductive plasma. As the wind follows 
the Sun’s magnetic field, it drags the magnetic field lines out into space. This effect, with that 
of the Sun’s rotation draws the magnetic field lines into a spiral structure known as the 
Archimedes Spiral (Figure-3.1).
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Figure-3.1: The Solar-Terrestrial Environment [TRA-92].
Since solar wind particles are not very energetic and their penetration power is low. As a 
result, they are not a significant source of risk to shielded electronics inside a satellite. They 
can however affect the external surfaces of the spacecraft through a phenomenon known as 
surface charging.
Solar Flares
In an eleven year cycle, intense solar activities known as solar flares occur inside the Sun 
leading to a greater stream of charged particles being released into space. Particles from solar 
flares consist of two main groups of radiation components:
•  A  charge-particle component which consists mainly o f  protons and a lower percentage o f  
electrons, alpha particles and heavy ions.
•  An electromagnetic component (x-ray, UV, etc.).
The electromagnetic component travels through space at 3x10^ m s"l while the charged- 
particles travel at an average speed of 1x10^ m s“l. Thus, the electromagnetic component 
usually crosses the Earth’s orbit a couple of days earlier giving a warning of the approach of 
the charged-particle component. Due to the greater stream of charged particles from flares, 
the amount of radiation received by satellites and even aircraft flying at high altitudes in 
increased during flares. However, this amount varies in terms of particle-fluxes, duration, and 
heavy-ion components. Usually, it will increase dramatically to peak levels (~1 O^-IO^ 
particles cm_2 s- *) within a couple of hours but will take a few days to decay to normal
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levels. The proton components of solar flares have energies in the range 10s to 100s of MeV, 
thus poses a significant threat to satellite electronics.
The occurrence of solar flares are associated with the number of Sun-spot groups which occur 
inside the Sun. Figure-3.2 shows the correlation of solar flare activity with Sun-spot number 
(or solar cycle) [GOS-88].
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Figure-3.2: Solar Flare Activity Correlated with Sun-Spot Number [GOS-88].
In addition to the main flare events, minor flares may also occur a few times per day or 
occasionally. Anomalously Large Events (ALEs) may some time occur giving rise to large 
particle fluences (time integrated flux) once or twice in a Sun-spot cycle. Figure-3.3 shows 
the difference between ordinary flare events and ALEs. Examples of such events were 
observed in August 1972 and in September/October 1989.
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Figure-3.3: Event-Integrated Solar Proton Differential Energy Spectra (Fm - a typical event, Fw - a 
worst-case ordinary event (90% confidence limit), Ft - an anomalously large event) [GAR-93].
3.1.2 Galactic Cosmic Rays
Unlike the solar cosmic rays, galactic cosmic rays (GCRs) originate from outside the solar 
system. Typical sources include novae, supemovae and other galaxies. GCRs have an 
isotropic distribution around a spacecraft and consist of highly energetic (>1 MeV to a few 
GeV) charged particles. About 85% of GCRs are made up of protons, approximately 14% are 
alpha-particles and 1% are heavy-ions. Since GCRs have very high energies, they are very 
penetrating and therefore a major hazard to spacecraft electronics. Fortunately, their flux 
levels are very low, ranging from approximately 2 to 4 particles cnr^s"! at solar maximum to 
solar minimum respectively. Solar and Galactic cosmic rays are commonly known as cosmic 
rays.
3.1.3 Geomagnetic Shielding
The Earth has a dense liquid iron core that creates a magnetic field around itself. The 
magnetic field lines run from the south pole to the north pole encompassing the region around
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the Earth known as the magnetosphere (Figure-3.4) [UND-95]. The influence of the Earth’s 
magnetic field is felt within this region.
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Figure-3.4: The Earth’s Magnetosphere [UND-95].
The total amount of cosmic rays received by a satellite depends on its orbit. As cosmic 
particles enter the magnetosphere they are deflected by the Earth’s magnetic field. For these 
particles to reach a particular spacecraft orbit they must have sufficient kinetic energy to 
penetrate the Earth’s magnetic field to that orbit. This kinetic energy is measured by a factor 
known as the magnetic rigidity, P, (measured in volts) of the particle.
Where:
p  -  relativistic momentum expressed in units of eV/c 
c = velocity of light (2.998 x 10^ ms"l) 
e = elementary charge (1.602 x 10" 19 C) 
z  -  charge number
Each point within the magnetosphere has a cut-off rigidity. Particles arriving at a particular 
point with less rigidity than the cut-off rigidity are deflected while those with higher rigidity 
penetrate the field lines. A cross sectional representation of the deflection of cosmic-rays 
approaching the magnetosphere is shown in Figure-3.5. The cut-off rigidity at higher latitudes 
and altitudes is low, approaching zero at the poles and at the edges of the magnetosphere. At 
equatorial or near equatorial low altitude orbits the cut-off rigidity is much higher. As a 
result, satellites in low altitude equatorial orbits are more shielded from cosmic-rays than 
those in high-altitude orbits (e.g. geostationary orbits) or high inclination orbits (e.g.
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Molniya) [WER-92]. With the exception of KitSat-1 and S80/T which are flown in a much 
higher altitude inclined orbit (1328x1316 km, 66° inclination) the UoSAT series of 
microsatellites are flown in typical low altitude, near polar orbits e.g. 780 km, 98° 
inclination. Thus, these satellites are quite shielded from primary cosmic-rays except at the 
Poles.
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Figure-3.5: Deflection o f  Cosmic Rays Approaching from the Zenith [LIT-68].
3.1.4 The Trapped Radiation Belts
Although the Earth’s magnetic field is capable of successfully stopping some energetic 
particles from reaching an Earth orbiting satellite, its interaction with the solar wind results in 
a concentration of charged particles trapped in the Earth’s magnetic field lines. The motion of 
these trapped particles is described by three components; a cyclotronic motion, a magnetic 
mirror effect and a longitude drift [UND-95]. The combination of these motions results in 
two torroidal-shaped belts of radiation around the Earth called the Van Allen belts as shown 
in Figure-3.6.
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Figure-3.6: The Interaction Between Solar Wind and the Earth’s Magnetic Field demonstrating the 
formation o f  the Van Allen Belts and the SAA [SEL-94].
The Van Allen belts consists of an inner (or hard) belt and an outer (or soft) belt separated by 
a region of relatively fewer particles known as the slot region. The inner belt stretches from 
roughly 300 km to 6400 km altitude at the same latitude and consists of high energy protons 
(a few hundred MeV) and electrons (with energies ranging from 10s of KeV to a few MeV). 
The outer belt extends from roughly 16000 km to 59000 km. It consists mainly of high 
energy electrons (typically of a few MeV to a maximum of about 7 MeV) with a few protons. 
The high energy particles of the inner belts pose great threat to satellite electronics.
Without the solar-wind the geo-magnetic field of the Earth is virtually dipolar. That is, the 
geo-magnetic axis is slightly tilted by approximately 11° and slightly offset by approximately 
342 km from the Earth’s geographical axis, as shown in Figure-3.6. This offset brings a large 
population of charged particles from the inner radiation belt to low altitudes in an area 
centred approximately 45° West longitude and 20° South latitude, East of South America. 
This is the region known as the South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA). At high magnetic latitudes 
(60°-70°), a population of particles in the outer belt also drift to low altitudes in the polar- 
horns also known as the auroral-oval region. Satellites in LEO are exposed to a significant 
amount of cosmic particles as they pass over the SAA and through the polar horns.
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3.1.5 Secondary Sources Of Radiation
Besides the three primary sources of radiation, there are two secondary sources [UND-95]. 
These include:
•  radioactivity induced in spacecraft materials by particles from primary sources. This produces 
electromagnetic radiation (x-rays, gamma-rays) and particulate radiation (beta-particles, alpha- 
particles, protons, etc.).
•  Bremsstrahlung or “braking radiation” being generated when an energetic charged particle is 
deflected by local electromagnetic field surrounding an atom in dense material.
However, the percentage of particles from these secondary sources is insignificant for typical 
spacecraft shielding thickness compared to fluxes from primary sources.
3.1.6 Summary of the space radiation environment
In summary, the types of radiation encountered by a satellite in Earth orbit comprises: 
particle radiation (e.g. electrons (e-), protons (p+), a-particles, and other heavy ions) and 
electromagnetic radiation (e.g. x-rays, y-rays, and UV-light). This research is concerned only 
with particles that possess sufficient energy to penetrate the spacecraft shielding (for 
example, an average of 2 mm thick of aluminium on UoSAT) and induce SEUs in electronic 
devices. Below is a brief discussion of some of the major particles and their likely effect on 
spacecraft material and electronics.
Electrons:
Electrons are the most likely charged particles that a satellite in Earth orbit will encounter. 
Although cosmic rays generate fewer electrons than protons, electrons are easily trapped in 
the geomagnetic field because of their low magnetic rigidity. With energies above a few 
MeV, electrons in the outer Van Allen belts are damaging. They can cause charge trapping in 
dielectric and can induce photocurrents which can eventually give rise to SEUs. The flux 
level of electrons varies with the daily activities of the Sun.
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Protons:
Protons are potentially more damaging than electrons. The population of protons encountered 
in space is also fairly high, with the highest concentration in the inner Van Allen Belts. They 
are very energetic (typically, energies range from a few to hundreds of MeV) and are 
therefore more penetrating than electrons. Their fluxes also vary with the solar activity. 
Protons are the major cause of long term degradation in semiconductor devices. They are also 
capable of causing transient malfunctions and failure during solar flares. Although they are 
not capable of inducing upset directly, their reaction with the nuclei of semiconductor 
materials can generate secondary particles of sufficient energy to cause SEUs.
Electromagnetic Radiation (X rays, Gamma rays and Alpha Particles):
Since X-rays and y-rays {photons) are only a small proportion of the overall radiation level. 
Their effect on the spacecraft is insignificant.
Neutrons;
Free neutrons generated from nuclear reactions in the upper atmosphere are unstable and 
have relatively short lifetimes (half-life of -1000 seconds) decaying into electrons and 
protons. Consequently, only few neutrons are present at any one time. They do however have 
high energies and velocities and can cause displacements in atoms and generate SEU through 
reactions with silicon.
Heavy Nuclei:
Heavy nuclei comprise only a small proportion of the radiation encountered in space. 
However, they are very energetic and they are very hazardous with regard to the generation 
of SEUs.
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3.2 T h e  E ffe c t s  o f  Io n isin g  R a d ia t io n  o n  VLSI C o m po n e n t s
Beside the various advantages of VLSI Complementary Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor (CMOS) 
devices listed in the previous chapter, VLSI CMOS technology consumes relatively lower 
power compared to other IC technologies (Bipolar Junction Transistors (BJT)) and CMOS 
inverters can be made immune to noise [HOL-93]. Unfortunately, the effects of space radiation 
on the basic building blocks from which CMOS ICs are constructed (the Field Effect Transistor 
(FET)) is detrimental. Generally, the effects of space radiation on VLSI devices can be 
classified in two categories [SCH-94, UND-96]:
•  Total D ose Effect (TDE), and
• Single Event Phenomena (SEP).
TDEs are caused by the progressive accumulation of charge in the oxide layers of FETs. This 
causes a gradual degradation of the electrical properties of the devices which may lead to 
failure. SEP are induced by the impact of single energetic particles at a sensitive node such as a 
depletion region of the FET. The following three sections describe the structure of FETs and 
how they are used to realise a typical CMOS IC, and the processes by which radiation causes 
TDE and SEP.
3.2.1 Field Effect Transistor
A FET is a three terminal (source, drain and gate) semiconductor device [MIL-87]. Although 
there are other types of FETs, the metal oxide semiconductor FET (MOSFET) is widely used 
in modem ICs. An n-channel MOSFET consists of two heavily doped n-type regions embedded 
in a lightly doped p-type silicon substrate. The n-type regions represents the source (S) and the 
drain (D). A silicon dioxide (Si02) insulator layer separates a metal gate from the conducting 
channel that is formed between the source and the drain. Figure-3.7 represents a simplified 
structure of an n-channel MOSFET and its symbols.
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Figure-3.7: An n-channel MOSFET and its corresponding symbols [MIL-87].
The MOSFET operates as a switch or an amplifier. Its operation as a switch is controlled by 
an electric field established by applying a voltage between the gate and body of the 
semiconductor and transmitted through the oxide layer. The transfer characteristics curve for 
an n-channel MOSFET is shown in Figure-3.8. If the gate voltage (VgS) is below the 
threshold voltage (Vth)1 the drain current (Id) is below a specified minimum and the switch is 
said to be “off’. When Vg becomes higher than Vfh, the drain current increases and the 
switch is said to be “on” [WAR-93].
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Figure-3.8: Typical Characteristic Curves o f  an n-channel MOSFET [MIL-87].
1 The least gate-to-source voltage for which drain current starts to flow.
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A p-channel FET has complementary doping patterns of the n-channel FET. A fabrication of 
NMOS and PMOS on the same chip gives a CMOS device. The simplest of such a device is 
the CMOS inverter whose structure is shown in Figure-3.9. CMOS inverters employ the 
switching properties of NMOS and PMOS to act as building blocks for very large scale 
integrated circuits (VLSI).
VDD
Figure-3.9: CMOS inverter
3.2.2 Total Dose Effects (TDE)
The continuous exposure of a CMOS device to ionising radiation leads to a progressive build­
up of charge in the Si02 layer of the FET. The total amount of energy that has been deposited 
per gram of material by radiation at some time / is referred to as the radiation dose [WAR- 
93]. Radiation dose is measured in rads or grays, but mostly in rad(Si) as most semiconductor 
devices are fabricated from silicon.
1 rad(Si) = 100 erg per gram of silicon and 1 Gray = 1 Joule kg'l = 100 rad.
For charged particles, dose in rads (D) is given by:
, 1 dE
z) = 1.6 x i o o — r-  
p  dx
where <D is the fluence in cm_2 and l/p(dE/dx) is the mass stopping power of the target 
material given in MeV-cm^/mg.
Ionising radiation traversing the SiC>2 insulating layer leads to the generation of electron-hole 
pairs. Some of the electrons and holes recombine immediately, while other electrons are 
mobile and are swept to the gate electrode if the electric field was positively biased. The 
holes are less mobile and are trapped as they migrate towards the interface between the oxide 
and the silicon. The trapped holes at the silicon-oxide interface repel the holes in the p- 
substrate and cause the substrate (of an n-channel transistor) to behave like n-type
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semiconductor. This results in the flow of drain current (Id) (leakage current) at a lower 
threshold voltage. In effect, a negative shift in the threshold voltage is observed as shown in 
Figure-3.10 [HOL-93]. At a higher dose, V^h can become less than zero and it becomes 
impossible to turn the transistor “off” (or “on” for p-channel) even when Vg is zero. When 
this happens, the device begins to draw excessive current and if the amount of current drawn 
becomes intolerable the device is said to have failed.
Increasing Radiation Dose250
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Drain
current
ID> HA
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Gate-to-source voltage VGS, V
Negative shift in threshold voltage 
Figure-3.10: Negative Shift in threshold voltage induced by radiation dose in an n-channel MOSFET.
The total dose accumulated by a device within a specified time depends on the spacecraft 
orbit and the shielding materials around the device. Figure-3.11 shows radiation dose rate as a 
function of low-altitude polar orbits for different amounts of aluminium shielding.
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Figure-3.11: Radiation Dose as a Function o f  Altitude for Low-Altitude Polar Orbits [W ER-92].
Whether a device will survive in a particular orbit for a particular mission period depends 
upon its dose tolerance (radiation “hardness”). This depends on several factors, for example: 
the technology, the thickness of the insulator oxide layer, the oxide growth mechanism 
employed during fabrication, circuit design, etc. Ground tests have shown that radiation dose 
tolerance may vary considerably for different COTS technologies from a few krad(Si) to 100 
krad(Si) from device to device [UND-96]. Because of this dramatic variation engineers are 
advised to ground test devices for total dose hardness, preferably from the same batch and 
production line from which devices are to be used. Luckily, the cost of total dose ground tests 
are relatively low. Testing of several COTS devices using the University of Surrey Cobalt-60 
source suggest 10 krad(Si) as the dose tolerance for typical COTS devices. Thus, an average 
of 3 g cm“2 aluminium shielding around COTS devices is usually sufficient to protect devices 
in a typical LEO environment for 8-10 years. The UoSAT series of LEO microsatellites (from 
UoSAT-1 launch in 1981 to CERISE launch in 1995) which are constructed almost entirely 
of COTS devices, are known to have suffered very few failures from TDEs. One example 
was the analogue-to-digital converter on UoSAT-2 which failed after eight years of 
operation.
In Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) and other high altitude orbits, the use of commercial 
devices will require extra shielding to achieve a reasonable lifetime. For example, COTS 
devices are predicted to have an average lifetime of 2-3 years in GEO and 2-3 months in
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geostationary transfer orbit (GTO) [UND-96]. An alternative to excessive shielding is to use 
radiation hard parts. However, radiation hard devices tend to be very expensive as a result of 
the specific design and processing techniques that must be applied to realise them. They are 
also less capable (for example in terms of computational power) compared to COTS 
technologies because the are usually two to three generations behind. Thus, the choice 
between shielding and paying for radiation hard devices must therefore be carefully thought 
through.
3.2.3 Single Event Phenomena (SEP) or Single event Effect (SEE)
SEEs account for the highest number of radiation induced anomalies in space systems. SEEs 
include Single-Event Upset (SEU) also known as “soft errors”, Single-Event Latch-up (SEL), 
Single-Event Burnout (SEB) and Single-Event Gate Rupture (SEGR) [SEX-92].
Generally, SEEs are induced by highly energetic single particles such as heavy ions and 
protons [HOL-93, PIC-83]. When a heavy ion travels through an IC, it loses energy by 
excitation and ionisation of the atoms along its path. This leads to the generation of electron- 
hole pairs as shown in Figure-3.12. If this occurs in a region with an electric field across it (a 
sensitive region) such as a pn junction, the electrons and holes are separated by the potential 
difference across the semi-conductor. As a result of this migration of charges a current spike 
is produced at the circuit junction. The current spike has two components. A prompt 
component which is associated with charge collection at the depletion region of the pn 
junction and the funnel region and a “Delayed component” associated with electrons and 
holes generated outside the sensitive region. The processes of charge generation and charge 
collection induces different SEEs in ICs.
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Figure-3.12: Ion track and current pulse induced by passage of a heavy ion 
through a depletion region of an IC [PIC-83].
3.2.3.1 Single Event Latch-up (SEL)
Parasitic vertical and lateral bipolar p-n-p and n-p-n transistors are present in bulk CMOS 
structures. These transistors together can form a p-n-p-n thyristor or silicon controlled 
rectifiers (SCR’s) which are susceptible to latch-up [WAR-92, JOH-96, DRE-81, GRE-73]. 
The cross section of such a structure for a p-well device is shown in Figure-3.13.
P-WELL
n+ SUBSTRATE
Figure-3.13: The cross section of a CMOS inverter showing parasitic 
p-n-p-n SCR connections [GRE-73].
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Under normal operating conditions the base and emitter of each transistor are held at the 
same potential and no base current flows. However, the passage of a single energetic ion 
through a sensitive node could cause excess current to flow in the base region of one of the 
transistors. This results in a flow of collector current which then causes the other transistor to 
become forward biased and a regenerative condition is developed within the entire circuit 
characterised by high current and low resistance. The circuit then draws excessive current 
from the power supply. This condition is known as latch-up. When latch-up occurs, the 
circuit will no longer operate until the power is turned “OFF” for some time and then “ON” 
again. If the power dissipated is too high, there will be thermal damage.
Fortunately, latch-up events are very rare and when they occur they can be detected. Using a 
latch-up test circuit, sudden increase in power supply current can be detected and the circuit 
switched off before permanent damage is induced. Also, radiation hardening techniques and 
operating procedures to alleviate the problem have also been proposed [JOH-96]. Past and 
current microsatellites designed at the University of Surrey have latch-up protection switch 
capabilities within the power sub-system. However, as the feature size for state-of-the-art 
devices continue to shrink [AKE-95] devices are likely to be more susceptible to latch-ups. It 
may therefore be necessary to re-examine the capability of the current circuitry.
3.2.3.2 Single Event Burnout (SEB)
SEB results from avalanche breakdown in bipolar power-transistors and power-MOSFETs 
[SEX-92]. The cross section of a typical power MOSFET is shown in Figure-3.14.
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Figure-3.14: Cross section of a typical power MOSFET structure [Hoh-87].
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In norm al operation, current f lo w s  from the source to the drain. A  parasitic n p n  transistor  
ex ists  b etw een  the drain, b ody and the source. The p assage o f  a h eavy  ion through the 
transistor m ay induce e x c e s s  current in the base region  w h ich  f lo w s  tow ards the b od y  contact, 
raising the potential o f  the base-em itter jun ction . I f  the potential rises up to the turn-on  
vo lta g e  for th is ju n ction  it b eco m es forward b iased  and the n p n  transistor is tu m ed -on . 
A valan ch in g  at the ep i-substrate ju n ction  can then cau se the transistor to enter a secon d  
breakdow n con d ition  w h ich  can lead to loca l over-heatin g  in a portion o f  the d ev ic e  (burnout) 
and con seq u en tly  co m p lete  destruction o f  the d ev ice . The threshold  vo lta g e  required for 
burnout to occur is the m easured  failure-threshold  vo lta g e  (V pth)- T h is v o lta g e  is u su a lly  
b elo w  the breakdow n v o lta g e  for the d ev ice  and has been  found to range from  22%  to 90%  o f  
the breakdow n v o lta g e  for n -channel d ev ices. P -channel d ev ic es  on the other hand are k now n  
to be im m une to SE B . Fortunately SEB are a lso  very  rare and som e techn iqu es for redu cing  
the su scep tib ility  o f  d ev ic es  have been proposed [JO H -96].
3.2.3.3 Single Event Gate Rupture (SEGR)
U nder high  potential con d ition s, such  as during the w rite or clear operations in a n o n -v o la tile  
S R A M  (static R A M ) or E^PR O M , (E lectrical Erasable P R O M ) the p assage o f  a h ea v y  ion  
through the d ielectric  capacitor (insulator layer) cau ses the capacitor to  d ischarge. That is, the 
insulator layer is broken. I f  su ffic ien t en ergy  is stored in the capacitor, e x c e s s iv e  heat can  be 
generated during d isch arge w h ich  can cau se m eltin g  o f  the d ie lectric  and evaporate the 
over ly in g  con d u ctive  layers [JO H -96, W R O -87]. T his m echan ism  is term ed SEG R . F igure- 
3. 15 sh o w s a picture o f  an N M O S  capacitor that has su ffered  a SEG R .
Figure-3.15: A M NOS capacitor showing the physical dam age associated with SEGR [W RO-87].
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A permanent gate rupture can occur if:
• the incident ion generates a high conductivity path through the device,
• the struck device releases sufficient energy along the ion’s path to destroy the device.
SEL, SEB and SEGR can lead to permanent structural damage in semiconductor devices. For 
this reason they are sometimes referred to as “hard errors”. However, these effects will occur 
at a much lower rate compared to the rate of occurrence of SEUs. Statistics on the number of 
hard errors and soft errors that have been observed on various devices flown on eight 
different experiments flown on five UoSATs missions are summarised in a thesis completed 
at Surrey in 1996 [UND-96, Chapter 7].
3.2.3.4 Single Event Upset (SEU) or Bit Flip or Soft Error
A SEU is a temporary change of state of a bistable element caused by ionisation induced by a 
single energetic particle. Commonly, this is due to heavy ions (cosmic rays) or indirectly by 
nuclear reaction products of energetic protons [SPA-96]. SEUs can be corrected by 
“rewriting” the corrupted data and hence are termed “soft errors”. However, if the frequency 
of occurrence of SEUs is too high the overhead involved in correcting corrupted data may 
become intolerable. The sequence of events leading to SEUs following an ion strike in 
dynamic and static semiconductor circuits are slightly different.
3.2.3.4.1 SEUs In Dynamic Circuits
A dynamic circuit, such as a DRAM is a form of semiconductor in which the bit is stored as 
charge on a semiconductor capacitor. The charge gradually leaks away but is restored 
periodically by a “refreshing” circuit. An example of a NMOS 3-transistor DRAM cell is 
shown in Figure-3.16 [PIC-78]. The storage node is capacitor C$N- When a binary *1* is 
stored on the capacitor the gate Qs is positively biased (turned on) and vice versa. To read 
the cell transistor Qr  is turned on, the bitline is pulled down and the complement state of the 
cell is read. The charge on Cgjq leaks away due to the reverse-biased source junction of the 
transistor Q\y. Hence, writing and refreshing of the cell is done via this transistor.
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Figure-3.16: A Schematic Circuit of a 3-Transistor DRAM Memory Cell [PIC-87]
Provided CgN is positively charged, an upset is said to occur when sufficient electrons are 
collected at CgN following an ion strike on the sensitive node Qw, resulting in excess 
negative charges at the storage node. If the node was negatively biased no upset will occur.
3.2.3.4.2 SEUs in Static circuits
A static circuit, for example SRAM (static RAM), is that form of memory that will store 
information without the need to rewrite the data at intervals. That is “refreshing” is not 
required. However, the bit density for SRAMs is lower. A typical six-transistor SRAM cell is 
shown in Figure-3.17. This is a bi-stable memory cell formed from two inverters. The output 
of one inverter is coupled into the input of the other inverter. To decrease the sensitivity of 
the device to upsets, feedback resistors (Rp) are connected within the circuit in a cross­
coupling link. The least-sensitive regions are the regions of lower potential. That is, the 
sources of the n- and p-channel transistors. Any current generated by an ion strike in these 
regions is removed immediately through ground or V]}D respectively. The drains of 
transistors PI and N2 are the most sensitive. The potential difference across them is high. If 
an ion strikes the drain of PI a current spike will be produced on the storage node Q. To 
counteract the effect of charge collection by PI the unstruck node (Nl) of the n-channel 
transistor removes the excess charge. For this reason, Nl is known as the restoring transistor.
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Figure-3.17: Schematic Circuit of a 6-transistor CMOS SRAM memory cell [WEA-87].
An upset will occur if the process of excess charge collection at the drain of PI is faster than 
the process of excess charge removal by N l. This is observed as a voltage rise across PI 
where the inverter formed by transistors N2 and P2 becomes an opposing inverter. To prevent 
this from occurring, PI must be able to recover one-half of the voltage swing within a time 
interval which is less than the time required to switch-off the opposing action of the opposing 
inverter. The time taken by PI to recover one-half of the voltage swing is known as the 
recoveiy time, tr, and the time required to switch-off this opposing action is known as the 
decoupling time, tj)C* Normally, an upset will occur if tr is greater than t j x \  The simulated 
voltages at a struck node for a p- and n-channel transistors are shown in Figure-3.18.
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Figure-3.18: Simulated node voltage of a CMOS SRAM following a strike to the p-channel drain (“p-
hit”) or the n-channel drain (“n-hit”) [SEX-92].
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The process leading to upsets in a SRAM n-channel transistor is slightly different. An upset 
occurs when the charge collected by the drain spreads out enough to lower the potential 
barrier at the source. This turns on the transistor and a delayed current pulse is produced at 
the storage node. Feedback resistors increase the decoupling time of the memory cell 
allowing more time for the removal of excess charge from the struck node.
3.2.4 Expected Trend of SEUs in COTS Devices1
In the past twenty-five years, the number of active transistors per IC have increased by 
several orders of magnitude while the minimum feature sizes have been decreasing. With this 
trend in device miniaturisation, the amount of charge required to store information at a device 
node is decreasing. Hence, the minimum charge (critical charge) required to change the state 
of a bit is decreasing and the SEU susceptibility is increasing. This technology evolution 
described in a study conducted in 1995 is shown in Figure-3.19, where the y-axis represents 
the energy required to operate the device and the x-axis is the critical charge for SEU 
measured in terms of the particle energy threshold11.
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Figure-3.19: Miniaturisation Trend in IC Technology [AKE-95].
1 [RIT-96], [AKE-95]
" The energy threshold is that amount of energy required to change the state of the most sensitive node 
of a device.
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If this miniaturisation trend in IC technology continues, then the SEU susceptibility in COTS 
devices is expected to continue increasing. Typical COTS devices today have critical charges 
of 1.0 x 10*15 coulombs but it is predicted that devices with critical charges as low as
1.0 x 10*16 may become available in the near future . Since charged particles (protons and 
heavy ions) that can induce SEUs are so energetic and can not be stopped by practical levels 
of satellite shielding, satellite systems designers must look for alternative methods of dealing 
with SEUs. For low cost missions where radiation hard devices are usually not a practical 
choice, cost-effective methods for accurately predicting the rate of SEU in electronic systems 
must be identified and implemented. This will reduce the overhead cost incurred by systems 
trying to recover from SEU induced malfunctions.
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CHAPTER 4
PREDICTING THE UNDERLYING SEU RATE IN 
MEMORIES AND MICROPROCESSORS
The occurrence of SEUs was first predicted in 1962 but very little was done until 1975 when 
unexpected changes were observed in digital circuits on-board satellite systems. Binder and 
Smith [BIN-75] the observers of these changes postulated that they were upsets caused by 
cosmic rays charging the junction capacitance of transistors within integrated circuits. 
Between 1975 and 1979, other scientists including May and Woods [MAY-79] were able to 
confirm that cosmic rays and alpha particles from radioactive sources could cause SEUs in 
MOS dynamic and static RAMs. Later on, it was also found that SEUs could be induced by 
neutrons and protons [GUE-79, GUE-81, OSL-93, NOR-91].
This chapter looks at the subject of SEU prediction in details. Historically the occurrence of 
upsets has been explained based on the concept of critical charge (Qc)- Section 4.1 explains 
this concept. To predict the SEU rate of a device, a model describing the radiation 
environment to which the device is exposed must be developed. Section 4.2 presents current 
methods used to construct this type of model and outlines the problems that are associated 
with them. In addition, a model describing the extent of vulnerability of a device to radiation 
(an ion-device interaction model) is also required. Current methods for constructing ion- 
device interaction models are presented in Section 4.3. Techniques employed for testing 
VLSI devices (memories and processors) and methods of predicting the underlying SEU rate 
from the test results are discussed in Section 4.4.
4.1 T h e  C o n c e pt  o f  Cr it ic a l  C h a r g e
It is considered that, within a semiconductor device, there are sensitive nodes characterised 
by high potential differences. An example of such a node is the reversed biased junction of a 
MOSFET. Each sensitive node can be thought of as a sensitive volume having an associated 
critical charge, defined as the minimum charge that differentiates between logic “ 1” and logic 
“0” at that node. This charge can range from 0.1 to 0.5 pC for DRAM circuits, which is
57
Chapter 4 : Predicting the Underlying SEU Rate in Memories and Microprocessors
equivalent to 5x10^ to 3x10^ electrons. Thus, if this number of electrons are collected at a 
sensitive node, following an ion strike, the logic state at that node will change [PET-92].
The critical charge (Qq) can be converted into the minimum energy (Emijj) that must be 
deposited at a sensitive node to cause an upset by the equation [SEX-92]:
£ min = ^ X (2c = 2 2 i 2 c ,
where q is the electronic charge, Qc is in pC, Em\n is in MeV and 3.6 eV is the energy 
required to generate an electron-hole pair in silicon (assuming that silicon is the 
semiconductor material of the device).
The rate at which energy is deposited in a device by an ion depends on the linear energy 
transfer (LET) of the ion. The LET or mass stopping power of an ion is commonly defined as 
the rate of energy loss by the ion as it traverses a device. It is measured in units of energy per 
unit path length per unit density of the device’s material. By multiplying the LET (L) of an 
ion with its pathlength through a junction (p), and the density of the device’s material (p), an 
estimate of the total amount of energy deposited (E) by an ion is obtained [SEX-92]. That is,
E  = pLp.
If E -  Em\m the LET of the ion is referred to as the LET threshold (LETpjres). It generally 
assumed that any ion with LET greater than the LET(hres of a particular device is capable of 
causing a SEU in the device. Thus, to predict the SEU rate for a device operating in a defined 
satellite orbit, it is necessary to:
• Determine the flux of ions with LET greater than the LET,^ to which the device is exposed. This 
is usually determined from models describing the radiation environment experienced by the 
device.
• Define a model that describes the interaction of the device with ionising radiation. Such a model 
is used to determine parameters which indicate the extent of vulnerability of the device to SEUs.
4.2 M o d e l s  o f  t h e  Spa c e  R a d ia t io n  E n v ir o n m e n t
As discussed in Chapter 3, the precise amount of radiation experienced by a device in a 
spacecraft is a function of the spacecraft’s orbit, the solar activities, and the shielding 
materials surrounding the device. Models describing the space radiation environment, known 
as environmental models take all these factors into consideration and compute the ion flux
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(ions cnr^s-l) to which a device is exposed. Typically, the outputs from environmental 
models are presented as curves or tables in the form of ion flux (ions cn r^s 'l) versus the 
LET or energy, commonly referred to as LET or energy spectra respectively. Examples of 
typical LET spectra are shown in Figure-4.1.
L0S10
  Galactic Cosmic Rays
Galactic Cosmic Rays + Mean Solar Flare
LOG 10LET (MeV cm8 g~*)
Figure-4.1: Galactic cosmic ray integral LET spectra for 850 km sun synchronous 
orbit with 0.25 inches of Al shielding [UND-95]
Because of the many factors that must be taken into consideration when developing 
environmental models, they are usually complex, difficult and time consuming to develop. To 
lessen this problem, a number of computerised models have been developed. The history of 
such models date back to 1977 when Henrich developed the first set for biomedical 
applications [HEI-77]. In 1980, Pickel and Blandford developed CRIER (cosmic ray induced 
error rate) and in 1981, Adams and his colleagues developed the CREME (Cosmic Ray 
Effects on Microelectronics) model at the Naval Research Laboratory [ADA-86]. Recently, 
CRRES/SPACERAD Heavy Ion Model of the Environment (CHIME) was developed by 
Louisiana State University working together with the University of Chicago [AKE-95].
CREME consists of four functions: SPEC and LET which are used for constructing LET 
spectra and BENDEL and UPSET which are used for calculating the upset rate in devices due
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to heavy ions and protons respectively. SPEC and LET have been the most widely used space 
radiation environmental models. The reason being that they can be used to construct LET and 
energy spectra of cosmic-rays for all the “interplanetary weather” conditions that were known 
to exist in the early eighties [HOL-93]. However, these models are presently known to be are 
out-of-date. They were last updated in 1986 and advances in the knowledge of the space 
radiation environment since then have not been incorporated into the models. An example of 
this is the discovery of a 22 year periodicity in galactic cosmic ray modulation. Accumulation 
of data over the years have provided evidence which confirms this periodic pattern, 
suggesting that the use of a sine function in CREME to model the galactic cosmic ray 
intensity is incorrect [PET-92]. Shortcomings are also reported with the model of the 
intensity of energetic particles produced during solar flares. The CREME anomalous cosmic 
ray spectrum model is known to overestimate the effect of these anomalous events. Despite 
these deficiencies, the CREME environmental models are known to remain the industry 
standard tools for constructing LET/energy spectra for different earth orbit environments.
4.3 I o n -D e v ic e  In t e r a c t io n  M o d e l
Parameters that describe the extent of vulnerability of a device to SEU are determined using 
ion-device interaction models. This type of model can be constructed using two methods:
• by theoretical modelling of the physics involved,
• by exposing the device to energetic particles and observing their behaviour.
4.3.1 T h eoretica l m odelling
Theoretical modelling involves modelling the processes of charge generation and charge 
collection following at ion strike at a sensitive node [UND-96]. An energetic particle 
generates free charges by ionisation along its track through a device. Charge collection can 
occur through ion drift in the funnel regions, field-assisted collection in the funnel regions, or 
through diffusion and ion-shunt collection processes. Modelling charge collection processes 
is complex, but computer codes have been developed for this purpose. From knowledge o f 
the charge-collection mechanism, the current pulse generated by the free charge at a 
particular sensitive node can be calculated. The results obtained are then assembled in a 
lumped-parameter circuit model using a circuit simulator such as SPICE [SPI-75] to predict 
the circuit’s response. Although results from theoretical models can be used to predict the
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SEU rate with better accuracy than results from ground based radiation test experiments, 
theoretical models are known to be computer intensive.
4.3.2 Ground based Radiation testing
This involves exposing de-lidded pre-programmed devices to an energetic beam of particles. 
Energetic particle sources range from heavy ions, protons, alpha-emitting radioactive 
isotopes such as 241^m to naturally fission isotopes such as 252cf ancj even ]aser beams 
[SEX-92]. However, heavy ion and proton sources are mostly used because they can be used 
to fully characterise a device with respect to SEUs susceptibility.
4.3.2.1 Heavy ion and Proton tests
Typically, ground-based SEU radiation test apparatus for heavy ion and proton tests consists 
of three main sections: an ion source and an accelerator, a beam regulatory section, and a test 
chamber as shown in Figure-4.2.
V.
Figure-4.2: Typical set-up for ground based ion beam tests [HOL-93].
The accelerator is used to boost the energy of the particles. The most common accelerators 
used are the Van der Graff accelerator and the Cyclotron. The basic principle of operation of 
both, is similar. A stream of ions is injected into each accelerator and subjected to a high 
potential difference during which energy and velocity is gained. The beam diagnostic section 
measures statistical information of the beam before it strikes the device. Scintillators and
Beam Diagnostics 
(scintillators, surface
barrier detectors, etc.) Test Chamber
Accelerator Kf
Gate Valves
NDevice Board 
'Beam Shutter
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surface barrier detectors are used to measure the uniformity of the beam flux and the beam 
energy and LET respectively. The energy of ions is determined by the mass of the ion, the 
charge state of the ion, and the magnitude of the potential difference across the accelerator.
The test chamber is used to position the test device in line with the beam. It also allows 
rotation of the test device in order to change the angle at which the beam strikes the device 
and consequently the pathlength of the ions through the device. The longer the pathlength, the 
higher the charge deposited in the device. This effect is illustrated in Figure-4.3.
■Overlayer
•Sensitive volume
Figure-4.3: The effect of varying angle of incidence on pathlength [SEX-92]
If the incident angle of the ion beam is 6, then the pathlength of the beam through the 
sensitive volume is Pef f  = P/cos 0 The LET of the ion is its LET normal to the device’s 
surface, known as the effective LET (LETejffi and defined as:
LET,
LET,, =  r  
#  cos 9
Similarly, the effective ion flux (Fejf i  reaching the device is modified to Fxcosd and the 
normal flux area (a) is decreased to cr\ Thus at higher incident angles, it takes more time to 
accumulate sufficient fluence since the flux is decreased.
In Europe, heavy ion and proton accelerator test facilities are available at the Catholic 
University of Louvain-Ia-Neuve (UCL) in Belgium and at the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI) in 
Villigen, Switzerland respectively. SSTL has had the opportunity to use the heavy ion 
facilities at UCL and Table-4.1 gives some of the ion species available at this facility and 
their characteristics [UCL-97]. North America (United States and Canada) has similar 
facilities, for example, the Berkeley 88-inch Cyclotron accelerator, the Brookhaven Twin
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Tandem van de Graaf Accelerator, McMaster University Tandem van de Graaf Acceleraton, 
Hamilton, Ontario, Canada.
Ion Energy (MeV) Range (pm Si) LET (MeV cm2/mg)
40Arfc+ 150 42 14.1
2°Ne4+ 78 45 5.9
15jq3+ 62 64 3.0
10fi2+ 41 80 1.7
Table-4.1: Ion Species Available at Heavy Ion Test Facility at UCL in Belgium [UCL-97]
Although ion accelerators are effective at fully characterising a device to SEU, they are very 
expensive to maintain and operate. As a result, there has been ongoing research to develop 
cheaper laboratory techniques for SEU testing.
4.3.2.2 Laboratory Techniques
Radioactive Isotopes: - Californium-252 Source
Radioactive isotopes such as 241 Am and 252£f (Californium-252) can be used to generate 
controllable sources of high-energy particles for SEU tests. In particular, 252cf is mostly 
used since it is capable of undergoing spontaneous fission producing high-LET fragments as 
by-products. Discs of Cf-252 with activity rate of up to 50 microcurie (pCi)1 are available. 
The nuclear properties of Cf-252 are given in Table-4.2. The fission fragments produced fall 
in two groups, light and heavy fragments with average energies of 79 and 103 MeV 
respectively, as shown in Figure-4.4. The mass and energy of the fragments results in particle 
LETs in the range 42-45 MeV-cm^/mg at the surface of a test device.
' One microcurie for Cf-252 will produce 3.5xl04 alpha particles/s, 2.2x103 fission fragments/s, and 
~4xl 03 fast fission neutrons/s.
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Half Life: 2.64 years (alpha decay)
85 years (spontaneous fission)
Decay Probabilities: 96.91% (alpha)
3.09 % (spontaneous fission)
Alpha Energies 5.98 MeV (0.2%) 
6.08 MeV (15.2%) 
6.12 MeV (18.6%)
Fission Fragments Average Energies: 78.7 MeV (heavy fragment) 
102.4 MeV (light fragment)
Fission Fragment LET in Si: 42-45 MeV-cm^/mg
Fission Fragment range in Si: 6-15.5 pm.
Table-4.2: Nuclear Properties of2 2Cf [STE-83]
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Figure-4.4: The mass and energy distribution from the spontaneous fissioning of 2S2Cf. The distribution 
shows two peaks: one for light fragment with average mass number of 106 and energy of 104 MeV, 
and one for a heavy fragment with average mass number of 142 and energy of 79 MeV [STE-83].
To test a device, the Cf-252 is mounted in a vacuum chamber and the device is placed close 
to it. A typical set-up is shown in Figure-4.5. This set-up was used to test the SEU and SEL 
vulnerability of the ARM60B microprocessor and the Philips 87C592 microcontroller at the 
European Space Agency (ESA) in March 1997. These devices are critical to the successful 
operation of a Global Positioning System (GPS) payload which has been designed and built 
at SSTL under contract to ESA.
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Figure-4.5: Californium-252 Single-Event Effects Test Set-up.
Unfortunately, Cf-252 has some shortcomings in SEU testing. Compared to heavy ion and 
proton beams from an accelerator, the fission fragments from a Cf-252 source possess very 
low energies. Hence, they have shorter ranges and limited penetration power. The longest 
range of a Cf-252 fission fragment is approximately 15 Jim compared to 80 jim for heavy 
ions. Also, the LET of fission fragments changes rapidly with depth in the sensitive volume. 
These problems results in large errors in LET versus SEU rate measurements. It is for this 
reason that a Cf-252 source cannot be used to fully characterise a device with respect to 
SEUs. Typically, it only gives us one point on the LET curve and a good indication of latch­
up susceptibility.
Laser Induced Upset
The second laboratory technique for inducing upsets is through the use of lasers. The 
Nd:YAG dye laser is an example and has been used on several occasions [BUC-87, RIC-87, 
BUC-88]. Wavelength and intensity are the characteristics that determine the suitability of a 
particular laser beam. Ideally, the wavelength should be within the infrared range to allow for 
uniform absorption of the beam in the sensitive region and for the intensity of the beam to be 
adjusted to control the energy deposited per unit pathlength in a test device. The main 
advantage of a laser beam over heavy ion and proton beams is that it can be used to study the 
SEU sensitivity of particular sensitive sections of a chip. This is because, the point of focus
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of a laser beam can be easily adjusted. However, some sensitive regions of a chip are covered 
by metallisation which cannot be penetrated by laser beams. Thus, laser beams cannot be 
used to fully characterise a device to SEU also. Furthermore it is difficult to correlate laser 
beam energy to particle LET because of differences in the distribution of free carriers along it 
track [SEX-92]. Although there are suggested solutions for these problems, the laser beam 
technique is not yet mature.
4.3.3 Ion-Device Interaction Model - Summary
Because of the inability to derive complete SEU characterisation curves using laboratory 
techniques, ion accelerators are still the best resources available for determining parameters 
that describes the SEU susceptibility of devices despite being expensive (~£1000 per hour to 
operate). The next section examine the steps involved in performing heavy ion and proton 
radiation tests and the methods employed to calculate the underlying SEU rate in ICs. The 
weaknesses associated with these method are also discussed.
4.4 SEU Te st  T ec h n iq u e s  a n d  M e th o d s  o f  In t e r pr e t in g  T est  
R esu l ts  in  m em o r ies  a n d  m ic r o pr o c e sso r s
4.4.1 Test Techniques - Memories
A memory device can be considered as a single functional circuit with identical repeating 
structures. That is, the basic cell design throughout the device is the same. Their mode of 
operation is also simple. For these reasons, upsets in memories can be readily detected. 
Memories are therefore easy to test. Generally, a computer is used to control a test set-up as 
shown in Figure-4.5. The computer sends and receives data to the test device. It also 
processes the data to determine the number of upsets that have occurred. The test device is 
normally loaded with a predefined pattern of bits followed by testing in a static or dynamic 
mode [KOG-84]. In static mode, the device is irradiated (with heavy ion or proton beam) and 
subsequently checked to determine those bits that have changed state [GUE-81, KOG-84]. In 
dynamic mode, there is irradiation during which the device is continuously being read to 
detect errors and written to correct any upsets.
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4.4.2 Test Techniques - Microprocessors
Unlike memories, microprocessors are made up of many functional units (registers, counters, 
arithmetic and logic unit (ALU), accumulator, timers, etc.). The design and mode of 
operation of these units are usually not the same. Consequently, techniques used for testing 
microprocessors and interpreting test results are more complex. The architecture of a typical 
microprocessor (the 8051) and its mode of operation are described in Appendix B.
The traditional method for testing and interpreting test results for microprocessors are 
extrapolated from those for memories. Normally, the aim is also to load as many of the 
microprocessor’s registers (its internal memory units) with a predefined pattern of bits and 
irradiate them. During or after irradiation, the device is interrogated to count the number of 
upsets that have occurred. Several methods have been presented in the literature for 
performing this task [ELL-73, WIL-81, SHA-82, GUE-81, KOG-84]. A summary of these 
methods is given in [KOG-85] to include:
1. Self-testing single computer method - where a microprocessor is tested in a simple computer 
configuration, e.g. single board computer. The microprocessor “self-tests” and the result of the 
test can be displayed visually or by a simple LED.
2. Controller assisted, single computer method - where an external controller (mini or micro­
computer) interrogates the operation of the microprocessor under test by comparing its outputs 
with the “true” values stored in an external memory table.
3. Controller assisted, Golden Chip method - where an external controller compares the output of 
the test device to the output of a “standard” microprocessor (“golden chip”) operation under the 
same program.
4. Controller dominated, single computer method - where the instructions are introduced by the 
controller and not fetched by the CPU itself. In this case, the instructions are said to be “forced 
fed”. The controller also interrogates the output at each step to collect data.
4.4.3 Interpreting Heavy Ion Tests Results
Results from heavy ion tests are presented as curves of the SEU cross-section (a) versus ion’s 
effective LET [PET-92]. The SEU cross-section is a measure of the sensitivity of the device to 
SEU expressed as the ratio of number of upsets to the total particle fluence1. That is
'Radiation fluence = ions cm'2 and flux = number of particles s'1 hitting a unit sphere.
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No. o f  Upsets 7
cr = — ------—------- —— -  cm^ .
Flux x Time x Cosu
To obtain a complete SEU characterisation for a device with respect to heavy ions, the 
effective LET of the ions is varied through a range of values by changing the species of the 
ion beam or by varying the incident angle 6 o i  the beam. Figure-4.6, shows published results 
for some devices.
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Figure-4.6: Measured SEU cross-section versus LET for a variety of memory devices [PET-92].
Two parameters, the LET threshold (Lff) and the saturation cross-section {<JSat) are derived 
from this curve and used to calculate the SEU rate. The upset threshold is taken as the 
minimum charge required to upset the most sensitive node of the chip and the saturation 
cross-section is that cross-section at which an increase in ion LET will have no effect on the 
upset rate (see Figure-4.7). Ideally, the saturation cross-section should approximate the total 
area of the sensitive regions on the chip.
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Figure-4.7: An Ideal and a Typical Measured SEU cross-section versus LET Curve.
The presentation of heavy ion test results in this format has been criticised for wrongly 
emphasising the existence of a single LET-threshold for all sensitive cells of a device and for 
giving a false impression of a saturation cross-section. It is believed that, there is a variability 
in LET threshold across a device associated with:
• variability in the depletion depths of sensitive areas across the device,
• variability in doping profiles, mask alignment, etc. across the device.
Thus, the measured threshold as determined from a curve such as Figure-4.7 does not 
corresponds to the true threshold for the most sensitive node hit in the most sensitive 
location. It is thought that, a better estimate of the SEU rate would be obtained if the 
measured LET threshold is taken as the threshold associated with the median cell. This is 
equal to the LET at 50% of the LET at the saturation cross-section.
The industry standard tool for predicting the underlying SEU upset rate (UPSET in the 
CREME suite of programs) assumes that, there is only one defined critical charge and 
sensitive volume which contributes to the bit-SEU rate. The critical charge is defined in terms 
of the LET at which the device cross-section is say 1%, 10%, 30% or 50% of the saturated 
cross-section for the device. To ensure that test data indicates a true saturation cross-section, 
Peterson et al [PET-92] suggested that test results be plotted on a linear versus log scale for 
cross-section versus LET respectively. This interpretation has been rejected by authors such 
as Lanworthy [LAN-89] and Xapsos et al [XAP-94] who have proposed their own
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interpretations. In fact, at present there is no unanimous agreement on the interpretation of 
the cross-section versus LET curve.
The geometry of the sensitive volume is also required to predict the upset rate at each 
sensitive node. The sensitive area of the chip or its saturation cross-section is divided by the 
number of bits per device and the number of sensitive nodes per bit to obtain the size of the 
sensitive volume. UPSET assumes that the sensitive volume can be represented by a 
rectangular parallelepiped. It also assumes that [PET-92]:
• the total energy loss by an energetic ion as it passes through the sensitive volume is equal to the 
energy deposited in the sensitive volume,
• ions with the same LET have the same effect,
• there is a negligible change in the LET as an ion penetrates a device.
From these assumptions, a triple integral function (equation-4.1) [PET-92] is obtained as the
rate prediction function for heavy ions. This is an integration over all possible ion species, in
terms of their LET and their possible angles via the sensitive volume.
Rate=  I]]* cr (L ,0  (L ,6  ,<f>)dLsin6d6 d</> equation-4.1
where cr and /  are the SEU cross-section and particle-flux respectively. They are both 
functions of the LET (.L) and incident angle (azimuth) defined by 0, and the angle normal to 
the plane of the device (the polar angle) defined by <p. Unfortunately, the practical application 
of equation-4.1 tends to be complex. A further number of simplifying assumptions are 
usually made in order to obtain a useable function. These assumptions which are also stated 
in [PET-92] include:
• the amount of charge generated is equal to the product of the ion LET and the “effective cord” 
length in the diffusion region.
• the charge collection path is independent of the LET.
The function obtained is:
Rate = J J J / (L,0,(/>)<Ja (x c, 6 , $) sin{0)dGd(j) dL equation-4.2
where cra is the projected area of the incident beam, which is a function of the critical chord- 
length (Xq) and the incident angles (Q, <j>).
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Additional assumptions could be made to simplify equation-4.2 further. The final function 
obtained, calculates the upset rate per bit per unit time due to heavy ions. This value is 
multiplied by the total number of bits in the device to give the underlying upset rate for the 
device due to heavy ions.
The approach presented above can be applied to devices with various degrees of hardness but 
it is complex and requires many inputs. For devices with LET thresholds less than 30 MeV - 
cm^/mg, a quick estimate of the upset rate can be obtained using a method known as the 
Petersen approximation [PET-83]. The LET spectrum for heavy ions is first approximated by 
means of a power law fit and the upset rate per bit (/?)is obtained using equation-4.3.
R = 5 x l0 ’10x <rsat/L /^  Equation-4.3
4.4.4 Interpreting Proton Beam SEU Test Results
Unlike heavy ions, protons do not have sufficient LET to induce upsets by direct interaction 
with a device. Instead, the interaction of energetic protons with silicon atoms sometimes 
generates secondary particles with sufficient LETs that are capable of causing upsets in 
devices with low LET thresholds. Ground testing using proton beams therefore measures the 
upset cross-section as a function of proton energy [STA-92]. Curves similar to those of 
Figure-4.6 are obtained from which the energy threshold and saturation cross-section can be 
determined. Bipolar devices with heavy ion LET threshold values in the range of 1-5 MeV 
cm^/mg are known to suffer a high number of upsets in regions with a large population of 
protons. Experimental data from UoSAT microsatellites have also shown that commercial 
devices operating on satellites in LEO are vulnerable to upsets induced by trapped protons of 
the Van Allen Belts [UND-96].
Initially, predictions of SEU rate due to protons were done through nuclear reaction 
calculations which involved quantifying the probabilities of elastic and inelastic scattering of 
the incident protons as a function of energy [SEX-92]. The results from these calculations 
were then used to estimate the energy deposited in the sensitive volume. Together with the 
proton spectrum incident on the device, an estimate of the proton SEU rate is then calculated. 
This approach was very complex and was simplified by the one- and two-parameter semi- 
empirical Bendel’s models [BEN-83, BEN-84, STA-90]. A fit to the measured SEU cross­
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section versus proton energy curve is derived using two parameters A and B. By defining the 
LET spectra of the protons impinging on a device, the proton upset rate can be calculated 
using the two-parameter Bendefs equation:
threshold and the saturation cross-section respectively. All three parameters E, A and B are 
measured in units of MeV. To obtain the one-parameter model, B is given a constant value of 
24. The one-parameter model is the model used in BENDEL (the sub-program in CREME 
used for calculating the proton-induced upset rate). However, the two parameter model is
method for calculating proton-induced SEU rate.
Compared to heavy ions, it was only in 1981 that protons were recognised as a significant 
source for upsets. Today, there are fewer facilities for proton-beam tests compared to heavy 
ion tests, hence, proton test results are scarce. The relationship between heavy-ion induced 
and proton-induced upsets has been investigated to establish an approach of predicting the 
rate of proton-induced upsets from heavy-ion test data. From this study, it was proposed that 
the Bendel “A” parameter can be derived from the following equation [PET-92a]:
where, Lo.l is the LET at 1/10*  ^of the LET at the heavy ion saturation cross-section.
For a particular device, the sum of the underlying SEU rate due to heavy ions and protons is 
taken as the underlying SEU rate for the device in a defined satellite orbit.
4.4.5 Accuracy of Heavy Ion and Proton Test Results
SEU rate predictions from the methods described in the previous section are prone to errors 
from environmental models as discussed in Section 4.2, from radiation test data and from 
ion-device interaction models. Uncertainties with radiation test data are associated with 
limitations imposed by ground based radiation test facilities. Firstly, since these facilities are
where X  is in units of 10" 12 upsets per proton/cm^ per bit and
where E is the incident proton energy. A and the ratio ( B / A ) 1 4  are related to the energy
known to be better for devices with smaller geometry and is presently the industry standard
A = Lo.i+15
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very expensive, experimental times are limited leading to poor statistics on particular data 
points on the LET curve. This might lead to misconceptions, for example, an apparent 
indication of saturation. Secondly, accelerators can only provide a discrete mono-energetic 
source of ion at any one time. This is not a representation of the variety of energetic particles 
with different energies which are incident on a device at any one time while in orbit. Thirdly, 
the incident ions are not omni-directional as the source of particles experienced by a 
spacecraft. There is also a variation in temperature experienced by the device inside the 
spacecraft compared to the temperature of the test device inside the test chamber. All these 
problems and others are discussed by Stassinopoulos [STA-92].
The device-interaction model in CREME has also been highly criticised for assuming a single 
threshold for all the sensitive nodes of a device. It has been shown that there is a range of 
sensitivities across the device and an integral method for calculating the upset rate has been 
proposed . This method is recommended by many authors as a better approach [PET-92, 
MAS-92]. The process of charge collection following an ion strike is also complicated by 
funnelling and diffusion [LAN-93, LET-91, REE-94, PET-93]. These mechanisms are not 
considered in the CREME models. Research has been continuing on investigating these 
weaknesses. New findings and methods of making these methods better are published in 
IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science. Nevertheless, the CREME models are today 
generally accepted for predicting the rate of SEUs in memory devices. A decade of research 
performed at the University of Surrey to investigate the accuracy of these methods through 
real satellite experiments showed that these procedures are reasonably accurate within a 
factor of -2-5 for predicting SEU rate in COTS memory devices. Although a factor of five 
may seems high, it is considered reasonable in SEU rate prediction as the error bounds are 
usually very large.
The subject of this research is not to continue with the investigation on how these weaknesses 
modify the predicted underlying SEU rate in ICs but, to predict the percentage of SEUs that 
will induce errors that can be observed at the output of a microprocessor system. That is, the 
observable SEU induced error rate. Also, to determine the nature of errors that are observed. 
As stated in chapter one, an SEU induced error in a microprocessor system is said to be 
observable when its affects the external state of the system made-up of one or more of these 
microprocessors. For memories, the observable SEU rate is equivalent to the underlying SEU 
induced error rate. This is attributed to their simple mode of operation. When data is stored in 
memory, an upset will normally be observed when this data is read and compared with the
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original data. For microprocessors, their complex architectures and mode of operation 
complicates this problem. The next chapter discusses the discrepancies that exist between the 
underlying SEU rate and the observable SEU induced error rate in microprocessor systems.
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CHAPTER 5 
PREDICTING THE OBSERVABLE SEU INDUCED 
ERROR RATE IN MICROPROCESSOR SYSTEMS
Operational experiences of the Intel 8051 family of COTS microcontrollers on several 
UoSAT missions have given the impression that SEUs are not a threat to the reliable 
operation of these devices in LEO. This impression is however contrary to results obtained 
when the traditional method of interpreting results from ground based radiation tests is 
applied. To address this discrepancy, the 8051 microprocessor is treated as an example in the 
remaining chapters of this Thesis. Moreover, the 8051 microprocessor is relatively less 
complex with respect to its architecture compared to microprocessors such as the Intel 486 or 
Pentium. In addition, knowledge on its architecture and instruction set was readily available 
from SSTL engineers. It was therefore a good choice to start this investigation.
Traditionally, the underlying SEU rate in a microprocessor is assumed to be a direct measure 
of the rate of observable SEU induced errors in a microprocessor system1. That is, it is 
assumed that every SEU that occurs in the microprocessor induces some disturbance in the 
system that can be observed by monitoring the system’s output. This interpretation is, in fact, 
the worst case situation [KOG-85]. Generally, an SEU will induce an observable error only if 
it occurs in a register that is being used (i.e. if the register is holding useful data) [GUE-81] 
[KOG-85]. Such registers are termed “live and relevant” registers. If and SEU occurs in a 
register that is not being used, it may be overwritten when new data is written into the register 
and therefore will not create an observable error. Microprocessors work by continuously 
moving data between registers and memory addresses with arithmetic and logic unit 
operations, flag register updates and program counter increments executed in between moves. 
It is unlikely that all registers within a microprocessor will be in used at all times during 
execution. Thus, the observable SEU induced error rate in a microprocessor system is in fact 
some fraction of the underlying SEU rate. Determining the fraction of SEUs that will induce 
errors observable at the microprocessor system level is the main interest of this research.
1 It is assumed that, there is only one microprocessor per system and the microprocessor is the only 
device that is susceptible to SEU in the system.
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The number of “live and relevant” registers of a microprocessor at any one time depends on 
the sequence and frequency with which data is moved during execution. This depends on the 
software that the microprocessor is executing. Thus, the observable SEU induced error rate in 
a microprocessor system is a function of the microprocessor’s software.
5.1 In it ia l  In v est ig a t io n s  o f  t h e  In fl u e n c e  o f  S o ftw a r e  o n  th e  
O b se r v a b l e  SEU In d u c ed  E r r o r  R a te
Results from microprocessor SEU tests can be reported in two forms:
• register-bit cross-section versus LET (or Energy) which is the underlying SEU cross-section and
• application cross-section versus LET (or Energy) which predicts the observable SEU induced 
error rate for a microprocessor in actual operation.
The application cross-section ignores those SEUs that do not induce errors in the system and 
as a result, gives more useful information to engineers. With this result, the capabilities of 
COTS microprocessors could be comfortably explored without fear of jeopardising reliability 
as may be the case if the worst case situation is assumed. However, compared with the 
register-bit cross-section, the application cross-section is not a convenient measure since it 
varies with software.
Two papers have published results showing how the application cross-section varies with the 
software assigned to a microprocessor. In [ELD-88], ten simple programs were used to 
characterise the SEU vulnerability of the Harris H80c85 microprocessors. Although the 
programs were not very complex, a difference in the observable SEU induced error cross- 
section was noted when irradiated. Figure-5.1 shows the results of three of the test programs 
that exercised the data registers with varying intensities. Four simple test programs (CALC: 
mathematical function; FFT: fast Fourier transformation; REG20: register test and TREJO: a 
program for sorting four data bytes) were also used to test the 68020 microprocessor and the 
results obtained are shown in Figure-5.2 [VEL-92].
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Figure-5.1: Total device vulnerability for three distinct programs running on the H80C85. 
The three programs exercise the data registers with different intensities [ELD-88].
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Figure-5.2: Test program influence on the SEU cross-section of the 68020 
microprocessor and 68882 coprocessor [VEL-92].
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Since the application cross-section varies with software, it implies that ground based radiation 
tests need to be repeated every time the software running on a microprocessor is changed. For 
low cost missions, this is unreasonable considering the expensive nature of these tests. This 
problem is expected to be more severe in future missions since LCSS are designed to allow 
frequent updates to flight software [WAR-95]. To promote the application of COTS 
technology microprocessors for space applications, a practical cost-effective method of 
determining the observable SEU induced error cross-section for different software (the SEU 
application cross-section) is essential.
Such a method has been proposed earlier. In [ELD-88], the application cross-section ( a A ) is 
defined as the weighted sum of the individual registers’ cross-sections (Oj), where the 
weighting factor (fi) of a register is its associated duty cycle. That is,
where n is the total number of registers in the microprocessor vulnerable to SEU.
The duty cycle of a register is defined as the period during which the register is holding 
useful data expressed as a percentage of the total program execution time. The condition fi = 
100% for all z, represents the worst case (underlying) SEU cross-section. This is the
SEU induced error cross-section of the microprocessor. This result is a function of the 
device’s technology only. It does not take into consideration the fact that some SEUs are 
overwritten during execution, hence, it overestimates the observable SEU induced error rate 
for real application programs where f- will typically be less than 100% for several registers.
To verify the accuracy of equation-5.1, Elder and his colleagues analysed a simple software 
routine to determine the duty cycles of the Harris H80C85 microprocessor registers as the 
software was executed. The application cross-section was then calculated. The results 
obtained were comparable with results obtained from exposing the microprocessor to a 
radiation beam as its executes the software and counting the number of SEU induced errors 
observed at the output of the system.
Although the validity of equation-5.1 was successfully verified using a simple program, Elder 
states that it will be impractical to determine the duty cycle of microprocessor registers 
associated with the execution of real satellite application software due to its complexity. That
n
Equation-5.1,
application independent situation assumed by the traditional method to be the observable
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is, where instruction flow cannot be predicted in advance due to the existence of several 
conditional statements, branches, loops, millions of instructions, etc. To verify this notion, an 
attempt was made by the author to calculate the duty cycle for registers that are utilised by the 
8051 microprocessor as its executes the software code that operates the telecommand system 
on some UoSATs.
5.2 Case  Stu d y : Com puting  The  SEU A pplication  Cross-section  
F or  T he  8051 M icroprocessor  on  A UoSAT Telecom m and  (TC) 
System  In  The  Space Station  Freedom  (SSF) Radiatio n  
E nvironm ent
A worst case (software independent) estimate of the observable SEU induced error rate 
expected in the 8051 microprocessor operating in the Space Station Freedom radiation 
environment was calculated. With several assumptions and approximations, an attempt was 
made to estimate the duty cycle for the registers of the device assuming that it was executing 
the UoSAT TC software. The results obtained, are compared with the worst case results.
5.2.1 The 8051 Microprocessor Architecture
The 8051 microprocessor architecture does not exist on its own. Instead, there are several 
microcontrollers built around this architecture known as 8051 derivatives. The 87C51 
microcontroller shown in Figure-5.3 is one example.
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Figure-5.3: The 87C51 (a derivative o f 8051) architecture [AM D-90]
All 8051 derivatives utilise the 8051 core as their central processing unit (CPU) and operate 
using the 8051 instruction set. A detailed discussion of the 87C51 architecture and the 8051 
Intel microprocessor instruction set is given in Appendix B.
User accessible units of the 87C51 consists of 4K bytes of EPROM, 128 bytes of internal 
RAM, 21 eight bits registers known as Special Function Registers (SFRs) and a Program 
Counter (PC). The size of the EPROM, internal RAM and the number of SFRs vary for the 
different derivatives. Although Figure-5.3, depicts the SFRs to be physically separate from 
the microcontroller’s internal RAM, these registers are actually eight bit locations within the 
internal RAM. Their names and their corresponding addresses are as shown in Table-5.1. The
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lower 32 bytes of the internal RAM consists of four register banks (0-3), only one of which 
can be used at a time. Each register bank consists of eight one byte registers. During software 
processing, the 8051 microprocessor utilises the SFRs, the PC and the bank registers. Unlike 
the EPROM, these units plus the remainder of the internal RAM are susceptible to SEUs.
Symbol Name Address
*ACC Accumulator 0E0H
*B B Register 0F0H
*PSW Program Status Word 0D0H
SP Stack Pointer 81H
DPL Data Pointer: Low Byte 82H
DPH Data Pointer: High Byte 83H
*P0 PortO 80H
*P1 Port 1 90H
*P2 Port 2 0A0H
*P3 Port 3 0B0H
*n> Interrupt Priority Control 0B8H
*IE Interrupt Enable Control 0A8H
TMOD Timer/Counter Mode Control 89H
*TCON Timer/Counter Control 88H
*SCON Serial Control 98H
PCON Power Control 87H
SBUF Serial Data Buffer 99H
THO Timer/Counter 0, High Byte 8CH
TLO Timer/Counter 0, Low Byte 8AH
TH1 Timer/Counter 1, High Byte 8DH
TL1 Timer/Counter 1, Low Byte 8BH
Table-5.1: 8051 Special Function Registers and Their Addresses (* = Bit addressable)
5.2.2 The UoSAT TC System and Its Software
The TC system takes data from a ground command station or on-board data sources, validates 
it, and uses it to control the state of latches which send commands to the rest of the satellite. 
The latest design of the UoSAT TC system is shown in Figure 5.4.
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Figure 5.4: The UoSAT TC System
Decoders 0 to 2 can only receive serial data from receiver 0 (RXO), the on-board computer 
(OBC186M) and the secondary on-board computer (OBC) respectively. Decoder 3 can 
receive data from up to eight sources depending on the address selected by the multiplexer 
(MUX) connected to it. Each decoder is connected to two, tri-state busses through which data 
is sent to two banks of command latches. The watchdog on each decoder is used to reset the 
decoder in case of some faulty operation which may cause the decoder not to receive a valid 
command within a period of 15 hours 32 minutes and 4 seconds. Each decoder is an 87C51 
microcontroller.
The TC system software is written in “assembler” and stored in EPROM. Following start-up 
or a reset, each decoder commences its function by initialising its control registers. It then 
continuously receives incoming characters (useful and noise characters) from the serial port 
and checks for a valid TC frame. A TC frame consists of seven bytes with the following 
format.
Sync 1 Sync 2 Sync 3 Command Data CRCO CRC1
The first three bytes define the validity of the frame, the fourth byte identifies the port or 
latch to which the command is to be issued, the fifth byte is the actual command carried by 
the frame and the last two bytes are results of a cyclic redundancy check performed on the 
first five bytes. If the frame is valid, it is processed and a command is issued otherwise
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processing is terminated after the first three bytes are processed. The software is not very 
large but it is complex because of loops, nested loops, conditional statements, subrountine 
calls, etc.
If the microprocessor clock is operating at a frequency of 3.6864MHz, a delay of up to 9.4 ms 
can be experienced between deciding to issue a command and the latch actually changing 
state. Serial transmission of the TC frame takes 7.3 ms and the time for processing the 
command varies from 0.1 to 2.1 ms. The rate of arrival of commands at each decoder input 
also varies. Decoders 0, 2 and 3 spend most of their time processing noise characters and are 
only called up occasionally to process data. Decoder 1 is the busiest of all decoders and 
decodes a maximum of 6 commands every 10 minutes.
5.2.3 The Worst Case Estimate
The worst case estimate (for f  = 100%) was determined by multiplying the underlying SEU 
rate per bit per unit time by the total number of SEU susceptible bits of the 8051 
microprocessor. In this Thesis, the 8051 microprocessor is assumed to be made up o f all the 
SEU susceptible units that are normally used by the 8051 microprocessor as registers during 
software execution. These include all user accessible units: the 21 SFRs, the PC and the 32 
registers o f register bank 0-3) which will be collectively referred to as registers in the 
remainder of this Thesis. Apart from the register banks, the internal RAM is not considered 
as part o f the 8051 microprocessor. Since it was not possible to determine the number ofnon- 
accessible units from the information that was available for this study, these units are not 
considered in the analyses that follow. Therefore, the total number of accessible SEU 
susceptible bits of the 8051 is ~ SFRs Bits + PC bits + Register bank bits.
That is, 21x8 + 1 x 8  + 8 x 8  x4= 432 bits (not including the internal RAM).
Application independent ground based radiation testing of the Intel 87C51FC microcontroller 
was carried out by Boeing to characterise the device for use in the SSF program [OBE-94]. 
The aim was to determine the SEU and SEL cross-sections of the device in the SSF 
environment. Tests were conducted using both heavy ions and protons at the 88-inch 
Cyclotron at the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory and the Havard Cyclotron Laboratory and 
Tri-University Meson facility respectively. The test program initialises the registers and 
internal RAM addresses upon start-up or reset and continuously test for upsets during
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irradiation. The results obtained for the worst case situation (where all bits tested add up to 
-2300) are given in Table-5.2. The galactic cosmic ray (GCR) and proton environments for 
the Space Station Freedom orbit defined as 51.6° and 350 km altitude, were assumed 
[NAS-91].
ENVIRONMENT
GCR Proton Proton
&GCR
Shield (mils Al) 100 150 N/A
Cross-section
(^ asym(^ rn ))
7.0E-3 1.0E-9
E (MeV) N/A 20
LET,hreshoid(MeV-cm2/m g) 2.5 N/A
Upset Rate (per device per day) 3.2E-3 3.8E-3
Mean Time To Failure
Upset (Days) 320 260 140
Reset 10 yrs
Latchup 630 yrs 630 yrs
Table-5.2: Rates o f upset, reset and latchup for the 87C51FC microcontroller. Rates are based on worst 
case conditions (4 volts for upset and reset, 6 volts for latchup) [OBE-94].
The sum of the upset rates per device per year for GCRs and protons divided by the total 
number of bits tested (2300), gave the upset rate per bit per day as 3.0 x 10'6. Therefore in 
one year, the expected average number of upsets for the 8051 microprocessor with 432 bits 
can be estimated as -0.5, assuming the UoSAT TC system was placed in the SSF radiation 
environment. With four decoders (and therefore four microprocessors) per command system, 
we expect to see an average of 2 SEU induced errors per year (worst case). Assuming a 
Poisson distribution, the approximate 95% confidence interval for this result was calculated 
as 1 to 6.
These results are computed assuming that all four decoders of the TC system are used 
continuously. In operation, Decoders 0, 2 and 3 are only used occasionally, they are therefore 
reset every 15 hours, 32 minutes and 4 seconds by the watchdog timer. The probability of an 
SEU occurring within this time interval in any of the bit addresses utilised during processing 
is very small. Thus, the application cross-section for these decoders can be approximated as
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zero. Decoder 1 is the only decoder that is used regularly. An attempt to obtain an application 
dependent estimate for Decoder 1 is discussed in the next section.
5.2.4 Application Dependent Estimate For the 8051 of Decoder 1
Decoder 1 processes at most 6 commands every 10 minutes and it takes a maximum of 9.4ms 
to process and issue a command. In processing a command, the 8051 utilises register bank 0 
only of the four register banks. Thus, the duty cycles for all registers of bank 1, 2 and 3 are 
taken as 0%. Seven registers of the remaining thirty registers (i.e., the 21 SFRs, the PC and 
the 8 registers of bank 0) operate in the “character read” loop of the TC software. This is the 
block of code that receives characters from the serial port and processed them to identify a 
valid TC frame. Although only six valid commands are received every ten minutes, this loop 
is continuously operating as noise characters are received regularly. In this analysis, it was 
assumed that the seven registers involved in this loop all have duty cycles of -100%. Thus, 
the average observable SEU induced error rate for these seven registers is taken as the 
underlying rate of 3x10'6 per bit per day.
Determining the exact duty cycle associated with the remaining registers manually was 
difficult. To do this, it is necessary to track the instruction flow sequence and the contents of 
the cycle counter during execution. This was complex not only becauase of the number of 
registers involved, but also due to the number of instructions (~ 900), loops, conditional 
statement and subroutine calls that are executed as each TC frame is processed. In some 
cases, the instruction flow sequence during execution depends of the particular frame 
received and as a result, it is not always the same. It was however, necessary to make some 
estimates in order to demonstrate the difference that exist between the underlying and 
application cross-sections.
To achieve this, it was assumed that, the remaining twenty-three register are susceptible for 
the total time that is taken to process and execute a command. That is, approximately 56.4 ms 
(6x9.4 ms) in every ten minutes. The average upset rate per bit per day for the remaining 
registers was then determined as 3.0x1 O’10. This value can be approximated as zero when 
compared with the worst case SEU cross-section of 3x10‘6 per bit per day for the seven 
registers that are used continuously. Thus, it was concluded that, the seven registers are the 
only registers that are likely to generate errors due to SEUs in the system. The average SEU 
induced observable error rate for microprocessor of Decoder 1 was therefore predicted as
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0.06 per year. The worst case estimate of 0.5 per year, therefore overestimates the observable 
SEU induced error rate by a factor of about 8.
5 .3  S u m m a r y
It should be noted that the result discussed in the last two sections have been derived after 
several assumptions. The aim here was to illustrate the significance of the duty cycle on the 
difference between the underlying cross-section and the application cross-section. Also to 
identify the difficulties involved in calculating duty cycles associated with the execution of 
real application software with several thousands of instructions, loops, branches, etc.
An appreciation of the difficulties encountered in an attempt to manually compute the duty 
cycle for each register of a microprocessor as it executes real application software was 
gained. Keeping track of each instruction executed and the content of the cycle counter 
during processing became practically unmanageable for the several hundreds of instructions 
that had to be executed to complete a processing cycle. This task is expected to be more 
difficult for larger software running on microprocessors with a higher number of registers. 
Nevertheless, from the estimates, it was possible to show that the influence of the duty cycle 
on the observable SEU induced error rate in microprocessor systems is very significant and 
must not be ignored. Although the example discussed here indicates that the underlying SEU 
cross-section overestimates the SEU application cross-section by a factor of 8 only, this factor 
could be higher or lower depending on the application program assigned to the 
microprocessor and on the microprocessor’s architecture. Also, several assumptions had been 
made to derive these results.
In conclusion, the worst case overestimates the observable SEU induced error rate in 
microprocessor systems giving a pessimistic view of the reliability of a microprocessor in the 
execution of satellite application software. It is very rare that a microprocessor will be used in 
the worst case condition. Thus, some SEUs are likely to be overwritten during execution and 
therefore will not contribute to the observable SEU induced error rate. The number of SEUs 
that are likely to be overwritten depend on the software that the microprocessor is executing. 
Thus, the successful operation of a microprocessor executing particular application software 
in a defined orbit does not necessary guarantee that a microprocessor of the same radiation 
hardness operating in the same orbit will work successfully for different application software.
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Although the SEU vulnerability of a microprocessor can be effectively characterised using 
the traditional approach of exposing the microprocessor to energetic ions as it executes 
software and monitoring its output, this approach is expensive. It requires tens of thousands 
of pounds to obtain significant results. For LCSS, this is a critical problem that must be 
addressed. Besides their constraint budgets, they are designed with a flexible methodology to 
allow continuous updates to on-board software. In addition to the fact that this characteristic 
is very useful for experimental payloads, it is sometimes necessary when fully proven reliable 
software is not available in time for launch. For example, at SSTL all microprocessors flown 
on UoSAT-2 onwards are designed with a simple ‘boot-loader’ program that allows new 
software to be uploaded while the satellite is already operational.
Instead of repeating ground based radiation tests, equation 5.1 can be used as an alternative 
method for characterising the SEU vulnerability of new software provided the underlying 
SEU cross-section for each register is known. In this research, it is assumed that the 
underlying SEU cross-sections for all the registers can be determined from the Boeing 
radiation test. The task is to develop a cost-effective, flexible method for calculating the duty 
cycles of microprocessor registers associated with the execution of complex satellite 
application software. Assumptions such as those made to derive the results in Sections 5.2.3 
and 5.2.4 can be made in order to derive estimates but this may not always be possible if the 
software is too complex and difficult to understand. Also, a standard approach accepted by 
the industry for undertaking this task will be beneficial. The next chapter presents a proposed 
solution.
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CHAPTER 6 
A MODEL FOR COMPUTING DUTY CYCLES
6.1 In t r o d u c t io n
In this Chapter a new approach is described which uses computer tools and software 
development techniques to enable automatic computation of the duty cycles of 
microprocessor registers as it executes real application software. This method requires a 
microprocessor simulator together with knowledge of the microprocessor’s architecture and 
instruction set. The main advantage of this approach over the manual approach is that, the 
time taken to calculate the application cross-section for complex satellite software will be cut 
down by several orders of magnitude once the approach has been successfully developed. In 
effect, it will be cheaper, particularly for satellites designed to allow frequent update to flight 
software and those with several microprocessors of the same type processing different 
application programs.
Since the 8051 microprocessor [AMD-90] is treated as an example in this research study, an 
8051 simulator was used. The Keil Elektronix 8051 simulator [KIE-91] was an obvious 
choice because it has been used at Surrey Satellite Technology Limited for many years. The 
satellite application software, written in assembler, is converted into HEX format, loaded into 
the simulator and executed in single-step mode. Each instruction and the content of the cycle 
counter (the clock), are traced and saved to a file during execution. By studying the 
architecture and the instruction set of the microprocessor, relevant information was identified 
and used to develop a software model which processes the file and computes the duty cycle of 
each register.
6 .2  The Kiel Elektronix dScope-51 Simulator
dScope-51 [KIE-91] is a high-level-language debugger for the 8051 family of 
microcontrollers. It consists of a hardware simulator (DS51) and a target interface (TS51) for 
8051 monitors and emulators. DS51 is of primary interest to this research. It can be used to 
simulate the hardware of various derivatives of the 8051 family. The peripherals which
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differentiate b etw een  derivatives ex ist as loadable drivers. A lthough D S51 has been  
d evelop ed  m ainly as a deb uggin g  tool, it has been m odified  and used  in this research to 
undertake a d ifferent task. A fter som e investigation , it w as realised that, as a debugger, D S51  
has a sign ifican t num ber o f  features built into it, w hich  cou ld  be extended  to a llow  tracing  
and recording o f  each  instruction and the content o f  the cy c le  counter during execu tion . 
Figure-6.1 sh ow s D S51 w in dow -oriented  user platform .
5 MS-DOS Piompl - DS51
Options Key View Peripheral Map Help Cpu
0003H AJMP 0053H
0005H NOP
0006H NOP Language Window
0007H NOP
0008H NOP
Serial Window
Trace R eg ister 
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00
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00
00
00
00
00
copyright KEIL ELEKTRONIK GmbH 1990, 1991 
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>/*************************************/ 
> \u \u \u \u \u \u \u \u  /*  Increase  Exe-Window
>/* remove comments to  enable the  i n i t  commands */
Register Window
>/* \o\m */
>/* \v \ s  */
>/* load \C51V4\DS51\8052.iof */
>/* map 0 ,0 x ff f f  */
>load ttc co d e l.h ex
Execution Window
/*  Options Medium (Lines) */
/*  View S e r ia l (Off) */
/*  IOF d riv e r  fo r 8052 */
/*  XDATA memory 64KByte */
!dos | ASM | ASSIGN | BreakDisable g BreakEnable | BreakKill g
R0 
Rl 
R2 
R3 
t R4 
R5 
R6 
t R7
1DPTR= 0000 PC $= 0000
|  PSW
|  — R0—
gCycles eye
I  0
|SP=07: 
1 1:06: 
■ 1:05: 
Q 1:04: 
=¥ 1:03:
—more—
jfisiaS ! 5  pr5rfptyDS5T.yF|
Figure-6.1: DS51 M ain W indow
A s can be seen , there are several su b-w indow s, the m ost important o f  w hich  include:
• The Language W indow - which displays the program  that has been loaded for debugging. 
The program can be displayed in three different modes; the program source text m ode for 
high level languages, in assembler mode, or a com bination of both. The language w indow  can 
also be used to communicate with the simulator. For example, to set breakpoints within the 
program code and to copy sections of text into a log file.
• The Execution W indow - which is the main channel of communication between the sim ulator 
and the user. It is used for command entry and for outputting results. For example, com m ands
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to start or stop the execution o f a loaded program, to display and change the content o f a 
register, etc. are entered via this window.
•  The Register Window - which displays the current content o f some registers, the cycle 
counter and the stack, during execution.
•  The Serial Window - which acts like a terminal connected to the serial interface o f the 8051 
CPU. User defined inputs to the software are entered via this window.
•  The Watch Window - which displays the current values o f  any defined variables during 
executions.
•  The message and help lines - for displaying error messages and HELP text respectively 
during command entry.
In addition, there are pull down menus within the main window, which allow a simple and 
fast means of executing commands.
Generally, DS51 has several standard commands which have been defined for particular 
tasks. However, these commands can be modified by the user for other purposes using special 
DS51 functions, which can be developed using the 8051 embedded C programming language. 
Some of the frequently used functions are available in a library. To debug a particular 
program, it is loaded into the simulator and execution can be started in single-step mode or in 
real-time mode by entering the corresponding commands via the execution window. During 
execution, the in-built features of DS51 can be used to trace and record each instruction that 
is executed into a file (file-1). However, these features were not sufficient to enable tracing 
and recording of the internal state of the cycle counter. To accomplish this, a program 
(program-1) was written to retrieve and save this information into a separate file (file-2). The 
code for this program is included in Appendix C.
In summary, to retrieve and save information required to compute the duty cycles, the 
following steps have to be taken:
1. D S51 is run and the corresponding 8051 peripheral is loaded.
2. The HEX file for the corresponding software is loaded.
3. Program-1 is also loaded.
4. The commands for tracing and saving each instruction executed into file-1 are enabled.
5. A log file file-2) is created into which the contents o f the cycle counter is saved.
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6.3  T h e  8051 C PU  A r c h itec tu r e
The 8051 architecture was briefly discussed in Chapter 5 and more details are given in 
Appendix B. The model described in this Chapter calculates the duty cycle of the SFRs, the 
PC and registers R0-R7 of register bank 0 only. The other register banks (1, 2 and 3) are not 
included because they are not used during the execution of the particular software 
applications analysed in this Chapter. Hence, each register of these banks has a duty cycle of 
0%. However, the model can be easily extended to include all the banks if necessary.
Besides the SFRs and the PC, other internal logic units of the 8051 CPU core are not accessible 
to the user. The arithmetic and logic unit (ALU) is one example. Arithmetic and logic operation 
of the CPU such as addition, subtraction, Boolean operations, compare, shift, increment, and 
decrement are executed in the ALU. The instruction register (IR), TMP1 and TMP2 (also shown 
on Figure-5.3) are other examples of such units. Since these units are not accessible, they are not 
modelled by the simulator. Thus, it is not possible to tell when data is written into or read from 
these units and their duty cycles cannot be calculated. This induces an error (discussed further in 
Section 6.8) in results obtained using the model.
6 .4  Th e  8051 In st r u c tio n  Se t
As discussed in Chapter 5, during the execution of software, it is unlikely that all registers 
and non-accessible logic units of the microprocessor will be used at any one time. Thus, 
upsets in some registers may be overwritten and will therefore not induce observable errors in 
a system. Whether an SEU in a particular register is overwritten or not, depends on the 
instructions executed by the CPU following the occurrence of the upset. The 8051 instruction 
set was studied to identify instructions that are capable of overwriting SEUs. It was found that 
an SEU in a register will be overwritten if the subsequent instruction executed wrote new data 
into the register or cleared the register (i.e. setting all its bits to zero). Similarly, an SEU at a 
bit address for bit-addressable registers is overwritten if new data is written into the bit 
location or if it is cleared. Instructions capable of doing this were found to include: data 
transfer instructions which write new values into registers, a logical operation which clears 
the accumulator (ACC), and Boolean variable manipulations that set or clear bits. This group 
of instructions have opcodes such as MOV, MOVX, MOVC, CLR and SETB. Any 
instruction in this category was described as a “duty cycle modification instruction”.
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6.5 T h e  M o d e l
6.5.1 SIGNIFICANT REGISTERS AND ASSUMPTIONS
Three groups of registers were identified that played important roles in developing the model.
These registers, their characteristics and subsequent assumptions made include:
•  Bit Addressable Registers - these are registers whose individual bit addresses can be written 
into and read from. For such registers, each bit is usually assigned a particular function. Thus, 
setting a bit high or low is usually equivalent to sending a command to the CPU. All registers 
marked with an asterisk in Table-5.1 are bit addressable. The PSW register bits and their 
corresponding functions are shown in Figure-6.2.
CY AC FO RSI RSO |o v P
PSW.7: Carry flag receives 
cany out from bit 1 of ALU—I 
operands
PSW.6: Auxiliary carry flag 
receives cany out from bit 1- 
of the addition operand
PSW.5: General purpose _ 
status flag
PSW.4: Register bank select 
bit 1
PSW.O: Rarity of ACC Set by 
-hardware to 1 if it contains an odd 
number of Is, otherwise it is reset to 0
.PSW. 1 User definable flag
PSW.2: Overflow flag set by 
"arithmetic operations
PSW.3: Register bank select 
"bit 0
Figure-6.2: The Program Status Word (bit addressable register)
As can be seen in Figure-6.2, bit addresses can be referred to by their addresses, by labels such 
as RSO and R S1 or by expressions o f the form “Register.Bit_position”. Where “Register” is the 
name or address o f the associated register and “Bit position” ranges from 0 to 7 for least 
significant to most significant bit respectively. For example, PSW.3, RSO and 0D0.3 all refer to 
the third bit o f the PSW. These formats are all recognised by the 8051 instruction set. By  
checking fo r  the different form ats in which a bit can be represented in an instruction, it was  
possible to identify whether this bit and  hence, it associated register has been used  in the 
execution o f  that instruction.
Status Registers - these registers hold information o f the current status o f the CPU. These 
include the PSW and the SP. For example, the bits RSO and RSI o f the PSW tell us which 
register bank the CPU is currently using, the carry flag informs us if  there was a carry in the
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last arithmetic operation, etc. The stack pointer can be used to determine if  the CPU was 
currently executing an interrupt or not. In this model, it is assum ed that status registers are in 
continuous use. Thus, the duty cycles o f  these registers are taken as 100%. This assumption 
slightly overestimate the duty cycles o f the registers. However, it is necessary since it is not 
always possible to determine from the information obtained using the simulator and from the 
device’s manual, when data is written into or read from these registers. This is because, the 
usage o f these registers is not only determined by the software code, but also by hardware 
features built into the microprocessor’s architecture. For example, the parity flag o f the PSW  
(PSW.O) will be set or cleared by hardware after each instruction cycle depending on the 
number o f ‘1’ bits in the ACC. In order to track the usage o f such a bit, full knowledge o f the 
internal implementation o f the device’s architecture is required. Because o f the commercial 
interest involved, it was not possible to obtain this information.
•  Control Registers - these registers are used to control the mode o f operation o f the GPU. 
They include: TCON, TMOD, SCON, PCON, IE and IP. Most bits o f control registers are 
crucial to the reliable operation o f the CPU. For example, if  the least significant bit o f  the 
power control register (PCON) is accidentally set high while the CPU is in operation, the 
CPU automatically ceases to function and goes into idle mode. Until this bit is reset low, the 
CPU cannot resume operation. Also, if  the serial port and timer 1 interrupt were enabled but 
an SEU occurs and set the most significant bit o f the IE register low, the interrupt system will 
be automatically disabled and the CPU will no longer respond to any interrupt request. From  
these examples, it was assumed that control registers are in continuous use fro m  the m om ent 
they are fir s t initialised until the execution o f  the software is terminated. Although, this might 
also lead to a slight overestimation o f the duty cycle o f these registers, it was again necessary 
to make this assumption for the same reason stated above.
Other Assumptions:
•  It is assumed that if  a register is being used, then all its associated bits are in use. Hence, an 
upset in any bit will induce an observable error. This is not always the case since some 
registers have bits that cannot be used. For example, the PCON register has three such bits. 
An upset o f any o f these bits will not induce an observable error in the system. It was 
however necessary to make this assumption to keep the model tractable and practical. Precise 
analysis could be done at bit level provided detailed information on the usage o f each bit was 
available for all registers.
6.5.2 METHODOLOGY
The model consists of several functions written in “C” (the code included Appendix C) and a
block diagram representation is shown in Figure-6.3.
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file-2file-1
file-3
Enter register or the command “ALL” *
Is the input 
identified?
YES
NO Is Input 
=  “ALL1
Get one register 
from list.
Calculate the Duty-cycle 
(See next page)
YESAny more 
register in 
list?
NO
Exit
Figure-6.3: Flow Diagram o f Duty Cycle Prediction Model (continue o f the next page)
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Get register from list.
YES
Is register in 
.continuous use?
Duty cycle of register = 100%
NO
Read record from file
NO
NOIs register used 
in current 
instruction?
Is this the end 
of the data file?
YES
Duty cycle of Register=0%Accumulative-duty-period = Execution 
period of current instruction
Exit
Read next record
NOIs register used 
in current 
^instruction?^
YES
YESIs register a 
control register? Increment Accumulative-duty-period _by “increment-1”.
. YESIs current instruction a 
‘duty-cycle modification’ 
. instruction? /
Increment 
Accumulative-duty-period 
by “increment-2”.
NO
Increment Accumulative-duty-period 
by “increment-3”
YES
Any more records on 
s .  data file? /
NO
Duty cycle = 
Accumulative-duty-period/Total execution time.
F
I
R
S
T
L
O
O
P
Figure-6.3: Flow Diagram of Duty Cycle Prediction Model
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Firstly, the data files (file-1 and file-2) are assembled into one file (file-3). A user instructs the 
model to calculate the duty cycle of one register only or the duty cycles of all registers in a 
sequence. The duty cycle for each register is computed and printed to the screen and a log file is 
assembled showing the total period for which the register is holding useful data during 
execution known as the accumulative-duty-period (acc_duty_period). File-3 is made up of 
separate records arranged in sequence. Each record consists of two important pieces of 
information that are used by the model. An instruction and the content of the cycle counter (the 
clock) at the beginning of executing that instruction. Table-6.1 shows an example of two 
consecutive records that might be recorded in file-3.
Record number Content of Cycle Counter Instruction
1 7d MOV B(0F0H) A
2 7e MOV B R4
Table-6.1: A  Sample Showing Records In File-3.
To calculate the duty cycle of a register, the follow steps are taken:
1. If the register is a status register, assumption one is applied. That is, it is assumed to be in
continuous usage and its duty cycle is automatically set to 100%.
2. For all other registers, records o f file-3 are sequentially processed in two main loops. The aim  
in the first loop is to establish the clock cycle at which the current register1 was f ir s t  used  
during execution. This is done as follows:
♦ The instruction in each record is checked for the name o f the register or for one o f  its 
corresponding bit addresses provided it is a bit addressable register. If any o f these is 
identified, then the register has been used in executing this instruction. This is the 
first time the register has been used and its accumulative-duty-period at this point is 
equal to the execution period o f the current instruction only. The value o f the cycle
counter at the end o f processing this instruction is saved. The first loop is terminated
and processing proceeds to the second loop.
♦ If all records are processed and neither the register’s name or a corresponding bit 
address is identified, it is concluded that the current register was not used during the 
execution o f the software. Its duty cycle is therefore zero.
In the second loop the Accumulative-duty-period is computed as follows:
•  For control registers, assumption two is applied. That is, it is assumed that the registers 
are holding useful data at all times from the moment of first initialisation. Thus, the 
accumulative-duty-period is incremented by the execution period of every instruction 
executed. This is “increment-1” in the flow diagram of Figure-6.3.
1 The current register is the register whose duty cycle is being computed.
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♦ For all other registers, each record is also processed to establish the usage of the 
current register. If the current register has been used (read, written into or arithmetic 
operation performed on it), the following rules are applied:
• If the current instruction is a “duty cycle modification instruction” the increment is equal 
to the execution period o f the current instruction only. This is “increment-2” in the flow 
diagram.
•  Otherwise, the increment is equal to the execution period from the last but one 
instmction during which the register was used to the end o f executing the current 
instruction. This is “increment-3” in the flow diagram.
• At the end of processing, the accumulative-duty-period is divided by the software execution 
time to obtain the register’s duty cycle.
6.5.3 AN EXAMPLE
Table-6.2 shows an example of twelve consecutive records that might be recorded in file-3.
Record number Content of Cycle Counter Opcode-1 Opcode-2 Operand
1 7d MOV B(0F0H) A
2 7e MOV B R4
3 7f ADD A B(0F0H)
4 80 INC R1
5 81 MOVX A @R1
6 83 XRL A #32H
7 84 MOV SBUF(99H) A
8 85 RET
9 87 DJNZ R2 0017H
10 89 MOV B(0F0H) A
11 8b LCALL 0022H
12 8d MOV A #00H
Table-6.2: A sample section of file-3 generated by the execution of a typical application software.
In the second column the content of the cycle counter at the beginning of executing the 
instruction of each record is given. Each instruction is represented in three parts (opcode-1, 
opcode-2 and the operand) for simplification purposes. After processing each record for the 
Accumulative-duty-period of the ACC, the results obtained are shown in Table-6.3. Cond-1 
and Cond-2 are binary variables defined as follows:
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•  Cond-1 = 1 if  the current register (i.e. the ACC) is used in the instruction o f the current 
record.
•  Cond-2 = 1 if  the instruction o f the current record is a “duty cycle modification instruction”.
Record No. Cond-1 Cond-2 Content of Cycle-counter Accumulative-
duty-period
1 1 0 7d 1
2 0 0 7e 1
3 1 0 7f 3
4 0 0 80 3
5 1 1 81 5
6 1 0 83 6
7 1 0 84 7
8 0 0 85 7
9 0 0 87 7
10 1 0 89 0D
11 0 0 8b 0D
12 1 1 8d 0E*
Table-6.3: Results obtained from processing the data in Table-6.3 for the accumulative-duty cycle o f  the 
ACC. *The instruction in this record took one clock cycle to execute.
Processing is done in the following steps:
1. Record one is processed. Opcode-2 and the operand are each compared with the format(s) in 
which the ACC and its associated bits are normally represented in the 8051 instruction set. A  
match (the operand) is found. Thus, the ACC was used during the execution o f this instruction 
(cond-1 =  1) and the accumulative-duty-period at this point equal to the execution period for 
this instruction only. That is, 7eH-7dH which is 1 clock cycle. Before processing the second 
record, 7eH is saved as a variable.
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2. The second record is processed and Cond-1 is determined as 0. Thus, the ACC was not used 
during the execution o f the instruction in this record. The accumulative-duty-period is not 
incremented.
3. On processing the third record, Cond-1 is determined as 1. Opcode-1 is compared with 
“SETB” or “CLR” but a match is not found. It is therefore compared with MOV, MOVC or 
M OVX and a match is identified. The software then checks if  data is being written into or read 
from the ACC. Since data is being read from the ACC, any existing SEU(s) will propagate. 
Hence, the instruction is not a “duty cycle modification instruction” ( Cond-2 = 0). The 
accumulative-duty-period is therefore incremented by the execution period from the last but 
one instruction during which the ACC was used to the end o f executing the third instruction. 
That is, 80H-7EH = 2 clock cycles.
4. Similarly, the remaining records are fetched and processed. The instruction in the fifth record 
is a “duty cycle modification” instruction. The accumulative-duty-period is therefore 
incremented only by the time it takes to execute this instruction only, that is, 83H-81H = 2 
clock cycles.
5. The total accumulative-duty-period is divided by the execution time (8EH-7DH) to give the 
duty cycle for the ACC. Typically, the content o f the cycle counter should be zero at the 
beginning o f executing the first instruction such that the program execution time is equivalent 
to the content o f the cycle counter at the end o f executing the last instruction.
By computing the duty cycle for all the registers of a microprocessor, the average duty cycle 
per register can be determined. Hence, the average expected observable SEU induced error 
rate for the microprocessor executing the software, expressed as a percentage to the worst- 
case upset rate can be computed.
6.6 P r e lim in a r y  S im ulatio n s a n d  R esu lts
To demonstrate the practicality of this model, four simple software programs were analysed. 
The characteristics of these programs are shown in Table-6.4 and the results obtained are 
summarised in Table-6.5.
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Execution Time 
in cycles
Size in Bytes of 
Hex file
Notes
Program-1 63 271 A sequence of arithmetic, logic and data transfer 
operations aiming to use as many instructions and 
registers as possible.
Program-2 105 369 Loads ten external data memory locations, reads 
and add them and the result compared with the 
expected result.
Program-3 164 212 Repetition of the previous task but loading and 
addition are done using a loop operation.
Program-4 131 355 Load a number of registers and data memory 
location, enters delay loop for a short duration, 
then reads the memory locations and registers and 
adds the data together. The result obtained is 
compared with the expected result.
Table-6.4: Characteristics o f software programs use for preliminary simulations.
Each program consists of two modules: an initialisation module that is common to all 
programs and a second module different in each case with the following characteristics:
1. The first program consists o f a judicious mix o f instructions from the instruction set. Eighteen 
different instructions were utilised and sixteen registers were exercised.
2. The objective o f the second and third programs were the same, but different program structures 
were implemented. The aim is to load ten external memory addresses with data and on 
completion, read and add the data, and compare the results with the expected results. Loops 
were implemented to carry out the task in the third program whilst no loops were implemented 
in the second program.
3. The fourth program was designed such that registers and internal memory locations are loaded 
and left for sometime before being read, added, and the results compared with the expected 
results.
The execution time for each program was approximated by dividing the total time that each 
program was running by the number of times that it was executed.
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Program-1 Program-2 Program-3 Program-4
ACC 94 69 47 24
B 81 45 84 23
R0 0 74 82 01
R1 0 90 89 94
R2 1 92 0 96
R3 5 0 92 50
R4 97 0 0 84
R5 15 0 0 77
R6 34 0 0 78
R7 18 0 0 80
PC 100 100 100 100
PSW 100 100 100 100
SP 100 100 100 100
P0 0 0 0 0
PI 0 0 0 0
P2 0 0 0 0
P3 0 0 0 0
PCON 0 0 0 0
TCON 98 97 96 8
SCON 100 100 100 100
TMOD 99 99 99 99
SBUF 0 1 1 1
IE 0 0 0 0
IP 0 0 0 0
TL0 0 0 0 0
TL1 0 0 0 0
TH0 0 0 0 0
TH1 99 98 98 98
DPL 0 0 0 0
DPH 0 0 0 0
Average 34.7 35.5 36.3 40.4
Table-6.5: Duty cycle for the various registers (expressed as a percentage o f total execution time)
obtained for software programs in Table-6.4
6.7 D isc u ssio n  A nd  A ppl ic a t io n s  o f  M o d el
The results in Table-6.5 were as expected. In real operation, the observable SEU induced 
error rate for program 4 is expected to be higher than for the other test programs since data is 
held in some of the registers for long intervals before being read. Compared to test programs 
1, 2 and 3; the bank registers R0-R7 have been used sparingly compared to their usage in test 
program 4. The average duty cycle for these registers ranges from 0.21-0.33 for test programs 
1 to 3 compared to 0.70 for test program 4. The control registers (TCON, SCON, TMOD and
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timer register TH1) were all utilised in the initialisation section common to all programs. 
Consequently, they have roughly the same duty cycle in each program. The PC, PSW and the 
SP are each assigned a duty cycle of a 100%. To ensure that the model was working as 
expected, each test program was re-executed in single-step mode. As each instruction was 
executed, the accumulative-duty-period for each register was computed and compared with 
the results generated by the model. At the end of the exercise, a level of confidence was 
gained with the validity and capabilities of the model.
Besides enabling us to predict the SEU vulnerability of different application programs, the 
model can be used to compare the SEU vulnerability of different program structures as 
illustrated with programs 2 and 3. Software engineers are occasionally faced with the problem 
of identifying the best structure in which to implement a particular software routine. For on­
board satellite software, it is of paramount importance that the structure chosen in less 
vulnerable to SEU induced errors. That is, the amount of time for which registers and 
unprotected RAM is holding useful data during execution must be minimised. Using this type of 
model the optimum software structure for a particular satellite application can be identified.
Duty cycle prediction models similar to the ones just described can be developed for other 
microprocessors being considered for space applications. A basic understanding of the 
architecture of the microprocessor and its instruction set will be necessary. Particular care has to 
be taken to identify “duty cycle modification instructions”. Verifying the usage of bit addresses 
in an instruction was found to be a difficult problem in the example discussed because of the 
following reasons:
• A register bit address can be represented by as many as three different formats as discussed in 
Section 6.3.
•  The bit addresses o f some registers are represented by the simulator in a completely different 
format to that in the instruction set. For example, an instruction such as:
SETB 0A8H
will be displayed by the simulator and thus, in file-3  in the form
SETB Tl+15(OA8H).
Registers can also be represented by their names or corresponding addresses. To write t h e  
software routine that checks for the usage of bits and registers, it was therefore necessary t o  
identify the formats in which each bit and each register can be represented in the instniction s e t  
and in the simulator. Since this procedure has been well thought through in this e x a m p l e ,  
writing similar functions for other microprocessors is expected to be less difficult. N e v e r t h e l e s s ,
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the architecture and instruction set for each microprocessor is different. It should be expected 
that microprocessors with more bit addressable registers and bit manipulation instructions would 
pose a greater problem to model than those with less of both features.
6.8 L im itations Of  T he M odel
There are some limitations to this model. Firstly, assuming that the duty cycle for status registers 
is 100% and that control registers are holding useful data from the moment they are first 
initialised until the execution of software is complete, will lead to slight overestimation of the 
observable SEU induced error rate. Beside the fact that some bits of status and control registers 
are not implemented, it is unlikely that upsets of all implemented bits will induce observable 
errors in a system. For example, consider the interrupt priority registers (IP) shown in Figure- 
6.4.
PT2 PS FT1 PX1 f id PXQ
IP.7: Not Implemented
IP.7: Not Implemented ~
IP.5: Defines the Tima- 2 
interrupt priority level.
IP.4: Defines the Serial Port 
interrupt priority levelr
IP.O: Defines the External interrupt 0  
priority level.
IP. 1: Defines the Tima- 0 interrupt 
priority level.
IP.2: Defines External interrupt 1 
"priority level.
IP.3: Defines the Tima- 1 interrupt 
“ priority level.
Figure-6.4: The Interrupt Priority Register.
Provided that for a particular system Timer 0, Timer 1 and the Serial Port interrupts [INT-90] 
were the only interrupts enabled and that, the priority levels for these interrupts have been 
defined. If any of the external interrupt priority level bits (IP.O or IP.2) is set or cleared as a 
result of an SEU, no errors will be induced in the system because these external interrupts are 
not enabled. For control and status registers, 9.7% of the bits are not implemented. Thus, an 
upset in any of these bits will not induce observable errors.
The second limitation of the model could underestimate the observable SEU induced error 
rate instead. Since it is not possible to access some logic units within the microprocessor,
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determining when data is written into and read from them is not possible. Hence, these units 
are not modelled by the simulator and were therefore not included in the duty cycle prediction 
model. Since data is temporarily stored in these units during execution, upsets in them could 
still induce observable errors if they occur while they are holding useful data. Thus, the 
proposed model could underestimate the observable SEU induced error rate by a factor that 
depends on the ratio of the number of non-accessible SEU susceptible logic units to the total 
number of susceptible units within the microprocessor. The estimated observable SEU 
induced error rate calculated using the tool will be closer to the real value for a 
microprocessor with a smaller percentage of non-accessible logic units. It will be very 
difficult to make a good estimate of the number of non-accessible SEU susceptible logic units 
of a microprocessor without detailed knowledge of its achitecture from the manufacturer. For 
the 8051 microprocessor, I believe that registers in this class includes: the instruction register, 
TMP1, TMP2, ALU, the RAM address register, the program address register, the buffer and 
the PC incrementer only, as shown on the architecture in Figure-5.3. Provided this is true and 
that each register has eight bits, then they consistute ~21% of the total SEU susceptible cross- 
section of the 8051 core plus register bank 1. Therefore, considering this factor only, an 
accuracy of -80% may be obtained for analyses performed for software running on the 8051 
microprocessor (using the SFRs and register bank 1 only). In Chapter 8, future work is 
proposed to enable proper validation of the model.
Another limitation associated with the example discussed is the limited capacity of dScope-51 
simulator’s buffer. This places a restriction on the size of the software that can be analysed. 
During software processing, each instruction executed is automatically saved in the buffer for 
analyses. This buffer can only hold information on the last 256 instructions executed. Thus, 
the execution must be halted after this number of instructions so that information in the buffer 
can be saved before it is overwritten. This is a tedious task for a program with millions of 
instruction.
Thirdly, the duty cycle for the serial buffer register (SBUF) cannot be calculated uisng this 
model. Although this register is user accessible it is actually a path to two non-accessible logic 
units (the transmit buffer and receive buffer). When data is written into SBUF, it is transferred 
to the transmit buffer and when data is read from SBUF, it comes from the receive buffer. Since 
the model computes the accumulative duty period for a register from the interval between which 
data is written and subsequently read from it, it was not possible to apply the same principle in 
this case since the destination and source of data are different. To improve the accuracy of
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results, it is proposed that practical estimates should be made for the duty cycle for this register 
depending on the frequency of using the serial port and hence, the serial buffer.
6.9 A n a ly sin g  A  R e a l  A p pl ic a t io n  S o ftw a r e  E x a m pl e
Before concluding this Chapter, results from analysing a real application software are 
presented. These results are compared with predictions obtained using the traditional method, 
and the improvement in prediction accuracy gained with the model is shown.
The UoSAT telecommand system software was analysed as an example. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, the 87C51 microcontroller functions as part of the telecommand (TC) subsystem 
to decode and issue commands to other subsystems. The TC frame is seven bytes long and 
decoding commences by checking asynchronous serial data receives via the serial port for a 
valid TC frame. If the frame is valid, the appropriate subsystem to which the command is to 
be sent is identified, the data is processed and the command is issued. As the microprocessor 
processes and issues a command, the data files {file-1 and file-2) containing each instruction 
executed and the content of the cycle counter were assembled. The model then processes the 
files and computes the duty cycles for the SFRs, the PC and the registers R0-R7 of register 
bank 0. The results obtained are given in Table-6.6.
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Register Duty Cycle (%) l Register . Duty Cycle (%)
A 57 SCON 98
B 3 TCON 99
R0 79 PCON 98
R1 67 TMOD 98
R2 33 IE 100
R3 18 B m B M I 100
R4 63 TL0 1
R5 73 0
R6 72 TH0 1
R7 14 TH1 98
PSW 100 | SBUF 100
PC 100 P0■ vn''' ; 0
SP 100 M M 0
DPL 3 P2 0
DPH 3 P3 0
Table-6.6: Registers and their respective duty cycles for the 8051 processor when 
executing the UoSAT Telecommand software.
The duty cycle of each register of register banks 1, 2 and 3 (not included in Table-6.6) is 0% 
since none of these banks were used during the execution of the software. The PC is used at 
all times, thus its duty cycle is 100%. The status registers (PSW and SP) are assumed to be in 
continuous usage thus, they are automatically assigned duty cycles of 100% also. The control 
registers: SCON, TCON, PCON, TMOD, IE and IP are initialised at the beginning of 
executing the software, hence, their duty cycles are 100% or close to this value. The timer 
TH1 is also used continuously from initialisation since its defines the baudrate. The serial 
port is used most of the time since the microcontroller continuously receives incoming 
characters. The duty cycle of the serial buffer was therefore estimated as 100%. From these 
results, the average duty cycle per register for all registers of the 8051 microprocessor 
(consisting of the 21 SFRs, the PC and R0-R7 of register banks 0-3) was calculated as -29%. 
In Chapter 5, the worst case (assuming a duty cycle for each register is 100%) observable 
SEU induced error rate for the 8051 microprocessor was predicted as -0.5 for the SSF 
radiation environment. When the duty cycle for each register as predicted above was 
considered, this number was reduced by a factor of -3.6 (to -0.14 SEU induced observable 
errors /microprocessor-year).
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The application cross-section predicted above assumes that the microprocessor of each 
decoder of the UoSAT TC system is continuously decoding commands. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, three of the decoders (0, 2 and 3) are redundant systems and are rarely used. Only 
decoder 1 is used regularly. The application cross-section of decoder 1 was computed and 
compared with the worst case estimate.
The microprocessor of decoder 1 processes a maximum of six commands every ten minutes. 
This is equivalent to a maximum of 56.4 ms of working time for the microprocessor in every 
ten minutes. When this fraction is considered, the duty cycles of some of the registers (A, B, 
Rl, R2, R3, R4, R7, DPL, DPH, TLO and THO) becomes very small (~9.4xl0'7%) since these 
registers are always re-loaded at the beginning of processing a new TC frame. In between 
valid commands, the microprocessor processes noise characters received or is in idle mode 
and some general purpose registers (RO, R5 and R6) and all control registers are holding 
useful data. Thus, if an upset occurs in any of these registers, the adverse effect on the system 
may be observed as soon as the microprocessor received a valid TC frame. As execution time 
tend to infinity, the duty cycles for these registers tend to 100% since, the percentage 
deviation of their total accumulative-duty-periods from the execution time becomes smaller. 
When these values were considered, the average duty cycle for each register of the 
microprocessor of decoder 1 was estimated as ~26%. The average observable SEU induced 
error cross-section associated with SEUs in the microprocessor as its executes the TC 
software was therefore predicted as 0.12 (observable SEU induced errors/year- 
microprocessor). Thus, the worst case estimate (of 0.5 SEU induced observable errors 
/microprocessor-year) overestimates the application cross-section of the microprocessor by a 
factor greater than four.
In a ten year period, the average expected number of observable SEU induced errors for this 
microprocessor is therefore 1.2. Assuming that the occurrence of SEUs follow a Poisson 
distribution, the approximate 95% confidence interval for this result is 0.4 to 4.8. For the 
worst case observable SEU induced error rate of 0.5 per microprocessor per year, the average 
expected number of observable SEU induced errors in a ten year period will be 5 per 
microprocessor. The approximate 95% confidence interval for this result is 3 to 11. Again, 
the worst case therefore overestimates the upper and lower 95% confidence interval 
boundaries of the application dependent estimate by factors of ~2 and ~8 respectively.
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Furthermore, if all SEU susceptible bits (i.e. including the internal RAM) of the decoder (the 
87C51 microcontroller described in Section 5.2.1) are considered, the worst case average 
expected number of observable SEU induced errors in the decoder in a ten year period will be 
-13. This results overestimates the average application dependent observable SEU induced 
error rate for the microprocessor of decoder 1 by more than an order of magnitude.
6.10 C o n c l u d in g  R e m a r k s
This Chapter has summarised a new methodology for computing the duty cycles of 
microprocessor registers associated with the execution of a real satellite application software. 
It demonstrates the use of a microprocessor simulator and software developed using 
knowledge of the microprocessor’s architecture and instruction set. The following list 
summarises the work done:
• A  function was defined which together with in-built features o f  DS51 enabled each 
instruction executed and the status o f the cycle counter to be traced and saved in a file during 
execution.
• The architecture o f the 8051 microprocessor core as given in a user’s manual was studied and 
registers were classified according to their various functions. Registers which are thought be 
in continuous use during execution and those whose usage is partly controlled by hardware 
embedded features were identified.
•  The instruction set was studied and instructions that are capable o f overwriting SEUs were 
identified.
•  A  program which processes the information assembled during execution to compute duty 
cycles o f the microprocessor registers was design, coded and tested.
• Typical flight software was analysed to demonstrate the capabilities o f the model. It was 
shown that the influence of software if taken into consideration could increase the prediction 
accuracy by a factor o f four or more.
This is the first investigation into the possibility of using the methodology presented herein to 
accurately predict the observable SEU induced error rate in microprocessor systems. The 
software example analysed has confirmed that the observable SEU induced error rate in 
microprocessor systems could be over-predicted if the influence of software is ignored. 
Although there are some limitations with the model, the feasibility of the methodology has 
been successfully proven. Proposals for future work are discussed in Chapter 8 in which the 
aim is to develop an improved model.
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CHAPTER 7 
PREDICTING THE NATURE OF OBSERVABLE SEU 
INDUCED ERRORS IN MICROPROCESSOR SYSTEMS
7.1 In t r o d u c t io n
Predicting the rate of observable SEU induced errors in microprocessor systems1 does not give 
any information regarding the nature errors that are observed. Understanding whether a SEU 
in a microprocessor will cause a system to fail catastrophically or simply lose service for a 
short duration is useful information in determining its suitability use in a particular space 
application. This Chapter presents a new software model for predicting the nature of 
observable SEU induced errors at microprocessor systems level.
Section 7.2 presents the current method used and describes the drawbacks that are associated 
with this method. A new approach is proposed which will enable the identification and 
quantification of different types of errors through software simulation. This approach involves 
the use of a software model which is described in Section 7.3. To demonstrate the practicality 
of this new approach, the UoSAT TC software was again analysed and errors were classified 
into three categories: fatal, transient and result errors, all defined in a later section of this 
Chapter. The software was then simulated using the model. The results are presented and 
discussed in Section 7.4. Validation of the model has been attempted and preliminary results 
are introduced in Section 7.5. A discussion on the benefits followed by the present limitations 
of the model are discussed in Sections 7.6 and 7.7 respectively. Concluding remarks are 
summarised in Section 7.8.
7.2  B a c k g r o u n d
According to Oberg [OBE-94] and Li [LI-84], microprocessor SEU induced errors can be 
classified into two main categories; program flow errors (also known as sequencing errors) and
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data errors. Data errors result from upsets that simply change data words while sequencing 
errors disturb the program execution path causing the microprocessor to skip certain sections 
of the code or execute certain sections more than once. The general belief is that sequencing 
errors are more “fatal” than data errors. For the 8051 microprocessor, sequencing errors are 
associated with upsets of the program counter (PC), certain special function registers (SFRs) 
and status registers. Data errors are associated with upsets in the data memory, counters, and 
also certain SFRs. Therefore, the percentage of observable SEU induced fatal errors is 
estimated from the percentage of SEUs that occur in registers associated with fatal errors and 
the percentage of data errors is estimated from the percentage of SEUs that occur in registers 
associated with data errors.
Although these extrapolations could be correct if the internal operation of the device only is 
considered, the effect observed at the system level can be different depending on the software 
that the microprocessor is executing. For example, depending on the microprocessor’s 
software, a data word upset could eventually cause a program flow error if the corrupted data 
is used to compute a code address during execution. Also, program flow errors which are not 
severe could go unnoticed but later manifest themselves as data errors at the system level. In 
effect, there is no direct correspondence between the effect of a SEU observed at system level 
and the register in which it occurred. The types of observable errors will vary with the 
software that the microprocessor is executing.
This has been illustrated by several authors [VEL-92, EST-94, BEZ-97]. The approach 
adopted by these authors is the same. A test system capable of detecting different types of 
errors is used to carry out ground based radiation tests on the microprocessor while it is 
executing software. Examples of error types include: data errors and sequencing errors (as 
defined above) and address errors which occur when the microprocessor tries to access a 
prohibited or non-existing address. Other examples include: time out errors, interrupt errors 
and slip errors defined in [BEZ-97]. During irradiation, errors in each category are detected 
and recorded.
This method is in fact, the most suitable method for detecting and quantifying the different 
types of errors observed at the microprocessor system’s level due to SEUs in the 
microprocessor. However, the cost of repeating ground-based radiation experiments, every
* It is assumed that, the microprocessor is the only device of the system that is susceptible to SEU damage 
by radiation.
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time software is changed is prohibitively expensive. This is one of the inherent problems with 
small LCSS (e.g. the UoSAT series) as they employ a design methodology whereby the on­
board software can be subject to frequent changes.
To avoid re-testing every time new software is loaded, the duty cycle prediction model will 
enabled better predictions of the observable SEU induced error rate in microprocessor 
systems. In addition, a software model (a SEU simulation model) has been developed for 
studying the different types of errors that may be observed at microprocessor systems’ level 
due to SEUs in the microprocessor.
7.3 A SEU SIMULATION MODEL
This simulation model was also developed for the 8051 microprocessor [INT-95]. The model 
consists of an 8051 simulator [KIE-91], a function that injects SEUs from the background into 
the simulator during execution (a SEU injection function), and a second function (a status 
function) that keeps a record of the microprocessor’s internal state (see Figure-7.1). The 
microprocessor’s internal state, at any time represents the content of all the SFR registers, 
registers of the current register bank, the PC and the cycle counter.
Software SEUs
Microprocessor
Simulator
No error observed. Error observed:
SEU overwritten or -by erratic behaviour in
injected in a non- execution sequence,
relevant register. "by file compare.
Figure-7.1: SEU simulation model.
The simulator is programmed to execute the software and during execution, the SEU injection 
function running in the background, selects a register and injects an upset into it. The time at 
which an upset is injected, the register into which it is injected and the particular bit that is 
changed are all randomly selected. The effect of each injected upset is determined either 
through erratic behaviour observed in the execution sequence of the software, incorrect
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outputs from the systems or by manual comparison of the internal state of the microprocessor 
(as assembled by the status function) at the end of each execution cycle with its internal state 
at the end of an “upset-free” execution cycle. The components of the model are individually 
examined below.
7.3.1 The Microprocessor Simulator
The Kiel Elektronix dScope-51 simulator was also used for this model. Most of the features 
used for the duty cycle prediction model were also found useful. The software (in Hex format) 
is loaded into the simulator and execution is started. Since the objective of the simulation 
model is to model the execution of software in the presence of SEUs and monitor the system’s 
response, execution is done in single-step mode. This enables the SEU injection and the 
subsequent tracking of errors to be followed via the language and register windows. In 
addition to these features, dScope-51 supports three classes of functions:
•  Pre-defined (built-in) functions - which are functions that are always defined and cannot be 
deleted or re-defined by the user.
•  User defined functions - which are functions defined by the user. They utilise pre-defined 
functions.
•  Signal functions - which are functions used to generate signals which can be applied on the 
input lines o f the 8051 CPU. They run in the background during program execution and are 
time-tagged to the dScope-51 clock.
All dScope-51 functions are written in a subset of the C programming language (8051 
embedded C).
7.3.2 The SEU Injection Function
The SEU injection function is a user defined signal function. It randomly injects an SEU from 
the background into the simulator during execution. The following dScope-51 pre-defined 
functions were used to develop the SEU injection function:
1. “void twatch(long cycles)” - which was used to set a temporal breakpoint during program 
execution such that a SEU can be injected. Commencing from the current clock cycle, the 
parameter “cycles” is used to define the number o f clock cycles that must elapse before the 
breakpoint is activated.
2. “int rand(int seed)” - which was used to randomly select the time at which a SEU is injected, 
the register into which it is injected and the particular bit that is changed:
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3. “void  p rin tf(string,...)” - which was used to print information to the screen, from where it is 
saved in a file for later analysis.
The time at which an SEU is injected is determined by assigning a different value to the 
parameter “cycles” during each execution cycle. This value is randomly chosen using the 
function “rand”. The same approach is used to randomly select a register and the particular bit 
whose state is changed. To change the state of a bit, an “XOR” operation is performed with the 
content of the selected register and a suitable integer number. For example, to change the state 
of the least significant bit of the accumulator with content FFH, the following operation “A 
OR 01H” is executed and the result FEH is retained in the accumulator. The code for the SEU 
injection function is included in Appendix C.
7.3.3 The Status Function
The status function is a user defined function. A method similar to that described in section 6.2 
was used to trace and save the internal state of all the CPU registers, and the cycle counter to a 
file during execution. From this file, it is possible to tell at what clock cycle a SEU was 
injected, the register into which it was injected, what the processor was doing at the time of 
injection and in most cases the response of the system to the upset. The code for the status 
function is also included in Appendix C.
7.3.4 The Microprocessor system and software
To study the response of a microprocessor system to SEUs using this model, an “external 
state” of the system must be defined. Assuming that all other parts of the system are working 
as expected and are not subject to faults during execution, a comprehensive set of possible 
outputs of the system while the microprocessor is subject to SEUs represents its external state. 
The external state will normally vary from no effect, to complete failure of the system. In 
between these extremes, are errors in various degrees of severity. The UoSAT TC system and 
its software were analysed as examples to illustrate the concept and to demonstrate the 
application of the model.
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7.4 A  C a se  st u d y  : T h e  U oSA T  T e le c o m m a n d  S y st e m
7.4.1 The System’s External State
The external state of the UoSAT TC system can be defined as shown in Figure-7.2.
S E U
Fault Free Correct command issued 
at correct time
♦ Incorrect command issued 
at correct time 
■* Correct command issued 
at incorrect time
Error Free 
Telecommand 
Frames
+. Incorrect command 
issued at incorrect time
■►No command issued
Decoder
(Microprocessor)
Figure-7.2: UoSAT TC System With Defined External State.
If the output of the system is nominal (that is, the correct command is issued at the correct 
time), then the SEU may have been overwritten, or it may have occurred in a register that was 
never used during the execution of the software. Erroneous outputs (2-5) may arise from one 
or more of the following:
♦ A SEU in a data register that was holding useful data at the time o f its occurrence.
♦ A SEU that disrupted the execution sequence, leading to incorrect computation.
♦ A SEU that corrupted an address register resulting in data being fetched from an 
incorrect location.
♦ A  SEU that corrupted a control register resulting to a change in the CPU’s mode of 
operation.
This is a sample of the immediate effects that will be observed inside a microprocessor 
following the occurrence of a SEU during execution. However, the manner in which these 
errors will propagate and subsequently manifest themselves at the microprocessor system level 
will depend on the application software.
The external state of a system (defined above) provides a useful means of classification of 
errors to engineers who need to understand the system. However, users may not be interested
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in the technical details of a system. Instead, they will find parameters which help them to 
quickly assess the overall system reliability associated with SEU in the microprocessor more 
useful. For example, knowing how many times the system will crash, how many times the 
system will be able to recover from minor errors without external inputs, etc. For this reason, 
the outputs of the TC system external state could be further classified into the following three 
categories:
•  Fatal errors - errors that will require a reset o f the microprocessor to resume normal 
operation. If there is no response from the system following the occurrence o f a SEU, it is 
logical to conclude that a fatal error has occurred (the system has crashed). Hence, all 
outputs in this category were considered as fatal.
•  Transient errors - errors where the current execution cycle was incorrect but the 
microprocessor was able to operate normally within the next cycle without a reset. Issuing 
correct commands at incorrect times were also considered as transient errors.
•  Result errors - errors where the program appeared to have been correctly executed but the 
result was incorrect. Issuing incorrect commands at the correct time were considered as 
result errors.
It is important to note that, the “external state” as defined in this Thesis will vary with the 
system under consideration. Knowledge of the system’s design will normally be required in 
order to define a useful external state for the system.
7.4.2 Methods for Detecting Errors
When all possible types of SEU induced errors have been identified and, a method of detecting 
each class during the simulations must be defined. For the TC system, result errors were easy 
to detect. The command issued and the time that it was issued were saved to a file (using the 
status function) and compared with the expected results from an “upset free” execution cycle. 
This method was also used to detect some fatal and transient errors. This was particularly 
useful in cases where the response of the system to an upset could not be observed with the 
simulator. For example, SEUs that cause the baud rate to change. In a real system, if the baud 
rate is changed, the processor will not be able to communicate with external equipment until 
the corrupted bits are corrected or the whole processor is reset. With the simulator, such a 
problem can not be physically observed. The method of comparing files is the only feasible 
way to identify such errors. For this reason, a detailed understanding of the function of each
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microprocessor bit and how it contributes to the reliability of the system is mandatory in order 
to use the model efficiently.
Other fatal and transient errors were detected by observing a sudden unpredictable behaviour 
in the program’s execution sequence. The effects of SEUs on the TC system were simulated 
and are discussed in the next section and examples of such sudden unpredictable behaviour are 
given.
7.4.3 Simulating the Effects of SEUs on the UoSAT TC Software
To demonstrate the practical application of the model, the UoSAT TC software was simulated. 
The following steps were taken:
•  DS51 was evoked and the 87C51 peripheral loaded.
•  The software was loaded.
• The status function was loaded.
•  The SEU  injection function was loaded and evoked.
Twenty-nine of the 8051 registers were included in the simulations. The serial buffer (SBUF) 
register could not be included in the simulations because of its mode of operation. This point is 
explained in detail in Section 7.7. A SEU injection function with twenty-nine registers was too 
large to be loaded into the simulator at once. The simulator would crash whenever an attempt 
was made to load the function. The function was therefore subdivided into three smaller 
functions. Two of the functions had ten registers and the third function had nine registers. The 
random number interval was divided equally among the registers of each function and a 
proportionate number of simulations were then performed with each function. Registers of 
banks 1, 2 and 3 were not included in the simulations since it was obvious that SEUs in these 
registers will not affect the execution of the software.
At the start of a simulation, execution commences at code address zero and continues 
uninterrupted until the initialisation section of the software code is completely executed. The 
initialisation section of the software configures the serial port, the interrupt system and the 
port registers. The software then enters a loop where it continuously checks characters 
received via the serial port, looking for the first byte of a command frame. To enter a byte 
(character) into the simulator, the cursor is moved to the serial window of the simulator, the
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character is entered and the cursor is then returned to the execution window. The command 
frame (discussed in Section 5.2.2) processed by the software during the simulations was the 
same. That is: 31H 32H 33H 01H 4FH 78H 50H.
In an “upset free” condition, if a valid command frame is received, it takes 1260 clock cycles 
for the CPU to process and issue the command and, return to the loop where it continues to 
check for the arrival of new valid frames. The next execution cycle takes slightly fewer cycles 
(1235) since the initialisation section of the code is not executed. The execution time per cycle 
(1260 clock cycles) is equivalent to 6.8 milliseconds for a microprocessor operating at a 
frequency of 1.8432 MHz. Typically, the probability of more than one SEU occurring within 
this time interval in a typical spacecraft orbit is extremely small except for Multiple Bit Upsets 
(MBU) induced by single particles. Thus, it is very unlikely that more than one SEU will occur 
within one execution cycle. One SEU only was therefore injected per execution cycle. The 
SEU injection function was re-loaded at the beginning of each cycle with different random 
numbers assigned to the SEU injection function for the random selection of a register and a bit 
in that cycle.
To speed-up each simulation cycle, only the content of registers of the SEU injection function 
currently being used and a candidate selection of registers which were found useful in 
determining whether a command frame was correctly executed were saved to a file for 
analysis. From this file, it was possible to determine when a SEU was injected and to track the 
propagation of the SEU during execution. The method of “file compare” was then used to 
identify result errors, and some transient and fatal errors.
To obtain statistically significant results, the Poisson distribution was used to determine the 
number of simulations that were needed. The target was to obtain results within a 95% 
confidence interval with approximately ±10% deviations from the mean. From calculations, it 
was clear that least 270 errors had to be observed to meet this target. Current features of DS51 
were not sufficient to allow the simulation process to be automated. Thus, it took 
approximately one hundred and twenty man-hours to obtain these results. This simulation time 
will vary depending on execution time per cycle of the software being simulated, the number 
of manual responses per cycle. With an execution time of 6.8 milliseconds (i.e., for the 
microprocessor operating at a frequency of 1.8432 MHz) and six manual responses per 
execution cycle, it took roughly 6 minutes to simulate one SEU.
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7.4.4 Results
Table-7.1 shows the distribution of upsets and the effects observed among the registers
included in the simulations.
Register Number 
of SEUs 
injected
Percentage 
of Fatal 
Errors
Percentage 
of Transient 
Errors
Percentage 
of Result 
Errors
Total Number of errors as a 
percentage of SEUs Injected
ACC 28 3.6 25 0 28.6
B 22 0 0 0 0
RO 18 0 66.7 0 66.7
R1 24 0 37.5 0 37.5
R2 17 0 11.8 0 11.8
R3 25 0 0 36 36
R4 21 0 66.7 0 66.7
R5 22 0 77.2 0 77.2
R6 21 0 66.7 0 66.7
R7 16 0 0 0 0
PC 30 46.7 43.3 0 90
SP 18 11.1 61.1 0 72.2
PSW 27 0 7.4 0 7.4
SCON 16 100 0 0 100
TCON 21 4.8 42.9 0 47.7
PCON 25 12 0 0 12
TMOD 28 78.6 0 0 78.6
PO 28 0 0 0 0
PI 16 0 56.3 0 56.3
P2 27 0 0 7.4 7.4
P3 24 8.3 0 0 8.3
TLO 14 0 64.3 0 64.3
TL1 25 0 80 0 80
THO 15 0 80 0 80
TH1 23 100 0 0 100
IP 17 0 0 0 0
IE 31 41.9 9.7 0 51.6
DPL 17 0 0 0 0
DPH 16 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 632 15.3 25.8 1.7 42.8
Table-7.1: Distribution of injected upsets and the effects observed among registers for 632 trials.
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7.4.5 Discussion
For all twenty-nine registers included in the simulations between 14 and 31 SEUs were 
injected per register. Thus, all user accessible registers of the microprocessor were well 
exercised during the simulations. To establish that the results obtained were as expected, it is 
necessary to understand fully the structure of the software and the functions of each register as 
the software is processed.
As stated in Chapter 5, the UoSAT TC system receives data from ground command stations 
and satellite on-board data sources, validates it and uses it to control the state of latches which 
sends these commands to other subsystems of the spacecraft. The software sequence 
(structure) can be depicted as shown in Figure-7.3. Following start-up or reset, the control 
registers (PCON, SCON, TMOD, TCON) and Timer 1 are used to configure the serial port. 
The two most significant bits of the serial control register (SCON) specify the mode of 
operation of the serial port as an 8-bit UART [INT-95]. Three other bits (0, 4 and 5) were also 
identifed as useful for correct operation of the seial port in the mode defined. These bits and 
two additional bits (1 and 3) which could not be identified by the TC system engineer as 
important in the operation of the serial port were seen to cause fa ta l  errors. As a result, the 
functions of each of the latter were then re-considered. For bit 3, it was not clear why upsets at 
this bit location were inducing observable errors. It is possible that a better understanding of 
the internal architecture of the processor will provide a explanation for this effect. However, it 
was found that, the state of bit 1 was in fact very important. Since this bit is the transmit 
interrupt flag, if it is set high by an upset, the microprocessor will automatically generate a 
“call routine” to the “vector address” of this interrupt. But because this interrupt was not used 
in the software, an exit point of the interrupt routine is never found. In effect, a sequencing 
error will occur. This result identifies a significant application of the SEU simulation tool. 
A lth o u g h  in  m o s t ca ses  a  s y s te m 's  en g in e e r  is  c a p a b le  o f  d e d u c in g  th a t a S E U  a t  a  p a r t ic u la r  
b it lo c a tio n  w ill  in d u c e  a n  o b se rva b le  e r ro r  in  th e  system , it  ca n  b e  le ss  o b v io u s  in  so m e  cases. 
U sing  the  S E U  s im u la tio n  tool, b e tte r  a n a ly s is  o f  S E U  e ffe c ts  ca n  b e  p e r fo rm e d .  Overall, the 
results obtained for the SCON register were not far from expectations. Six bits were identified 
as significant by the engineer and all SEUs injected into these bit locations generated fatal 
errors.
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T H1, TL1, IE, P I ,  P2, P3)
Figure-7.3: UoSAT TC system software flow diagram
The baud rate of the serial port (1200 bits per second) is defined using the Power Control 
register (PCON) and Timer 1 (TH1 and TL1). The most significant bit of PCON register is set 
high, defining a double baud rate. The states of the two least significant bits are also useful. 
Setting bits 0 and 1 high puts the microprocessor into idle and power down mode respectively. 
Since it was not necessary to put the microprocessor into any of these states as the simulations 
were performed, the duty cycles for these bits are 100% also. These three bits accounts for the 
fatal errors observed as SEUs were injected into the PCON.
Timer 1 is programmed as an 8-bit auto-reload timer. Thus, TH1 is used to hold a value (254) 
that is re-loaded into TL1 each time it overflows. TH1 therefore has a duty cycle of 100% and 
SEUs injected into this register will change the baud rate. Hence, all SEUs injected into TH1
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induced fatal errors since the microprocessor must be reset to restore the defined baud rate. 
For TL1, it is re-loaded every time it overflows, thus, SEUs injected into this register while the 
microprocessor was receiving characters only caused transient errors. However, because the 
serial port is almost in use continuously, the percentage of errors is high (80%).
Since a Timer is used, the Timer/Counter Control register (TCON) and the Time/Counter 
Mode register (TMOD) are also important. The second most significant bit of TCON is used to 
turn the Timer 1 ON. Bits 4 and 5 of this register are also used for a limited period during 
processing of a TC frame. These bits control the operation of Timer 0 (whose application is 
described in a later paragraph) and were seen to cause transient errors during simulations. 
Typically, this occurs when a 3 ms delay defined by Timer 0 is disturbed by triggering the 
interrupt at a much earlier time or when the timer is turned off. SEUs injected into these bits 
locations (4 & 5) caused 42.9% of transient errors while SEUs that turned the Timer off 
caused fatal errors (4.8% as given in Table-7.1).
For the TMOD register, bits 4-6 and bits 0-2 are used to define the modes of operation of 
Timer 1 and Timer 0 respectively. Observable errors expected by SEUs injected into this 
register were detected using the method of “file compare”. From knowledge of the system’s 
design and operation, it was understood that a SEU in any of the six bits listed will change the 
mode of operation of either Timer. Since it is necessary to reset the processor for the timer to 
restore its mode of operation, it was assumed that all SEUs injected into these bit locations 
will cause fatal errors. This accounts for the 79.6% of fatal errors induced by SEUs in this 
register.
In the initialisation phase, the interrupt system is also configured. The system and the serial 
port interrupt are enabled using the bits 7 and 4 of IE register. The Timer 0 overflow interrupt 
is also utilised at a later time during processing. Thus, bit 1 of the IE register is also useful. If 
the state of any of these bits including the Timer 1 interrupt bit (bit 3 of IE, which must be 
disabled since it is used as the baud rate generator) is changed during processing of the 
software, it is expected that an error will be generated in the system. Precisely, bit 7, 4 and 3 
also have duty cycles of 100%. Observable errors induced by SEUs at these bits locations were 
seen to b & fatal. Typical examples of the types of errors observed include:
•  A SEU that disabled the interrupt enable flag of the IE register and as a result, the whole 
interrupt system was disabled. The simulator was therefore unable to response to all 
interrupts requested.
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•  A  SEU that disabled the serial port interrupt and the serial port was not able to receive 
command bytes. The simulator had to be reset in order to resume normal operation.
• A  SEU enables the Timer 1 interrupt and as a result, the baud rate generator is disrupted.
It was also easy to detect such errors. They are a representation of the class of errors that 
caused unpredictable behaviours in the program flow. SEUs in the IE register also induced 
some transient errors. Again, these were observed when SEUs were injected into the Timer 0 
interrupt flag. Although the flag is holding useful data only for 3 ms as each TC frame is 
processed, it was seen that the interrupt routine is executed at an incorrect time if the flag is 
changed during this interval. The percentage of transient errors (9.7%) induced by SEUs in the 
IE register were caused by this flag. The four remaining bits of the IE register (0, 2, 5 and 6) 
and the interrupt priority (IP) register were not of any significance as far as processing of the 
TC software was concerned. Thus, the results of Table-7.1 agree with the expectations. Four 
bits (50%) of the IE bits were not significant and approximately 50% of the thirty-one SEUs 
that were injected in this register did not induced observable errors.
The ports P0-P3 are also initialised. For the TC frame processed, P0 was not used. Hence, all 
SEUs injected into this register did not cause any effect on the system. The four least 
significant bits of PI are defined to activate transmission of a command to one of the two 
command banks when the transmission lines are clear. Thus, if the state of any of these bits is 
changed during processing, transmission will be activated at an incorrect time. This accounts 
for the significant number of transient errors associated with the register PI. For Port 3, only 
one bit was considered significant. The least significant bit P3.0 which is used as the serial 
input port. If the default state of this bit is changed, it will no longer receive characters arriving 
at the input port. This accounts for the fatal errors (8.3%) observed from SEUs injected in this 
register.
Before a TC frame is processed, the registers rO, r5 and r6 are first loaded with pre-defined 
values which are to be used later. The microprocessor is then programmed to go into idle mode 
by setting the least significant bit of the Power Control (PCON) register high. The 
microprocessor stays in idle mode until a character arrives at the serial port and triggers the 
serial port receive interrupt. The receive interrupt is disabled and the character is read and 
processed. As stated in Section 7.4.3, the TC frame processed during the simulations was: 31H 
32H 33H 01H 4FH 78H 50H.
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Each character of the frame must be processed in sequence. Thus, as each character is received 
it is checked to ensure that it is within the expected range and that it has arrived in the correct 
sequential order. Otherwise, processing of the frame is terminated and the microprocessor re­
loads rO, r5 and r6 and returns to idle mode until the arrival of another character. The first 
three bytes 31H, 32H and 33H are identical for all the UoSAT TC frames and identifies the 
start of a new valid frame. The fourth byte is known as the command bytes identifies where the 
command is to be issued. This byte must be in the interval 0-3H. For the TC frame defined 
above, 01H identifies that the command should be sent to Port 2 of command bank “B”. The 
fifth byte (4FH) is the actual command to be issued and the last two bytes are the expected 
results from a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) that is performed on the first five bytes of the 
frame. By comparing the results from the CRC with these bytes, any errors in the data is 
detected and the command is not issued.
As each character is received and the CRC is performed, the data held by the registers rO, r5 
and r6 is utilised. Thus, if a SEU occurs in any of these registers between the time they are 
initialised and the time the seventh character of the TC frame is processed, it will disrupt the 
processing sequence or the CRC and thus, induced an observable error. This accounts for the 
high percentage of transient errors observed from SEUs injected in these registers. However, 
after the seventh character has been processed, the data held by these registers is no longer 
useful. SEUs in them are overwritten when they are re-initialised at the beginning of 
processing the next command frame.
The registers rl, r2, r4, r7 and the ACC are used mainly as data registers also. Although the 
immediate effects of SEUs in these registers were seen to comprise sequential errors as well as 
incorrect computations from the CRCs, a high percentage of these effects led to transient 
observable errors when the external state of the system as defined in Section 7.4.1 was 
considered. For example, the register rl was used to store a character after it is read from the 
serial buffer. If a SEU changes the value of the character in rl, a check will identify an 
incorrect TC frame and processing will terminated. This is an example of a sequencing error 
that is triggered by a SEU in a data register. Similar kinds of errors were observed from SEUs 
in r4, r2 and the ACC. On the other hand, at least one SEU in the ACC was seen to cause a 
fatal error. Therefore, although these results indicate that a high percentage of observable SEU 
induced transient (less severe) errors are likely to be caused by SEUs in data registers, they do 
not rule out the possibility that more severe errors (fatal) can be caused by SEUs in data 
registers.
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The register r3 is also used as a data register to store the data byte after it is read from the 
receive buffer until it is output to Port 2. During this interval, a SEU in this register will 
change the value of the data and hence, an incorrect command will be issued. This accounts 
for 36% of the result errors that were induced by SEUs in this register. Also, before a 
command is transmitted to Bank B, it is held by Port 2 for 1 ms during which the output lines 
are allowed to settle. During this time, if this data is corrupted, this will also lead to an 
incorrect command being issued. A small number of result errors (7.4%) were induced by 
SEUs injected into the Port 2.
The transmission takes some time before the command lines are ready to receive another 
command. Using the Timer 0 interrupt, a 3 ms delay is defined after which the interrupt then 
activates the command lines indicating that they are ready to transmit the next available 
command. During this 3 ms delay, the processor continues to function normally until it is 
interrupted to execute the interrupt routine. The registers TLO and THO are used to set-up the 
interrupt. Thus, a SEU in any of these registers should increase or decrease the 3 ms delay and 
this can disrupt the transmission of a command. By the method of “file compare”, SEUs 
injected into these registers were seen to cause a high percentage of transient errors.
Surprisingly, although the PC is used at all times, up to 10% of the SEUs injected in this 
register did not induce errors. It was observed that this occurs frequently when the 
microprocessor is executing a loop (e.g. a delay loop) and the SEU causes a slight disruption 
and as a result, a couple of instructions are skipped or executed more than once. If no 
computational error arises, the effect on timing alone is usually very small (a few |is) and was 
considered insignificant. Also of interest, up to 43% of the errors induced by SEUs in the PC 
were transient instead offatal as the traditional method (discussed in Section 7.2) will predict. 
Typically, these errors arise from a similar effect like the one described. However, a 
computation error may arise or the effect on time becomes so large that its is no longer 
insignificant. These results reinforced the importance of the SEU simulation tool. It is some 
times possible to predict from knowledge of software that a SEU in a particular register at 
some known time will induce an observable error. However, predicting the nature of the error 
will be very difficult without a tool such as the SEU simulation discussed here. A wide range 
of fatal errors were also induced by SEUs in the PC. A typical examples was observed when 
the SEU injected caused the PC to point to a memory location where no code was stored.
Only three bits of the PSW were thought to be significant. The register bank select bits and the 
carry flag. These bit were responsible for inducing transient errors (7.4%) as shown in Table-
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7.1. The register bank select bits have 100% duty cycle while the carry flag will induce an 
observable error only if the SEU was injected into it while it was being used. Two of PSW bits 
are undefined and the remaining three are used mainly as s ta tu s  f la g s  in arithmetic operations. 
SEUs in the stack pointer caused errors only when it corrupted the contents which were to be 
used at a later time. Errors observed were mainly transients although a small number of fatal 
errors were also seen. The registers DPL, DPH and B were hardly used thus, all SEUs injected 
in them were overwritten.
It was also of interest to consider the percentages of SEUs injected within the first and the 
second halves of the execution cycle that induced observable errors. SEUs that occur earlier in 
the execution cycle are thought to be more likely to induce errors than SEUs that occur later in 
the execution cycle. The statistics shown in Figure-7.2 agrees with this hypothesis. 
Approximately 10% of the SEUs injected in the first half of the execution cycle caused more 
errors than in the second half.
Execution
Cycle
Total Number 
of SEUs 
Injected
Number of
Fatal
Errors
Number of
Transient
Errors
Number of
Result
Errors
Percentage of Total 
Errors Observed to 
SEUs Injected
1st half 302 48 95 0 47.4
2nd half 330 45 77 11 39.7
Table-7.2: Statistics o f SEUs simulated with the 1st and 2nd half o f the Execution Cycle
7.4.5.1 Summary
Of the 632 SEU randomly injected into the 29 registers, the number of errors observed in each 
category (calculated as a percentage of the total number of errors) were 35.8%, 60.1%, and 
4.1% for fa ta l ,  tra n s ie n t and in c o rre c t re su lt e r ro rs  respectively. From the observable SEU 
induced error cross predicted in Chapter 6 for the Space Station Freedom environment, the 
fa ta l ,  tra n s ie n t a n d  in c o rre c t re su lt error cross section for this software were estimated as 
~4.7xl0'7, ~7.8xl0'7, and ~5.3xl0'8 per bit per day respectively. Qualitatively, the results 
indicate that fatal errors are more likely to be induced by SEUs in control and status registers 
than SEUs in data registers. This agrees with the traditional method discussed in Section 7.2. 
However, the results have also confirmed that a SEU in a data register could eventually lead to 
a fatal error. Furthermore, approximately half of the SEUs in the PC and most SEUs in the 
status registers (PSW and SP) did not induce fatal errors but transient errors. This however 
contradicts the traditional method and therefore negates the idea of associating a particular
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class of errors with SEUs in certain registers. In addition, although designers of 
microprocessor systems could use their knowledge to predict that a SEU in a register at a given 
time will induce an error, this is not usually obvious for all registers. It is only by using a 
simulation type tool like the one describe in this Chapter that one can develop a true statistical 
picture of the nature of SEU induced errors that one will expect from an application software 
operating in the space radiation environment.
Its is important to note that the results obtained only apply to the UoSAT TC software. For a 
different application program it may be seen that SEUs in the data registers are consistently 
generating a high number of severe errors (i.e. causing the system to crash). This should not be 
unexpected as this depends on how each register (or bit) is used in the test software. 
Simulations similar to those discussed in this section have been repeated for an another 
application system and the results are briefly introduced in the next section.
7.5  V a l id a t io n
Although the results from simulating the UoSAT TC system indicates the successful 
application of the proposed SEU simulation tool, proper validation of the tool will be useful. 
To compliment this research program, this process was begun. The SEU simulation tool was 
also used to simulate the effects of SEUs on a system (COTS2) which will be flown on the 
scientific satellite STRV-2d (Space Technology Research Vehicle). The results obtained were 
compared with SEU induced errors observed as the COTS2 system was tested with energetic 
ion beams. The results show reasonable correlation. A complete discussion of the COTS2 
simulations is not included in this chapter as this results were only obtained after 90% of this 
Thesis had been written. However, a discussion of the COTS2 system and the results were 
included in a paper submitted for publication in the IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science 
which has been attached in Appendix D.
7.6  A pp l ic a t io n s  o f  R esu lts  F r o m  SE U  S im u la tio n s
From the UoSAT TC system simulation experiment, a number of conclusions can be drawn 
and some recommendations made for writing software which is more robust to SEUs. These 
ideas can be summarised as follows:
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1. The higher the number o f control registers within a microprocessor, the higher the probability 
o f observing more severe SEU induced errors.
2. Allowing for registers to be refreshed frequently will reduce the number o f SEU induced 
errors. In particular, control registers which are likely to cause fatal errors. For example, the 
robustness o f  the UoSAT TC software could be improved by ensuring that all registers are re­
freshed before processing a new TC frame.
3. Software can be made more robust by including methods for detecting and handling 
sequencing errors. For example, routines to re-direct the software if  it attempts to fetch 
instructions from a non-existing address and routines to terminate an infinitely long loop caused 
by SEUs. These methods will significantly reduce the number o f transient and fatal errors that 
were observed as the TC software was simulated. Details on examples o f these methods are 
discussed in [L I-84],[JOS-85] and in [EIC-86].
4. Do not use registers for storing data for long intervals. This will cut down their duty cycles. It 
is better to use external memories since its is easier to detect and to correct (employing 
hardware error detection and correction techniques based on the Hamming and Reed-Solomon 
codes), SEUs in memories.
5. If data on the SEU sentivity o f the different microprocessor registers is available, avoid using 
very sensitive registers. A lso try to make an optimum choice o f instructions from the 
instructions set (avoid very slow instructions).
6. For software with a high number o f interrupts, ensure that the stack is protected or check that 
the content o f the stack is correct when it is re-loaded into the PC.
7. Design with redundancy to obtain more robust microprocessor systems. For example, 
employing “lockstepping” and “triple modular redundancy” techniques will be beneficial. 
Details o f these techniques are discussed by [KAS-91].
8. Use radiation-hardened microprocessors and watchdog timers.
9. Design such that the microprocessor can be turned off in very high radiation environment. For 
example, for very complex software operating on satellites in low earth orbit, the system can be 
turned off in the South Atlantic Anomaly. Thus, SEUs that occur in this region will be 
overwritten when the system re-powered.
10. Finally, the exact time and location o f occurrence o f a SEU in a microprcessor is purely 
random. It is not always obvious that a SEU at a particular bit location will induce an error and 
in particular the nature o f the error. Use SEU simulation tools such as the one described in this 
chapter to study the robustness o f your software code to SEUs. This will provide adequate 
identification and localisation o f errors which can then be examined to improve the reliability o f  
the software.
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The practical application of the SEU simulation model has been successfully demonstrated 
with the UoSAT TC system and the validation experiment with the COTS2 system appear 
encouraging. They are however, some limitations which were encountered and future work 
should aimed at addressing these shortcomings.
7 .7  L im it a t io n s  O f  T h e  M o d el
Present limitations of the model were identified to include:
•  The inability to automate the sim ulation procedure which considerably limits the speed p e r  
simulation cycle due to manual response to inputs: To achieve complete automation,
♦ A method o f deactivating the SEU injection function and re-loading it when necessary 
without human intervention must be implemented.
♦ Also, a method to automatically change the parameters “cycles” and “seed” o f the SEU 
injection function must be defined and implemented.
♦ Techniques for detecting and keeping a record o f the number o f errors in different 
categories must also be developed and incorporated into the simulator.
♦ Finally, the simulator must also possess self recovery capabilities in order to resume 
operation after the occurrence o f fatal errors.
Unfortunately, since dScope-51 was not developed with this kind o f application in mind, its 
current features are not sufficient to support these additional characteristics. This conclusion 
was reached after some investigation and experimentation with dScope-51.
• The second limitation o f the model was partly discussed in Section 6.8 in connection with the 
duty cycle prediction model. That is, the inability to include in the model those internal logic 
units (e.g. IR, TMP1, TMP2, ALU) o f the microprocessor that cannot be accessed by the 
programmer and are not modelled by the simulator. In real applications, these units are also 
susceptible to radiation damage. Thus, SEU in these units are also capable o f inducing 
observable errors at the microprocessor’s system level. Not taking them into consideration 
induces errors in the results. Although the error may not be significant for microprocessors 
whose percentage o f non-accessible registers is small. It is a major shortcoming for those 
microprocessors with a large cross-section o f inaccessible logic units. To address this issue 
some modifications to the current DS51 simulator will be necessary and inputs from the 
microprocessor designer will also be required. Attempts to obtain detailed information o f the 
8051 architecture from the manufacturer were futile because o f the commercial interest
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involved. Other possibilities o f developing a simulator which encompasses all logic units are 
therefore encouraged.
•  Problems were also experienced with individual registers during the simulation. Using the 
SEU injection function to change logic states within the serial buffer (SBUF) was 
unsuccessful. According to the 8051 architecture writing data into the SBUF initiates 
transmission by setting the transmit interrupt flag o f the serial port control registers. When 
this occurs the CPU responds by generating a hardware branch instruction to the appropriate 
service routine which should normally be stored at the code address 0023H o f the program 
memory. Thus, inducing SEUs by performing a mathematical operation which writes the 
results into this register will trigger the transmit interrupt flag and the execution sequence is 
completely disrupted. For this reason, the serial data buffer (SBUF) was also not included in 
the simulation model.
•  Som e other registers have bits that cannot be set and/or cleared by software. Thus, is it was 
also not possible to induce upsets at such bit locations with the SEU injection function. 
Examples o f such bits are the Timer 0 and Timer 1 overflow flags o f TCON, the parity flag 
of the PSW, etc. There may however be susceptible to SEUs from energetic ions.
•  Finally, it is necessary that the detailed design o f  the software and  m icroprocessor system  be 
understood before the simulation model can be efficiently used. Identifying errors using the 
method o f file comparison will not be possible without this knowledge. Obtaining this 
information could be a problem in situations where the system designers are not present. 
However, this is not a problem unique to this model since many software programs normally 
require some inputs from a user to enable efficient utilisation.
7.8 Conclusions
It has been demonstrated that a low cost, readily available, commercial-off-the-shelf 
microprocessor simulator can be adapted to study the nature of SEU induced errors observed 
at microprocessor system level. The 8051 dScope-51 simulator developed mainly for software 
debugging purposes has been adapted to realise this idea by adding and/or exploiting the 
following features:
•  A background function for randomly selecting a microprocessor bit and changing its states 
during execution. It was shown that, randomisation can be fully achieved by making use 
dScope-51 pre-defined functions.
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•  A  function to enable tracing and recording o f the entire internal states o f all 
microprocessor’s accessible registers.
• Two methods for determining a system’s response to SEUs:
♦ by observing sudden unpredictable behaviour in the software execution sequence, and
♦ by comparing an erroneous file with an error-free file.
•  The use dScop-51 window-oriented platform to track the propagation o f  a SEU induced error 
during software execution.
The practical application of this model was also proven by analysing a real satellite application 
system. To achieve this,
•  A n external state o f  the system was defined. Compared to the traditional method which 
classifies the nature o f SEU induced error into two categories (sequencing or data error) 
only, it has been shown that observable SEU induced errors at system level can be classified 
into more than two categories by defining it’s external state.
• Over six hundred SEUs were successfully sim ulated and  estimates o f  observable SEU  
induced errors in different categories were obtained within a 95%  confidence interval and  
±10%  deviations fro m  the mean assuming a Poisson distribution.
• The observable SEU  induced error rate obtained fro m  the sim ulations correlates quite well 
with the value predicted using the duty cycle m odel described in Chapter 6.
•  Sim ilar experiments were perform ed fo r  the COTS2 system  and  the results obtained show  
some correlation with results obtained fro m  testing the COTS2 system  using a radiation  
beam.
Although the initial cost involved in developing a microprocessor simulator for this kind of 
application may be high, it is thought that the total cost involved in characterising the SEU 
response of a microprocessor system will be much lower with the methodology described 
when compared to the cost of radiation tests. This will be particularly beneficial to present and 
future LCSS where there is frequent updates to satellite software. Although there are 
limitations associated with the model, it is the first investigation of its type and these problems 
would not have been identified without this study. These findings have in fact identified 
possible directions for future developments and improvements of the model which are 
presented in Chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The results from an investigation into reliability prediction and improvement methods for 
electronic subsystems on low cost small satellites (LCSS) are presented in this Thesis. Over 
the last decade, such satellites have become fashionable and attractive instruments for 
carrying out space missions. However, the design techniques and technologies employed in 
these satellites are different from those employed in conventional large, expensive satellites. 
Typically, the average development, launch and operation cost for LCSS is kept below two 
million pounds. Thus, electronic subsystems on these satellites are manufactured from 
modern complex COTS components because they are cheap, highly capable and readily 
available. For example, they employ a large number of advanced COTS VLSI 
microprocessors and memory components for on-board data processing and storage. They are 
also designed with flexible on-board characteristics. For example, software can be 
continuously upgraded and uploaded onto the satellite while in operation.
The objective of the this research was to investigate the applicability and accuracy of current 
reliability prediction methods for predicting the reliability of electronic subsystems on LCSS. 
To identify any limitations associated with these methods and propose solutions to enable 
more accurate predictions and improvements in reliability.
8.1 C o n c l u d in g  O v e r v ie w
The following paragraphs presents the conclusions and novel contributions from this 
research.
• The reliability of a system is predominantly dependent on the reliability of its components. Two 
methods for predicting the reliability of electronic components are known to exist: empirical 
reliability prediction methods such as those of MIL-HDBK-217 and a theoretical method known as 
the Physics of Failure (PoF) approach. However, none of these methods can be used to accurately 
predict the reliability of electronic subsystems constructed from COTS components such as those on 
LCSS.
♦ Existing empirical reliability prediction models are out-of-date and inaccurate. Due to the 
high quality of modem electronic COTS components and the fact that component
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technology tend to change rapidly, it is very difficult to obtain sufficient statistics on the 
failures of these components to update existing empirical models, or to develop new 
ones. The changing trend in component quality and technology is predicted to continue. 
Thus, the difficulty of obtaining failure statistics is expected to be more acute in the 
future. It is therefore unlikely that empirical models will be found useful when accurate 
field reliability predictions are required for complex, modem systems produced in low 
volumes such as satellite systems.
♦ The PoF method is too specific and hence, it is very complex and expensive to apply it to 
modem components which are also very complex. The method is still under development 
and models do not exist for all classes of components. With the limited budgets of low 
cost missions and continuous change in component technology, it will be impractical to 
invest in the development of such models.
• Advanced COTS VLSI components are becoming the predominant devices in electronic subsystems 
on LCSS. Although the quality of these components is high, they are usually not radiation 
hardened. Therefore, they can be easily damaged or corrupted by space radiation. Radiation poses 
the greatest risk to the reliability of these devices and consequently the reliability of any satellite 
systems constructed from them.
• Memories and microprocessors make up the two main classes of advanced COTS VLSI 
components. Methods for predicting the rate and effects of radiation induced Single Event Upsets 
(SEUs) in memories have been well developed and are generally accepted. However, controversies 
still surround methods used to perform similar tasks in microprocessors.
♦ The traditional method for predicting the rate of observable SEU induced errors in 
microprocessor systems ignores the influence of software1 giving a pessimistic estimate 
of the reliability of COTS microprocessors operating in the space environment. 
Furthermore, the existing method for predicting the nature of SEU induced errors 
observed at microprocessor system level simply extrapolates from the particular bit that 
is changed and classifies all errors in one of two categories (sequencing and data errors) 
only. This method has been shown to be incorrect.
8 .1 .1  O R IG IN A L  A C H IE V E M E N T S
A low cost, readily available commercial-off-the-shelf microprocessor simulator has been 
successfully adapted for better predictions of the rate and nature of observable SEU induced 
errors in microprocessor systems. In summary:
1 D uring execution, som e SEU s m ay be overwritten an d  therefore, w ill not induce errors. The num ber 
o f  SEU s that are overwritten depends on the software that the m icroprocessor is executing
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• It has been successfully demonstrated that, a microprocessor simulator and a software model 
developed using knowledge of the microprocessor’s architecture and instruction set can be used to 
compute the duty cycles of registers as a microprocessor executes real application software. With 
the registers’ duty cycles known, more accurate predictions of the observable SEU induced error 
rate in microprocessor systems could be made. Although the full capabilities of this methodology 
could not be demonstrated due to limitations associated with the microprocessor simulator, the 
feasibility of the method was fully proven. Example software were analysed and the predicted 
observable SEU induced error rate was better than results obtained using the traditional prediction 
method by a factor of four. It was also demonstrated that, this methodology can be used to identify 
optimised software structures for space applications.
• A software model consisting of a microprocessor simulator and a function that randomly injects 
SEUs from the background into the simulator was successfully developed for studying the nature of 
SEU induced errors (the effect of SEU) observed in microprocessor systems. Compared to the 
traditional approach, this model offers the following advantages:
♦ it takes into consideration the effect associated with the propagation of the SEU induced 
error during execution.
♦ by defining a system’s “external state”, it can be used to study and classify errors into 
more than two categories, which is more useful to engineers.
A real satellite system was analysed and its external state was defined by three categories of 
errors: fatal, transient and results errors. SEU simulations were performed using the model 
and the percentage of observable SEU induced in each category were determined at 95% 
confidence interval, within a 20% deviation from the mean. Although they were difficulties 
encountered which could not be completely solved during this research, the feasibility of the 
method was also successfully proven.
• They duty-cycle prediction model and the SEU simulation model described in this Thesis are the 
first investigation of this kind. Although there are limitations associated with the results obtained, 
the feasibility of both methodologies have been demonstrated. Most importantly, these limitations 
would not have been identified without this study which has led for proposals to future work 
outlined Section 8.2.
8.2 F u t u r e  W o r k
The duty Cycle Prediction Model
Although the results obtained using the duty cycle prediction model indicates that some 
improvement in the prediction accuracy of the observable SEU induced error rate can be
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realised, there are still some limitations with the model which leaves room for improvements. 
The main shortcomings were identified to include the following:
• Non-accessible SEU susceptible logic units within the microprocessor are not modelled by the 
simulator. Determining when data is written into or read from these units was therefore not 
possible. Thus, their accumulative-duty-periods and as a result their duty cycles could not be 
calculated.
• The usage of status and control registers is determined not just by the software that the 
microprocessor is executing but also by hardware features in-built into the microprocessor 
architecture. Determining the influence of these features was not possible using the information 
obtained from the simulator and the microprocessor’s user manual. Detailed information on the 
internal implementation of the microprocessor is required.
• Since the simulator was not developed for this type of application, the capacity of its buffer is quite 
limited. This places a restriction on the size of the software that can be analysed. Although this 
limitation was found to be associated with the 8051 simulator, it is likely that other commercial 
microprocessor simulators may have similar shortcomings.
To enable more accurate duty cycle predictions for all registers and hence, the observable 
SEU induced error rate, the author proposes the development of a simulator without the 
above limitations. This can be successfully achieved if full co-operation is received from the 
microprocessor’s manufacturer.
The SEU Simulation Model
Similarly, non-accessible internal logic units of the microprocessor were not included in the 
SEU simulations. A simulator which will allow the effects of SEUs in these units to be 
simulated is also recommended. Further to that, it will be beneficial if the simulation process 
is automated since statistically significant results could be obtained more cost-effectively. 
DScope-51 simulator and possibly other commercial microprocessor simulators currently do 
not possess sufficient features to enable automation. For this to be possible, it is necessary to 
incorporate new features into a simulator that will enable:
• automatic detection and recording of errors in different categories.
• automatic recovery of the model following a fatal error.
Validation of Models
To ensure accurate predictions and commercial viability of the duty cycle prediction model 
and the SEU simulation model, proper validation of the models is also encouraged. For
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example, it may be possible to use radiation test methods to estimate the proportion of non- 
accessible SEU susceptible logic units within a microprocessor to the total number of SEU 
susceptible units. With this proportion, a correction factor can be determined and used to 
adjust results obtained using both models. This will therefore enabled an accurate estimation 
of the improvements in prediction accuracy that can be gained using the models.
8.3 Im pl ic a t io n s  of  R e se a r c h
This research has identified a solution to a fundamental problem that has perpetuated 
conservatism in the adoption of modem COTS microprocessors for space. For the first time, 
engineers will be able take into consideration the software programs to be executed by a 
given microprocessor when considering its suitability for a particular satellite application.
Currently, large amounts of money (several tens of thousands of pounds) are paid for 
radiation beam time to enable the susceptibility of a microprocessor as it executes software to 
be studied and for developing radiation hard devices. As the current trend in satellite design 
allows frequent updates to on-board software, the amount spent on radiation testing is 
expected to increase. This research has examined an alternative solution to this problem 
which is thought to be cheaper. Although the initial cost involved in developing a 
microprocessor simulator may be high, it is thought that the total cost involved in 
characterising the SEU response of a microprocessor system which is subject to frequent 
software updates will be much lower with the methodologies described when compared to the 
cost of radiation tests.
With further developments on the results presented in this Thesis, commercial software tools 
for studying the vulnerability of microprocessors to SEU should be available in the near 
future. Such tools will promote the application of COTS microprocessors in space. Since 
COTS microprocessors are cheap, highly capable and readily available, this can cut down the 
cost of satellite mission thus, promoting space activities both in the industry and in the 
community.
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T r a d it io n a l  D e s ig n  a n d  M a n u f a c t u r in g  P r a c t ic e s
In t r o d u c t io n
Typically, two approaches exist for designing and manufacturing highly reliable electronic 
hardware systems. These include the techniques of fault prevention and fault tolerance. Fault 
prevention [RAG-91] is achieved through traditional design and manufacturing principles 
whereby, possible causes of failures are removed from a system before it is put into service. 
It involves two aspects, namely, fault avoidance and fault removal. Fault avoidance is 
concerned with design methodologies and the selection of techniques which aim to avoid the 
introduction of faults during the design and manufacturing process. Fault removal is 
concerned with checking the implementation of a system and removing those faults which 
are exposed.
Since unexpected failures may still occur in a system, fault tolerance (or redundancy) 
techniques can be used to make a design more robust. That is, being able to operate 
successfully even with the failure of some of its parts. Two main redundancy techniques 
exist: active redundancy and stand-by redundancy. Both of these techniques can be further 
divided into many sub-techniques which relate to the way the primary part and its redundant 
counterparts are interconnected. Detailed knowledge on them can be obtained from [RAG- 
91]. A detailed break-down of fault prevention and fault tolerance techniques is given in 
Figure-A.l. Knowledge on some of the tools mentioned can be obtained from [O’CO-96]. 
The techniques are discussed briefly in this appendix together with design, manufacturing 
and maintenance practices at Surrey Satellite Technology Limited.
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Figure-A.l: Fault Prevention and Fault Tolerance Techniques [O’CO-96, RAG-91].
F ault  P reventio n  T ech niq u es
The most important aspect of fault prevention is the process of selection, specification, 
application and control of the components used in the system. To select components of 
sufficient strength the designer must know the various stresses which these components are 
likely to experience whilst in operation. The ‘stress-strength’ approach to design is normally
Stress-Strength Approach to Design
Electronic components have characteristics such as a nominal operating voltage, a 
temperature range, tolerance, breakdown voltage, etc. For each component, a combination of 
these characteristics determine its strength. When this component is in operation, it 
experiences several stresses such as thermal, electric field (e.g. power), mechanical, chemical 
and radiation stresses. If at some time during operation the magnitude of the stress becomes 
greater than the strength, the component will fail. Therefore, if a system is designed such that 
the strength is always greater than the stress it experiences then failure will be very unlikely. 
The component manufacturers provide the designer with the boundary conditions within
used.
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which components are supposed to operate successfully. A designer should know the stresses 
(both electrical and environmental) which these component are going to experience while in 
operation. Also, the designer should know how these stresses are likely to affect the strength 
of the components. With this information a component with sufficient strength for the entire 
period of the mission can then be selected. Figure-A.2 shows an example in which the 
magnitude of strength decreases with time [JEN-95].
Strength > Stress, 
Component cannot fail.
Stress (y(t))Strength (x(t))Strength
Stress Stress > Strength, 
Component will fail
time
Figure-A.2: Interaction between strength and stress.
Numerous documents (for example [REM-94]) have been developed for the process of 
selection, specification and application of component parts, but these are mainly guidelines. 
This process should very much depend on the particular mission under consideration. In 
addition, designers are always advised to derate as much as possible to lessen the possibility 
of the stress becoming greater than the strength during operation [ESA-82], and fault removal 
techniques can also be used to review the design.
Testing
There are two main types of testing: functional and environmental testing. Functional testing 
is done to ensure that a component or system has met its basic performance requirement. 
Environmental testing is done to ensure that the design will operate reliably under the 
expected range of environmental stresses [O’CO-86]. In a spacecraft, both functional and 
environmental testing are important. The main environmental factors to test for include, 
temperature, vibration, radiation, vacuum, power input and output, shock, humidity, etc. 
Results from design review techniques (FMECA, FTA, SCA, Stress Analysis, and Parameter 
Variation Analysis) are usually exploited when developing reliability test plans. A number
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of documents (US MIL-STD-810, US MIL-STD-781, UK Defence Standard 07-55) provide 
test methods appropriate for many environmental conditions. Test procedures for some 
classes of components have also been developed [REM-94].
Manufacturing & Quality Control
It is common that a well-designed product can be unreliable in service because of poor 
manufacturing quality. Quality control in any manufacturing process, is a method of ensuring 
conformance to specification and tolerances. The most likely source of variability is from 
human operation. For spacecraft manufacture, proper procedures to reduce the possibilities of 
contamination (e.g. clean room facilities) should be implemented. Handling, storage, 
packaging and shipping should be done by qualified personnel. Many space companies also 
have product assurance requirements specifications which should be followed during 
manufacture. An example is the Alcatel Space document ‘Space Segment Microsatellite 
Product Assurance Requirement Specification for Subcontractors’ [REM-94].
Use and Maintenance
Proper use and maintenance is also of paramount importance in ensuring the reliability of a 
product. In a spacecraft, there is rarely any maintenance as far as electronic hardware is 
concerned. It is therefore obligatory that the spacecraft is working as expected and that there 
is enough confidence that it will survive the required mission period before being launched. 
However, modem spacecraft are becoming increasingly dependent on software. Thus, ground 
based methods of controlling their operation and even maintaining them are becoming 
possible. At SSTL, each satellite telemetry is monitored regularly to ensure that it is healthy.
F a u l t  T o l e r a n c e1
Although the benefits of redundancy are well known its application is not without penalties. 
It will increase weight, volume, complexity, cost and time to design. The most common types 
of redundancy configurations are shown in Figure-A.l. The applicable block diagrams, 
mathematical formulae and reliability functions to facilitate the computation of reliability 
gain from each configuration have been developed. Depending on the requirements of a
1 [KLA-68]
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system the designer can identify which configuration will be most feasible and beneficial for 
his/her application.
D e sig n , M a n u fa c t u r in g  a n d  M a in t e n a n c e  P r a c tic es  a t  Su r r ey  Sa t e l l it e
TECHNOLOGY LIMITED (SSTL)
Engineers at SSTL have accumulated over sixty years of experience designing reliable 
electronic systems for microsatellites. The processes implemented are more or less identical 
to those described. A summaiy of these processes can be obtained from three papers [WAR- 
95, DAY-98, OLD-98] which have been published by SSTL/CSER engineers over the last 
three years. Below is a summary of some of the key techniques that are implemented:
• Component Selection - the useful lifetime (e.g. survivability in the space radiation environment), 
cost, availability, performance and thermal characteristics are some of the issues considered 
during component selection. Suitable internal storage regimes are used and physical examination 
and testing are done before use. Handling and PCB mounting is accomplished only by trained 
personnel and evaluated through vibration testing.
• System Design - A layered architecture is used to implement redundancy. That is, redundancy is 
not achieved by simply duplicating identical systems but through different technologies. Usually, 
flight-proven subsystems are operating in parallel with experimental ones thus, eliminating the 
risks of duplicating problems inherent within a particular system. Also, the layered architecture 
provides ideal mediums to introduce new technology into space without jeopardising reliability. 
Practically, multiple paths are allowed for all mission critical operations on the satellites through 
hardware or software. All on-board computers since UoSAT-1 are designed such that new 
software can be loaded onto the spacecraft whilst in operation. This feature provides a means of 
re-configuring the spacecraft to use alternative operating paths following failure of primary 
paths.
• Testing - On-site functional testing of individual components and subsystems is done. Bum in 
testing is done in order to identify possible early failures. Environmental tests which include: 
EMC test, vibration test, magnetic and thermal vacuum tests are also done off-site. Radiation tests 
on individual VLSI devices are also conducted whenever there are concerns and when resources 
permit.
• Manufacture - Construction and assembly is accomplished through a small dedicated team of 
trained personnel within SSTL clean room facilities. Individuals are solely responsible for 
maintaining high reliability standards in their work and this is easily achieved within a small team 
and the fact that all subsystems are manufactured under the same roof.
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• Use and Maintenance - Telemetry data of each satellite is transmitted and analysed regularly from 
the SSTL mission control ground-station to ensure that the satellite is operating as required. This 
task is automated. If out of range telemetry data is identified a pager is automatically triggered 
which summons mission control staff.
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Th e  Arc h itec tu re  Of  A  Ty pic al  8-bit  
M ic r o pr o c esso r: - Th e  8051
The microprocessor or central processing unit (CPU) is one of four main parts of every 
microcomputer [AND-94]. The other three parts include: the memory ( ROM, RAM), the 
crystal clock oscillator and the input/output devices. Figure-B.l is a block diagram showing 
the architecture of the Intel 87C51 (a derivative of the 8051 processor) [AMD-90].
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Figure-B.l: A typical block diagram of the Intel -51 family of microcontrollers [INT-90].
T he memory
Computer memory consists of two basic types, RAM and ROM. RAM stands for ‘random 
access memory’, commonly referred to as the data memory. With RAM, the computer can
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read as well as write to any part of the memory desired, hence random-access. ROM stands 
for ‘read only memory’, commonly referred to as the program memory. With ROM devices, 
the computer system can read from it but can’t write into it, hence read-only memory. All 
instructions into ROM must therefore be loaded prior to operation. Another type of memory 
is the Programmable ROM (PROM). This type of memory is by the user to meet his/her 
requirements. The most common type of PROM is the EPROM (Erasable, Programmable, 
Read Only Memory) which can be erased by shining ultra-violet light through a quartz 
window on the top of the device before re-programming. The 87C51 program memoiy is of 
the EPROM type. Both types of memory RAM and ROM could be internal (on the same chip 
as the microprocessor) or external.
Modem microcomputers operate using electrical signals that are defined by two logic states 
only, logic 1 (ON) and logic 0 (OFF). Information is stored in binary form. The number of 
binary bits that can be stored determines the size of a computer memory. 2^0 is equal to 1024 
bytes of data which represents IK byte of computer memoiy. The 87C51 has 4K bytes of on- 
chip EPROM and 128 bytes of on-chip RAM. The basic building blocks for these memory 
devices are transistors. 4K bytes of memory is made up of (8x8x4x1024) = 262144 bistables 
which is equivalent to 524288 transistors [AND-94]. The 8051 processor is based on CMOS 
technology hence these transistors are FET transistors.
T h e  CRYSTAL CLOCK OSCILLATOR AND CPU TIMING [AMD-90]
The 8051 timing is managed by a crystal controlled clock oscillator which ensures a precise 
and constant frequency. The oscillator, located externally to the CPU generates a clock signal 
which is used to drive the internal clock generator. The signal from the oscillator is usually a 
square wave with a clock period called the ‘T cycle’. The internal clock generator operates at 
half the oscillator frequency and defines the sequence of internal phases that make up a 
machine cycle (execution cycle), [see Figure-B.2].
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b. 2-byte, t-cycle kietructlon, «.g., A 0 0  A ,fdata
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S 1 S 3  S3 S4 SS S4 SI I S3 I S3 ! S4 I SS I $4
e. 1-byte, 2-cycle Instruction, e .g ,  INC DPTR
SI S3 I S3 I $4 I SS I SS I 11 I S3 I S3 I S4 I SS I S4
d. MOVX (1-byte, 2-cycle)
Figure-B.2: 8051 Fetch/Execute Sequences [AMD-90].
A machine cycle consists of a sequence of 6 states, numbered SI through S6. Each state lasts 
for two “T cycles”, thus, it takes 12 oscillator periods or 1 ps at an oscillator frequency o f 12 
MHz to complete a machine cycle. During the first “T cycle” known as the Phase 1 half, the 
Phase 1 clock is active and during the second “T cycle” known as the Phase 2 half the Phase 
2 clock is active. Typically, arithmetic and logical operations take place during Phase 1 and 
internal register-to-register transfers take place during Phase 2.
In pu t /O u tpu t  d e v ic e s: Po r t  S t r u c tu r es  a nd  O pe r a t io n
The ports of a microcomputer function as input/output (I/O) devices for interfacing the 
computer with external peripherals. Common examples of peripheral devices include: the
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visual display units (VDU), printers, external memory and keyboards. The 87C51 has four 
ports which are all bi-directional. Each port consist of a latch, an output driver and an input 
buffer. Communication within the CPU takes place via a group of interconnecting lines 
known as buses. These buses may be uni-directional or bi-directional, dedicated for particular 
functions (e.g. address, data and control buses) or for multiple functions. The 87C51, has 
eight data lines per bus. The detailed architecture of the Intel 87C51 internal bus structure 
was shown in Chapter 5 (Figure-5.3).
T h e  M ic r o pr o c e sso r  o r  C e n t r a l  P r o c e ssin g  U n it  (CPU )
The CPU is the main element of the microcomputer. It accesses the memory units, fetches 
and executes instructions, and send commands to other parts of the computer. Generally, it 
consist of registers, counters, an arithmetic and logic unit (ALU), timing and control 
circuitry. Registers are special locations of the RAM type (usually 8-bits for the 8051) used 
by the CPU for temporary storage of data as it fetches and executes an instruction. Registers 
can be grouped according to their functions, such as, the instruction register (IR); general 
purpose registers (GPRs), special purpose registers (SPRs), address registers etc. for the 8051 
architecture.
The instruction register is the first destination for instructions fetched from the program 
memoiy. “General purpose” registers, under program control can be used for more than one 
function. The accumulator (ACC) is an example of such a register. SPRs also known as 
dedicated registers on the other hand can only perform particular functions. These registers 
are hard-wired into the machine to perform these functions and cannot be controlled by 
software. The program counter (PC) and the stack pointer (SP) are examples of this type of 
register. The PC keeps a record of the address in the program memory of the next instruction 
to be fetched by the CPU. This helps the CPU to execute a program in a properly assigned 
sequential fashion. The stack is used during the execution of interrupts, for temporary storage 
of the address held by the PC prior to arrival of the interrupt request signal. Address registers 
hold the address of locations in the data memory to be accessed during a read or write 
operation. The 8051 CPU also has a status register (the PSW), control registers and 
timers/counters. A list of all 8051 registers and their corresponding addresses was also given 
in Chapter 5 (Table-5.1). All arithmetic and logic instructions are executed by the ALU. 
Typical instructions include: addition, subtraction, Boolean operations, compare, shift,
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increment, and decrement. A SPR known as the flag register indicates the result type 
(negative, positive, carry, or no carry, etc.) from an ALU operation.
T h e  O p e r a tio n  o f  t h e  C P U  - 8051
Generally, the operation of a CPU involves, fetching instructions from the program memory, 
decoding and interpreting these instructions and finally executing them. An instruction 
usually consists of two parts: the operator (or ‘OPCODE’) and the operand. The “opcode” 
may be an instruction to load the accumulator with a number and the operand could be the 
number to be loaded or the memory address where it can be found.
An address is defined as a unique numerical value which labels each memory location in the 
system and permits access to it by placing its value on a bus. The method used to specify an 
address in an instruction is the addressing mode. All instructions available for programming a 
particular computer are collectively known as the instruction set. The 8051 instruction set has 
the following addressing modes:
• Immediate addressing - where the operator is followed immediately by the number to be loaded.
• Direct or Absolute addressing- where the operator is followed by the address of the memory 
location where the number to be loaded is found.
• Indirect addressing- where the instruction specifies the register which contains the address of the 
operand.
• Register instructions- these are code efficient instructions which eliminates the need of an address 
byte. Very similar are Register-specific instructions in which instructions are specific to certain 
registers. For example, some instructions always operate on the accumulator, or data pointer, etc. 
only, so no address byte is needed to point to them. The op-code itself does it.
The 8051 instruction sets consist of a total of 111 instructions; divided into data transfer, 
arithmetic, logic and control transfer instructions [AMD-90]. With a 12 MHz clock, all data 
transfer instructions execute in either 1 or 2 jus. For external data memoiy, only indirect 
addressing can be used and all instructions execute in 2 jis. Arithmetic instructions execute in 
1 p.s except the INC (increment) DPTR (data pointer register) instruction which takes 2 fis, 
and the Multiply and Divide instructions which take 4 |is. Logic (Boolean) operations (AND, 
OR, Exclusive OR, NOT) instructions are performed on a bit-by-bit basis. Those that are
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accumulator specific execute in 1 ps, while others take 2 ps. Control transfer (jump 
instructions) execution time is typically 2 ps.
T h e  F etc h  & E x ec u t e  Se q u en c e  W ith  In te r r u pt s
The sequence of events involved in fetching and executing an instruction are controlled by 
the clock. When the program stored in the ROM is run, the CPU initiates an instruction fetch 
sequence. Initially, a ‘start address’ or origin (ORG) is made known to the CPU. This start 
address is then transmitted to the memory via the address bus where the desired address is 
identified and data is transferred between the memory and the CPU. This transfer is a read or 
write operation depending on the signal on a control bus. At the end of a fetch, the program 
counter will increment to the record of the location which contains the next address to be 
fetched. The instruction that was fetched goes into the instruction register (IR) where it is 
decoded and interpreted to determine if more data is needed. If so, another ‘fetch’ is executed 
during state 4 of the same machine cycle. Two fetches are therefore executed during each 
machine cycle. During processing, data is continuously being moved between the CPU 
registers and memory, with ALU operations, flag register updates’ and PC increments 
executed in between.
Interrupt capabilities are used to reduce the idle time of the CPU. Instead of the CPU 
suspending its normal operation to wait for a slower peripheral device to catch-up, the CPU 
can continue to execute other tasks, while the peripheral device sends an interrupt request 
signal to the CPU when it is ready. When the interrupt request is received, the CPU suspends 
execution of the main program and automatically branches off to the appropriate subroutine 
to service the interrupt. On completing the subroutine, the CPU then resumes execution of the 
main program.
R e fe r e n c e s
[AMD-90] Advanced Micro Devices, “Eight-Bit 80C51 Embedded Processors”, Data Book, 1990. 
[AND-94] Anderson S.; “Microprocessor Technology”; 1994.
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D u t y  C y c l e  P r e d i c t i o n  a n d  SEU S im u la t io n  M o d e l s  -
S o f t w a r e  C o d e
C-l
/* + •* + * + ***** + * + + *★ + + + ****★****★***★ + *** + /
/ * * * * * * ‘ V e r o n i c a  A s e n e k  : 0 5 / 9 7 * * * * * * * * * /  /******★***********★*************★****+*/
/ * D u t y  C y c l e ( D C )  P r e d i c t i o n  M o d e l  f o r  t h e  8 0 5 1  M i c r o p r o c e s s o r - M a i n  F u n c t i o n  * /
# i n c l u d e  < s t d i o . h >
# i n c l u d e  < s t d l i b . h >
# i n c l u d e  < s t r i n g . h >
t i n c l u d e  " G l o _ v a r l . h "  / * I n i t i a l i s e s  v a r i a b l e s  * /
# i n c l u d e  " F u n c _ l . h "  / * D e f i n e s  f u n c t i o n s  * /
/ ♦ I n i t i a l i s e s  v a r i a b l e s  t h a t  c a n  n o t  b e  i n i t i a l i e s  v i a  g l o _ i n i t . c  * /
c h a r  s e p l  [ ] = " , " ;
c h a r  s e p s [ ]  = " , , " ;
i n t  c t r l l  = 0 ;
i n t  c t r l 2  = 0 ;
l o n g  i n t  D u t y _ c y c l e _ t o t a l  = 0 ;
c h a r  R e g i s t e r _ l i s t [ ] = " A , A L L , B ( 0 F 0 H ) , R 0 , R 1 , R 2 , R 3 , R 4 , R 5 , R 6 , R 7 , P C , P S W , D P T R ,
S P , P 0 ( 8 0 H ) , P I ( 9 0 H ) , P 2 ( 0 A 0 H ) , P 3 ( 0 B 0 H )  , P C O N ( 8 7 H ) , T C O N ( 8 8 H ) , 
SCON ( 9 8 H )  ,  TMOD ( 8 9 H )  ,  S B U F  ( 9 9 H ) ,  I E  ( 0 A 8 H ) ,  I P  ( 0 B 8 H )  ,  T L 0  (8A H ) 
T L 1 ( 8 B H ) , T H 0 ( 8 C H ) , T H 1 ( 8 D H ) , D P L ( 8 2 H ) , D P H ( 8 3 H )
c h a r  R e g i s t e r _ l i s t 2 I ] = " A , B ( 0 F 0 H ) , R 0 , R l , R 2 , R 3 , R 4 , R 5 , R 6 , R 7 , P C , P S W , D P T R , S P ,
P 0  ( 8 0 H )  , P I  ( 9 0 H )  , P 2  (OAOH) , P 3  (OBOH) , PCON ( 8 7 H )  , TCON ( 8 8 H )  , 
S C O N ( 9 8 H ) , T M O D ( 8 9 H ) , S B U F ( 9 9 H ) , I E ( 0 A 8 H )  , I P ( 0 B 8 H ) , T L O ( 8 A H ) , 
T L l ( 8 B H ) , T H O ( 8 C H ) , T H 1 ( 8 D H ) , D P L ( 8 2 H ) , D P H ( 8 3 H ) \ 0 " ;
v o i d  m a i n ( v o i d )
{ / * R e w r i t e  d a t a  f r o m  D S 5 1  i n  a  f o r m  e a s y  t o  p r o c e s s  * /  
r a e r g e _ l  ( ) ;  
m e r g e _ 2 ( ) ;  
m e r g e _ a l l ( ) ;
R e s u l t _ l  ( ) ;
R e s u l t _ 2 ( ) ;
f i l e P t r l  =  f o p e n ( , , c : \ \ c 5 1 v 4 \ \ e x a m p l e s \ \ t e s t _ l \ \ r e s u l t _ 3 . d a t , , / " w " )  ; 
i f  ( f i l e P t r l  == N U L L )
{
p r i n t f ( " E r r o r  o p e n i n g  f i l e . \ n ” ) ;  
e x i t ( 0 ) ;
}
f i l e P t r 2  =  f o p e n ( " c : W c 5 1 v 4 \ \ e x a m p l e s \ \ t e s t _ l \ \ r e s u l t _ 4 . d a t " , " w " ) ; 
i f  ( f i l e P t r l  = = N U L L )
{
p r i n t f ( " E r r o r  o p e n i n g  f i l e . \ n " ) ;  
e x i t  ( 0 ) ;
}
g l o b a l _ i n i t i a l i s a t i o n ( ) ;
G e t _ R e g i s t e r ( ) ;  / * G e t  a  r e g i s t e r  f r o m  t h e  u s e r  * /
i f ( s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " A L L \ 0 " ) = = H I T )
(
A l l R e g D C O ;  / * C a l c u l a t e s  DC f o r  a l l  r e g i s t e r s * /
P e r c _ D C l ( ) ;  / ‘ C a l c u l a t e s  % a v e r a g e  DC f o r  a  r e g i s t e r * /
)
e l s e
{
R e g D C O ;  / ‘ C a l c u l a t e s  DC f o r  t h e  r e g i s t e r  d e f i n e d  * /
P e r c _ D C 2 ( ) ;
}
f c l o s e  ( f i l e P t r l ) ;  
f c l o s e  ( f i l e P t r 2 ) ;
}
/ * M e r g e _ l . C :  R e w r i t e  m y d a t a . d a t  ( f i l e - 2 )  a s  d a t a l . d a t a  d i s c a r d i n g  b l a n k  l i n e s  
a n d  u n w a n t e d  i n f o r m a t i o n  * /
v o i d  m e r g e _ l ( v o i d )
(
# d e f i n e  b u f f e r _ s i z e  2 5 0  
c h a r  l i n e [ b u f f e r _ s i z e ] ;
F I L E  * f p t l ,  * f p t 2 ;
f p t l  =  f o p e n ( " c : W c 5 1 v 4 \ \ e x a m p l e s \ \ t e s t _ l \ \ d a t a l . d a t " , " w " ) ;
1
i f  ( f p t l = = N U L L )
{ p r i n t f ( " E r r o r  o p e n i n g  f i l e . \ n " ) ;  
e x i t ( O ) ;
}
e l s e
{
p r i n t f ( " F i l e  d a t a l . d a t  o p e n e d . \ n " ) ;
}
f p t 2  =  f o p e n ( " c : W c 5 1 v 4 \ \ e x a m p l e s \ \ t e s t _ l \ \ m y d a t a . d a t " ,  " r " ) ;
i f  ( f p t 2 = = N U L L )
{
p r i n t f ( " E r r o r  o p e n i n g  f i l e  m y d a t a . d a t . \ n " ) ; 
e x i t ( O ) ;
}
e l s e
{
p r i n t f ( " F i l e  m y d a t a . d a t  o p e n e d . \ n " ) ;
}
w h i l e  ( J f e o f ( f p t 2 ) ) / * c o n t i n u e  u n t i l  e n d  o f  f i l e * /
{
f g e t s  ( l i n e ,  b u f f e r _ s i z e ,  f p t 2  ) ;
i f  ( f p t 2 = = N U L L )
{
p r i n t f ( " E r r o r  r e a d i n g  f r o m  f i l e  m y d a t a . d a t . \ n " ) ; 
e x i t ( 0 ) ;
}
e l s e
{
i f  ( ( l i n e  [ 0 ]  = =  ' O i l  ( l i n e [ 0 ]  = =  ' P ' )  I | ( l i n e  [ 0 ]  = =  ' T ' ) )  
{ f p u t s ( l i n e ,  f p t l ) ; }
}
}
f c l o s e ( f p t l  ) ;  
f c l o s e ( f p t 2  ) ;
}
/ * M e r g e _ 2 . C :  R e - w r i t e  d s t r a c e . t p x  ( f i l e - 1 )  a s  d a t a 2 . d a t  w h i l e  d i s c a r d i n g  
u n w a n t e d  i n f o r m a t i o n .  * /
v o i d  m e r g e _ 2 ( v o i d )
{
# d e f i n e  b u f f e r _ s i z e  2 5 0
c h a r  l i n e [ b u f f e r _ s i z e ] , l i n e l [ b u f f e r _ s i z e ] ; 
i n t  c t r ,  l e n ;  
c h a r  * t o k ;
c h a r  s e p s _ l [ ]  =  " " ;
F I L E  * f p t l ,  * f p t 2 ;
f p t l  =  f o p e n ( " c : \ \ c 5 1 v 4 \ \ e x a m p l e s \ \ t e s t _ l \ \ d a t a 2 . d a t " , " w " ) ;
i f  ( f p t l  == N UL L)
{ p r i n t f ( " E r r o r  o p e n i n g  f i l e . \ n " ) ;  
e x i t ( 0 ) ;
}
e l s e
{ p r i n t f ( " F i l e  d a t a 2 . d a t  o p e n e d . \ n " ) ;
)
f p t 2  =  f o p e n ( " c : W c 5 1 v 4 \ \ e x a m p l e s \ \ t e s t _ l \ \ d s t r a c e . t p x " , " r " ) ; 
i f  ( f p t 2  ==NULL)
{
p r i n t f ( " E r r o r  o p e n i n g  f i l e  d s t r a c e . t p x . \ n " ) ; 
e x i t ( 0 ) ;
)
e l s e
{
p r i n t f ( " F i l e  d s t r a c e . t p x  o p e n e d . \ n " ) ;
)
w h i l e  ( ! f e o f ( f p t 2 ) )
{
f g e t s ( l i n e ,  b u f f e r _ s i z e ,  f p t 2  ) ;
i f  ( f p t 2  ==NULL)
{
p r i n t f ( " E r r o r  r e a d i n g  f r o m  f i l e  d s t r a c e . t p x . \ n " ) ;
2
e x i t ( 0 ) ;
}
e l s e
{
l e n  =  s t r l e n ( l i n e ) ;
} / ‘ c o m p u t e  l e n g t h  o f  l i n e  a n d  p u t  t o  d a t a l . d a t  i f  >  2 4 * /
i f ( ( l e n > 5 )  && ( l e n < 5 0 ) )
{
s t r c p y ( l i n e l ,  l i n e ) ;  
t o k = s t r p b r k ( l i n e , "  " ) ;  
f p u t s ( t o k ,  f p t l ) ;
}
i f ( l e n > 5 0 )
{ f p u t s ( l i n e ,  f p t l ) ;  }
}
f c l o s e ( f p t l  ) ;  
f c l o s e  ( f p t 2  ) ;
}
/*******************★*★*******************************************************/ 
/ ‘ M e r g e a l l . c :  M e r g e s  d a t a l . d a t  a n d  d a t a 2 . d a t  i n t o  o n e  f i l e  a l l _ d a t a . d a t * /
v o i d  m e r g e _ a l l ( v o i d )
{
F I L E  * f p t l ,  * f p t 2 ,  * f p t 3 ;
c h a r  l i n e [ 6 6 ] ;
i n t  c t r ,  C t r l ,  c t r 2 ;
f p t l  =  f o p e n ( " c : W c 5 1 v 4 \ \ e x a m p l e s \ \ t e s t _ l \ \ a l l _ d a t a . d a t " , " w " ) ;
i f  ( f p t l  == N U L L )
{
p r i n t f ( " E r r o r  o p e n i n g  f i l e . \ n " ) ;  
e x i t ( 0 ) ;
)
e l s e
{
p r i n t f ( " F i l e  a l l _ d a t a . d a t  o p e n e d . \ n " ) ;
}
f p t 2  =  f o p e n ( " c : \ \ c 5 1 v 4 \ \ e x a m p l e s \ \ t e s t _ l \ \ d a t a l . d a t " , " r " ) ;
i f  ( f p t 2  == N U L L )
{
p r i n t f ( " E r r o r  o p e n i n g  f i l e  d a t a l . d a t . \ n " ) ; 
e x i t  ( 0 ) ;
}
e l s e
{
p r i n t f ( " F i l e  d a t a . d a t  o p e n e d . \ n " ) ;
}
f p t 3  =  f o p e n ( " c : W c 5 1 v 4 \ \ e x a m p l e s \ \ t e s t _ l \ \ d a t a 2 . d a t " , " r " ) ;
i f  ( f p t 2  =*=NULL)
{
p r i n t f ( " E r r o r  o p e n i n g  f i l e  d a t a . d a t . \ n " ) ; 
e x i t ( 0 ) ;
}
e l s e
(
p r i n t f ( " F i l e  d a t a l . d a t  o p e n e d . \ n " ) ;
}
w h i l e ( ! f e o f ( f p t 2 ) )
(
f o r  ( c t r l = l ;  c t r l < = 3 ;  c t r l + + )
(
f g e t s ( l i n e ,  6 6 ,  f p t 2  ) ;
i f  ( f p t 2  == N UL L)
(
p r i n t f ( " E r r o r  r e a d i n g  f r o m  f i l e  d a t a l . d a t . \ n " ) ; 
e x i t ( 0 ) ;
)
e l s e
(
f p u t s ( l i n e ,  f p t l ) ;
}
3
}f o r  ( c t r 2 = l ;  c t r 2 < = 3 ;  c t r 2 + + )
{
f g e t s ( l i n e ,  6 6 ,  f p t 3  ) ;
i f  ( f p t 3  ==N UL L)
{
p r i n t f ( " E r r o r  r e a d i n g  f r o m  f i l e  d a t a . d a t A n " ) ; 
e x i t ( 0 ) ;
}
e l s e
{
f p u t s ( l i n e , f p t 1 ) ;
}
}
}
f c l o s e ( f p t l  ) ;  
f c l o s e  ( f p t 2  ) ;  
f c l o s e  ( f p t 3  ) ;
}
J  - k - k  +  *  +  +  +  j
/ *  R e s u l t _ l . C :  R e a d s  d a t a  f o r  a  r e g i s t e r  a n d  c l o c k  c y c l e  f r o m  a l l _ d a t a . d a t  
a n d  w r i t e  i n  a  f o r m a t  t h a t  i s  e a s y  t o  p r o c e s s  i n  r e s u l t _ l . d a t * /
v o i d  R e s u l t _ l ( v o i d )
(
# d e f i n e  B U F _ S I Z E  2 5 0  
c h a r  l i n e [ B U F _ S I Z E ] , p s w [ 1 5 ] ;
i n t  p e o n ,  t c o n ,  s c o n ,  t m o d ,  s b u f ,  i e ,  i p ,  T L O ,  T L 1 ,  THO, T H 1 ,  D P L ,  DPH; 
i n t  c y c l e , A ,  B ,  r O ,  r l ,  r 2 ,  r 3 ,  r 4 ,  r 5 ,  r 6 ,  r 7 ,  d p t r ,  s p ,  p O ,  p i ,  p 2 ,  p 3 ;
F I L E  * f i l e P t r ,  * f i l e P t r l ;
f i l e P t r  =  f o p e n ( " c : W c 5 1 v 4 \ \ e x a m p l e s \ \ t e s t _ l \ \ a l l _ d a t a . d a t " , " r " ) ;
i f  ( f i l e P t r  ==N UL L)
{
p r i n t f ( " E r r o r  o p e n i n g  f i l e . N n " ) ;  
e x i t ( 0 ) ;
}
f i l e P t r l  =  f o p e n ( " c : \ \ c 5 1 v 4 \ \ e x a m p l e s \ \ t e s t _ l \ \ r e s u l t _ l . d a t " , " w " ) ;
i f  ( f i l e P t r  == N U L L )
{
p r i n t f ( " E r r o r  o p e n i n g  f i l e . \ n " ) ;  
e x i t ( 0 ) ;
}
w h i l e  ( ! f e o f ( f i l e P t r )  && ! k b h i t ( )  ) / *  T i l l  e n d  o f  f i l e  o r  k e y  b o a r d  h i t  * /
{
f g e t s ( l i n e ,  B U F _ S I Z E ,  f i l e P t r  ) ;
i f  ( ( l i n e [ 0 ]  = =  *C • )  && ( l i n e [ l ]  = = ' y ' ) )
{
s s c a n f  ( l i n e ,  " C y c l e = % d \ n " ,  f i c y c l e ) ; 
f p r i n t f  ( f i l e P t r l ,  " c y c l e = % x \ n " ,  c y c l e ) ;
}
i f  ( l i n e [ 0 ]  = =  ' P ' )
{
s s c a n f  ( l i n e , " P C O N = % x H  TCON=%xH SCON=%xH TMOD=%xH SBUF=%xH 
IE = % x H  I P = % x H \ n " , f i p c o n ,  & t c o n ,  & s c o n , i t m o d , & s b u f , & i e , & i p ) ; 
f p r i n t f  ( f i l e P t r l , " P C O N : % x  T C O N ;% x  S C O N :% x  TMOD;%x S B U F :% x  
I E : % x  I P : % x  " , p c o n ,  t c o n ,  s c o n ,  t m o d ,  s b u f ,  i e ,  i p ) ;
}
i f  ( l i n e [ 0 ]  = =  ' T ' )
(
s s c a n f ( l i n e , " T L 0 = % x H  T L l= % x H  T H 0= % xH  T H l= % x H  DPL=%xH 
D P L = % x H \ n " ,  & T L0,  & T L 1 ,  & TH0, & T H1,  &DPL, & D P H ) ; 
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r l ,  " T L 0 : % x  T L l : % x  T H 0 : % x  T H l : % x  D P L :% x  
D P H : % x \ n " ,  T L O ,  T L 1 , THO, T H 1 ,  D P L ,  D P H ) ;
)
if ((line[0] == •O')I I(line[0] == ' 1') |I(line[0] == '2')
I I ( l i n e [0] == ' 3 ' ) | | ( l i n e [0] == • 4 ' )  | I ( l i n e [0] == ' 5 ' )  I I 
( l i n e [0] == ' 6 ' ) I I ( l i n e [0] —  • 7 • )  I I ( l i n e [0] == ' 8 ' )  I I 
( l i n e [0] == * 9 * ) I I ( ( l i n e [03 = = ' A ' )  && ( l i n e f l ]  != ' ' ) )  I I 
( l i n e ( 0 ]  == ' B* ) I I <( l i n e I 0 J  = = ' C ' )  && ( l i n e [ l )  != ’y * ) ) I I 
( l i n e [0] == *D' )  It  ( l i n e [0] == ' E •) I I ( l i n e [0] == ' F ' ) )
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{
s s c a n f ( l i n e ,  "% x  %x %x %x %x %x %x %x %x %x %s %x %x %x %x %x % x \ n " ,  
&A, &B, & r O ,  & r l ,  & r 2 , & r 3 , & r 4 , & r 5 , & r 6 , & r 7 , p s w , & d p t r , & s p , & p O , & p l , & p 2 , & p 3 ) ; 
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r l ,  " A : % x  B : % x  r O : % x  r l : % x  r 2 : % x  r 3 : % x  r 4 : % x  r 5 : % x  r 6 :  
%x " ,  A ,  B ,  r O ,  r l ,  r 2 ,  r 3 ,  r 4 ,  r 5 ,  r 6 ) ;
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r l ,  " r 7 : % x  d p t r : % x  s p : % x  p O : % x  p l : % x  p 2 : % x  p 3 : % x \ n " ,  
r 7 , d p t r , s p , p 0 , p l , p 2 , p 3 ) ;
}
i f  ( l i n e [ 0 ]  = =  ’ ' )
{
f p r i n t f  ( f i l e P t r l ,  " i s " ,  l i n e ) ;
}
>
f c l o s e ( f i l e P t r ) ; 
f c l o s e ( f i l e P t r l ) ;
)
/ *  R e s u l t _ 2 . C :  P r o d u c e s  a  t a b l e  f o r  e a c h  r e g i s t e r  s h o w i n g  i t s  c o n t e n t  a s  
e a c h  i n s t r u c t i o n  i s  e x e c u t e d  a n d  t h e  c l o c k  c y c l e  a t  t h e  s t a r t  o f  e x e c u t i o n * /
v o i d  R e s u l t _ 2 ( v o i d )
{
# d e f i n e  b u f f e r _ s i z e  2 5 0
c h a r  l i n e l [ 2 5 0 ] , l i n e 2 [ 2 5 0 ] , l i n e 3 [ 2 5 0 ] , l i n e 4 [ 2 5 0 ] ;  
c h a r  l i n e l a [ 2 5 0 ] ,  l i n e 2 a [ 2 5 0 ] ,  l i n e 3 a [ 2 5 0 ] , l i n e 4 a [ 2 5 0 ] ;  
c h a r  s e p s _ 0 [ ]  =  " ,
c h a r  * t o k e n l ,  * t o k e n 2 ,  * t o k e n 3 ,  * t o k e n 4 ;  
s t r u c t  DATA_PACKE T 
{
i n t  c y c l e ;
i n t  c o n t e n t ;
c h a r  i n s t r u c t i o n l [ 1 0 ] ;
c h a r  i n s t r u c t i o n 2 [ 3 0 ] ;
} d p ;  / *  r e c o r d  l e n g t h  =  2  + 2  + 1 0  + 3 0  =  4 4  b y t e  * /
F I L E  * f i l e P t r ,  * f i l e P t r l ,  * f i l e P t r 2 ;  
i n t  B _ p r e v i o u s  = 0 ;
i n t  A ,  B ,  r O ,  r l ,  r 2 ,  r 3 ,  r 4 ,  r 5 ,  r 6 ,  r 7 ,  d p t r ,  s p ,  p O ,  p i ,  p 2 ,  p 3 ;  
i n t  p e o n ,  t c o n ,  s c o n ,  t m o d ,  s b u f ,  i e ,  i p ,  T L O ,  T L 1 ,  THO, T H 1 ,  D P L ,  D PH ; 
i n t  c y c l e ,  r e s u l t 1 ,  r e s u l t 2 ,  r e s u l t 3 ;  
i n t  r e c  =  0 ;
f i l e P t r  =  f o p e n ( " c : W c 5 1 v 4 \ \ e x a m p l e s \ \ t e s t _ l \ \ r e s u l t _ l . d a t " , " r " ) ;
i f  ( f i l e P t r  = = N U L L )
{ p r i n t f ( " E r r o r  o p e n i n g  f i l e . \ n " ) ;  
e x i t ( 0 ) ;
}
f i l e P t r l  =  f o p e n ( " c : \ \ c 5 1 v 4 \ \ e x a m p l e s \ \ t e s t _ l \ \ r e s u l t _ 2 . d a t " ,  " w + b " ) ;
i f  ( f i l e P t r l  = = N U L L )
{ p r i n t f ( " E r r o r  o p e n i n g  f i l e . N n " ) ;  
e x i t ( 0 ) ;
}
f i l e P t r 2  =  f o p e n ( " c : W c 5 1 v 4 \ \ e x a m p l e s \ \ t e s t _ l \ \ r e s u l t 2 1 . d a t " ,  " w " ) ;
i f  ( f i l e P t r 2  == N U L L )
{ p r i n t f ( " E r r o r  o p e n i n g  f i l e . \ n ” ) ;  
e x i t  ( 0 ) ;
}
w h i l e  ( J f e o f ( f i l e P t r ) )
{
f g e t s { l i n e l ,  b u f f e r _ s i z e ,  f i l e P t r  ) ;
/ * R e a d  4 l i n e s  i n  a  s e q u e n c e  a n d  s a v e  * /  
i f  ( f i l e P t r  == N UL L)
{ p r i n t f ( " E r r o r  r e a d i n g  f r o m  f i l e  r e s u l t . d a t . \ n " ) ; 
e x i t ( 0 ) ;
}
f g e t s  ( l i n e 2 ,  b u f f e r _ s i z e ,  f i l e P t r  ) ;
f g e t s ( l i n e 3 ,  b u f f e r _ s i z e ,  f i l e P t r  ) ;
f g e t s ( l i n e 4 ,  b u f f e r _ s i z e ,  f i l e P t r  ) ;
s t r c p y ( l i n e l a ,  l i n e l ) ;  / * s t r i n g  c o p y  l i n e l - 3  i n t o  l i n e l a - 3 a  * /  
s t r c p y ( l i n e 2 a ,  l i n e 2 ) ; 
s t r c p y ( l i n e 3 a ,  l i n e 3 ) ;
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t o k e n 4 = s t r p b r k ( l i n e 4 , " A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z " ) ;
/ ♦ e l i m i n a t e s  s p a c e s  b y  l e t t i n g  p o i n t e r  p o i n t s  t o  f i r s t  c h a r a c t e r  * /
s t r c p y ( l i n e 4 a ,  t o k e n 4 ) ;
/ ♦ c o p y  s t r i n g  f r o m  f i r s t  c h a r a c t e r  i n t o  l i n e 4 a  * /  
t o k e n l  =  s t r t o k ( l i n e l a ,  s e p s _ 0 ) ; 
t o k e n 2  =  s t r t o k ( l i n e 2 a ,  s e p s _ 0 ) ; 
t o k e n 3  =  s t r t o k ( l i n e 3 a ,  s e p s _ 0 ) ;
/ ♦ C o m p a r e  t o k e n  w i t h  t h e s e  s t r i n g s  c o n t i n u e  a s  b e n e a t h * /  
r e s u l t l  =  s t r c m p ( t o k e n l ,  " c y c l e " ) ;  
r e s u l t 2  =  s t r c m p ( t o k e n 2 ,  " P C O N " ) ;  
r e s u l t 3  =  s t r c m p ( t o k e n 3 ,  " A " ) ;
i f  ( r e s u l t l = = 0 )
{
s s c a n f  ( l i n e l , " c y c l e = % x \ n " , & c y c l e ) ;
}
i f  ( r e s u l t 2 = = 0 )
{
s s c a n f  ( l i n e 2 ,  " P C O N :% x  T C O N :% x  S C O N ;% x  TMOD:%x S B U F :% x  
I E : % x  I P : % x  T L 0 : % x  T L l : % x  T H 0 : % x  T H l : % x  D P L :% x  D P H : % x \ n " ,
& p c o n ,  & t c o n ,  & s c o n ,  & t m o d ,  & s b u f ,  & i e ,  & i p ,  & T L0,  & T L 1 ,
& TH0, &TH1, &DPL, & D P H ) ;
}
i f  ( r e s u l t 3  = = 0 )
{
s s c a n f  ( l i n e 3 ,  " A : % x  B : % x  r 0 : % x  r l : % x  r 2 : % x  r 3 : % x  r 4 : % x  
r 5 : % x  r 6 : % x  r 7 : % x  d p t r : % x  s p : % x  p 0 : % x  p l : % x  p 2 : % x  p 3 : % x \ n " ,
&A, &B, & r 0 ,  & r l ,  & r 2 ,  & r 3 ,  & r 4 ,  & r 5 ,  & r 6 ,  & r 7 ,  & d p t r ,  & s p ,  & p 0 ,
& p l , & p 2 , & p 3 ) ;
}
d p . c y c l e  =  c y c l e ;
d p . c o n t e n t  =  r 7 ;
s s c a n f  ( l i n e 4 a ,  "% s  % s \ n " ,  d p . i n s t r u c t i o n l ,  d p . i n s t r u c t i o n 2 ) ;
f p r i n t f  ( f i l e P t r 2 ,  " \ t % x  %x %s % s \ n " ,  d p . c y c l e ,  d p . c o n t e n t ,  
d p . i n s t r u c t i o n l , d p . i n s t r u c t i o n 2 ) ;
f w r i t e  ( & d p ,  s i z e o f ( s t r u c t  D A T A _ P A C K E T ) , 1 ,  f i l e P t r l ) ;  
d p . i n s t r u c t i o n l [ 0 ]  = 0 ;  
d p . i n s t r u c t i o n 2 [ 0 ]  =  0 ;  
r e C + + ;
}
f c l o s e  ( f i l e P t r ) ;  
f c l o s e  ( f i l e P t r l ) ;  
f c l o s e  ( f i l e P t r 2 ) ;
}
/ * G l o b a l _ i n i t i a l i s a t i o n . c :  R e - i n i t i a l i s e s  v a r i a b l e s  b e f o r e  t h e  d u t y  c y c l e  o f  
t h e  n e x t  r e g i s t e r  i n  a  s e q u e n c e  i s  c a l c u l a t e d * /
v o i d  g l o b a l _ i n i t i a l i s a t i o n  ( v o i d )
{
r e c = 0 ;
c y c l e _ p r e v l  =  c y c l e _ p r e v 2  = 0 ;
c o n t e n t _ p r e v l  =  c o n t e n t _ p r e v 2  = 0 ;
d u t y _ c y c l e  = 0 ;
A c c _ d u t y _ p e r i o d  =  0 ;
c o n d i t i o n l  =  c o n d i t i o n 2  =  c o n d i t i o n 3  =  c o n d i t i o n 4  =  c o n d i t i o n 5  = 0 ;
}
^ ' k ' k i c ' k ' k - k ' k ' k ' i e ' k ' k - i t i r i c - t r i r ' i c ' k i c ^ - k ' k - t e ' k ' k i e ' i e - l r i c i r i r ' i c - k - k i r ' k i t i e l r ' i i i e ' k i c ^ c ' t e ' k ^ c ' i e i r ' k ' i r i r ' k ' k i r ' k ' k ' k ' ^ r ' i r i r ' k ' k ' k ' i r ' i c ' k ' k i c i t i r ' k ' k ' k ' t e ' k ' t c  j
/ * G e t _ R e g i s t e r . C :  G e t  t h e  n e x t  r e g i s t e r  w h o s e  d u t y  c y c l e  i s  t o  b e  c o m p u t e d  
f r o m  a  l i s t  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  a l l  r e g i s t e r s  * /
v o i d  G e t _ R e g i s t e r ()
{
i n t  r e s u l t  =  c t r  = 0 ;  
c h a r  * t o k e n _ l ;
w h i l e ( c t r < 4 )
{
p r i n t f ( " % s \ n " ,  R e g i s t e r _ l i s t ) ;
p r i n t f ( " P l e a s e  e n t e r  a  r e g i s t e r  f r o m  t h e  a b o v e  l i s t : " ) ;  
s c a n f  ( "  % s " ,  R e g i s t e r ) ;  
p r i n t f ( " \ n " ) ;
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s t r c p y ( R e g i s t e r _ l i s t l ,  R e g i s t e r _ l i s t ) ; 
t o k e n _ l  =  s t r t o k (  R e g i s t e r _ l i s t l ,  s e p s  ) ;
w h i l e ( ( s t r c m p ( t o k e n _ l ,  R e g i s t e r )  ! =  r e s u l t ) & &  ( t o k e n _ l  ! =  N U L L ))
{
p r i n t f ( " % s  " ,  t o k e n _ l ) ;  
t o k e n _ l  =  s t r t o k ( NULL, s e p s  ) ;
}
i f ( ( s t r c m p ( t o k e n _ l ,  R e g i s t e r )  = =  r e s u l t ) )
{
p r i n t f ( " \ n P l e a s e  w a i t  w h i l e  t h e  d u t y  c y c l e  f o r  %s i s  c o m p u t e d . \ n " ,
R e g i s t e r ) ;
c t r = 4 ;
}
e l s e
{
c t r + + ;
p r i n t f ( " \ n R e g i s t e r  n o t  f o u n d ,  " ) ;
}
}
i f ( s t r c m p ( t o k e n _ l , R e g i s t e r ) ! = r e s u l t )
{
p r i n t f ( " s o m e t h i n g  m a y  b e  w r o n g  w i t h  t h e  p r o g r a m .
P l e a s e  r e s t a r t  t h e  p r o g r a m . \ n " ) ;
e x i t  ( 0 ) ;
}
}
/ ♦ C a l c u l a t e s  t h e  d u t y  c y c l e  o f  a l l  r e g i s t e r s  i n  a  s e q u e n c e  * /
v o i d  A l l R e g D C ()
{
s t r c p y ( R e g i s t e r _ l i s t l ,  R e g i s t e r _ l i s t 2 ) ;
/ *  g e t  a  r e g i s t e r  f r o m  a  l i s t  a n d  c a l c u l a t e s  i t s  d u t y  c y c l e * /  
t o k e n  =  s t r t o k ( R e g i s t e r _ l i s t l ,  s e p s  ) ;  
s t r c p y ( R e g i s t e r ,  t o k e n ) ;
R e g D C ( ) ;  
c t r l l  = 1 ;
w h i l e  ( c t r l l  ! =  3 1 )
{
s t r c p y ( R e g i s t e r _ l i s t l ,  R e g i s t e r _ l i s t 2 ) ;  
t o k e n  =  s t r t o k ( R e g i s t e r _ l i s t l ,  s e p s  ) ;  
w h i l e ( c t r l 2  ! =  c t r l l )
{
t o k e n  *= s t r t o k ( NULL, s e p s  ) ;  
s t r c p y ( R e g i s t e r ,  t o k e n ) ;  
c t r l 2 + + ;
}
g l o b a l _ i n i t i a l i s a t i o n  ( ) ;
s t r c p y ( i n s t r u c t i o n l _ p r e v , " N o t h i n g ! ! ! " ) ;
s t r c p y ( i n s t r u c t i o n 2 _ p r e v , " N o t h i n g ! ! ! " ) ;
R e g D C ( ) ;  
c t r l l + + ;  
c t r l 2  = 0 ;
i f  ( s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r , " T C O N ( 8 8 H ) " ) = = H I T I  I s t r c m p  ( R e g i s t e r ,  " S C O N ( 9 8 H ) " ) = = H I T  
I | s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " P C O N ( 8 7 H ) " ) = = H I T I | s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " I P ( 0 B 8 H ) " ) = = H I T  
I | s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " I E ( 0 A 8 H ) " ) = = H I T | I s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " T M O D ( 8 9 H ) " ) = = H I T  
I I s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " T L O ( 8 A H ) " ) = = H I T | I s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " T L 1 ( 8 B H ) " ) = = H I T  
I | s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " T H O ( 8 C H ) " ) = = H I T | I s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " T H 1 ( 8 D H ) " ) = = H I T  
I | s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " S P " ) = = H I T | | s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " P S W " ) = = H I T )
{ C o n t _ D C ( ) ;  }
)
}
v o i d  C o n t _ D C ()
{
i f ( s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r , " T C O N ( 8 8 H )  " ) = =  H I T )
{ TCON =  A c c _ d u t y _ p e r i o d ;
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r 2 ,  "TCON =  % x \ n " ,  T C O N ) ;
}
i f ( s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r , " S C O N ( 9 8 H ) " ) = =  H I T )
{ SCON =  A c c _ d u t y _ p e r i o d ;  f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r 2 ,  "SC O N  =  % x \ n " ,  S C O N ) ;  }
i f ( s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r , " P C O N ( 8 7 H ) " ) = =  H I T )
( PCON =  A c c _ d u t y _ p e r i o d ;  f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r 2 ,  "PC O N  =  % x \ n " ,  P C O N ) ;  }
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i f ( s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r , " I P ( 0 B 8 H ) " ) = =  H I T )
{ I P  =  A c c _ d u t y _ p e r i o d ;  f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r 2 ,  " I P  =  % x \ n " ,  I P ) ;  }
i f ( s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r , " I E ( 0 A 8 H ) " ) = =  H I T )
{ I E  =  A c c _ d u t y _ p e r i o d ;  f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r 2 ,  " I E  =  % x \ n " ,  I E ) ;  }
i f ( s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r , " T M O D ( 8 9 H ) " ) = =  H I T )
{ TMOD =  A c c _ d u t y _ p e r i o d ;  f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r 2 ,  "TMOD =  % x \ n " ,  TM O D );  }
i f  ( s t r c m p  ( R e g i s t e r ,  "T L O  (8A H ) ")«=«= H I T )
{ TLO =  A c c _ d u t y _ p e r i o d ;  f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r 2 ,  "T L O  =  % x \ n " ,  T L O ) ;  }
i f ( s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r , " T L l ( 8 B H ) " ) = =  H I T )
{ T L l  =  A c c _ d u t y _ p e r i o d ;  f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r 2 ,  " T L l  =  % x \ n " ,  T L l ) ;  }
i f ( s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r , " T H 0 ( 8 C H ) " ) = =  H I T )
{ THO =  A c c _ d u t y _ p e r i o d ;  f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r 2 ,  "THO =  % x \ n " ,  T H O ) ;  }
i f ( s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r , " T H 1 ( 8 D H ) " ) = =  H I T )
{ TH1 =  A c c _ d u t y _ p e r i o d ;  f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r 2 ,  " T H 1  =  % x \ n " ,  T H 1 ) ;  }
i f ( s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r , " S P " ) = =  H I T )
{ S P _ 0  =  A c c _ d u t y _ p e r i o d ;  f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r 2 ,  " S P  =  % x \ n " ,  S P _ 0 ) ; }
i f ( s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r , " P S W " ) = =  H I T )
{ PS W _0  =  A c c _ d u t y _ p e r i o d ;  f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r 2 ,  "PSW  =  % x \ n " ,  P S W _ 0 ) ;  }
}
/ * R e g D c . C :  C o m p u t e s  t h e  a c c u m u l a t i v e - d u t y - p e r i o d  f o r  a  r e g i s t e r  ♦ /
v o i d  R e g D C ( v o i d )
{
c h a r  s e p 2 [ ]  =  " , " ;
c h a r  ♦ t o k l ;
f i l e P t r  =  f o p e n ( " c : \ \ c 5 1 v 4 \ \ e x a m p l e s \ \ t e s t _ l \ \ r e s u l t _ 2 . d a t " ,  " r + b " ) ;
i f  ( f i l e P t r  ==NULL)
{ p r i n t f ( " E r r o r  o p e n i n g  f i l e . N n " ) ;  
e x i t ( O ) ;
>
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r l ,  " ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ R E S U L T  F I L E  FOR R E G I S T E R  % s * * * * \ n \ n \ n " ,  R e g i s t e r ) ;
w h i l e ( ( c o n d i t i o n l  ! =  1 )  && ( c o n d i t i o n 2  ! =  1 )  && ( ! f e o f ( f i l e P t r ) ) )
{
n u m b e r  =  r e c * R E C O R D _ S I Z E ;
f s e e k  ( f i l e P t r , n u m b e r  , S E E K _ S E T ) ;
f r e a d  ( & d p ,  s i z e o f ( s t r u c t  D A T A _ P A C K E T ) , 1 ,  f i l e P t r ) ;  
f p r i n t f  ( f i l e P t r l ,  "% d  %x %x " ,  r e c ,  d p . c y c l e ,  d p . c o n t e n t ) ;
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r l ,  " % s  % s \ n " ,  d p . i n s t r u c t i o n l ,  d p . i n s t r u c t i o n 2 ) ;
/ ♦ S e p e r a t e  d p . i n s t r u c t i o n  i n t o  i n s t r 2 _ l  a n d  i n s t r 2 _ 2  * /
s t r c p y  ( e r a s e ,  d p . i n s t r u c t i o n 2 ) ; 
t o k l  «= s t r t o k  ( e r a s e ,  s e p 2 ) ;  
s t r c p y  ( i n s t r 2 _ l ,  t o k l ) ;  
t o k l  =  s t r t o k  (NULL, s e p 2 ) ; 
s t r c p y  ( i n s t r 2 _ 2 ,  t o k l ) ;
/ ♦ C h e c k s  f o r 1 t h e  n a m e  o f  r e g i s t e r  i n  c u r r e n t  r e c o r d  * /
R e g i s t e r _ c h e c k { ) ;
/ ♦ C h e c k s  f o r  b i t  o f  r e g i s t e r  i n  c u r r e n t  r e c o r d . ♦ /  
i f  ( c o n d i t i o n l  ! =  1 )
{ B i t _ C h e c k l ( ) ;
C h e c k _ B i t _ R e g i s t e r ( ) ;
i f  ( c o n d i t i o n 2  ! =  1 )
{ B i t _ C h e c k 2 ( ) ;
C h e c k _ B i t _ R e g i s t e r ( ) ;
}
}
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r l , " c o n d i t i o n l = % d , c o n d i t i o n 2 = % d ,  c o n d i t i o n 3  = % d \ n " ,  
c o n d i t i o n l ,  c o n d i t i o n 2 ,  c o n d i t i o n 3 ) ;
C a l c u l a t e _ D u t y _ C y c l e l ( ) ;
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r l , " c y c l e _ p r e v l = % x  c y c l e _ p r e v 2 = % x  " ,  c y c l e _ p r e v l ,  c y c l e _ p r e v 2
) ;
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r l ,  " d p . c y c l e = % x  A c c _ d u t y _ p e r i o d  = % x \ n " , d p . c y c l e ,  A c c _ d u t y _ p e r
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i o d )  ;
c y c l e _ p r e v 2  =  d p . c y c l e ;  
c y c l e _ p r e v l  =  d p . c y c l e ;  
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r l ,  " \ n \ n " ) ; 
r e C + + ;
}
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r l ,  " E n d  o f  l o o p  o n e \ n \ n " ) ;  
w h i l e  ( ! f e o f ( f i l e P t r ) )
{ / * I f  r e g i s .  i s  a  c o n t r o l  r e g i s . ,  c a l c a l .  a c c .  d u t y  p e r i o d  u s i n g  c a l c u l a t e _ D u t y _ C y c  
l e 3 * /
i f  ( s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " T C O N ( 8 8 H ) " ) = = H I T | | s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " S C O N ( 9 8 H ) " ) = = H I T  
| | s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " P C O N ( 8 7 H ) " ) = = H I T I | s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " I P ( 0 B 8 H ) " ) = = H I T  
| | s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " I E ( 0 A 8 H ) " ) = = H I T | I s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " T M O D ( 8 9 H ) " ) = = H I T  
I | s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " T L O ( 8 A H ) " ) = = H I T I  I s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " T L l ( 8 B H ) " ) = = H I T  
| | s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " T H O ( 8 C H ) " ) = = H I T | | s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " T H 1 ( 8 D H ) " ) = = H I T )
{
C a l c u l a t e _ D u t y _ C y c l e 3 ( ) ;
d u t y _ c y c l e  =  ( f l o a t ) A c c _ d u t y _ p e r i o d / ( f l o a t ) d p . c y c l e ;
}
e l s e
( / *  C h e c k  f o r  t h e  u s a g e  o f  r e g i s t e r  a n d  u s e  c a l c u l a t e _ d u t y _ c y c l e 2 ( ) * /  
n u m b e r  =  r e c * R E C O R D _ S I Z E ;  
f s e e k  ( f i l e P t r , n u m b e r  , S E E K _ S E T ) ;
f r e a d  ( & d p ,  s i z e o f ( s t r u c t  D A T A _ P A C K E T ) , 1 ,  f i l e P t r ) ;  
f p r i n t f  ( f i l e P t r l ,  "% d  %x %x " ,  r e c ,  d p . c y c l e ,  d p . c o n t e n t ) ;
f p r i n t f  ( f i l e P t r l ,  " % s  % s \ n " ,  d p .  i n s t r u c t i o n l ,  d p .  i n s t r u c t i o n 2 - )  ;
s t r c p y  ( e r a s e ,  d p . i n s t r u c t i o n 2 ) ;
t o k l  =  s t r t o k  ( e r a s e ,  s e p l ) ;
s t r c p y  ( i n s t r 2 _ l ,  t o k l ) ;
t o k l  =  s t r t o k  (N U LL ,  s e p l ) ;
s t r c p y  ( i n s t r 2 _ 2 ,  t o k l ) ;
R e g i s t e r _ c h e c k ( ) ;
i f  ( c o n d i t i o n l  ! =  1 )
{
B i t _ C h e c k l ( ) ;
C h e c k _ B i t _ R e g i s t e r ( ) ;  
i f  ( c o n d i t i o n 2  !*= 1 )
{
B i t _ C h e c k 2 ( )  ;
C h e c k _ B i t _ R e g i s t e r ( )  ;
}
}
C a l c u l a t e _ D u t y _ _ C y c l e 2  ( ) ;
}
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r l ,  " A c c _ d u t y _ p e r i o d  = % x \ n " , A c c _ d u t y _ p e r i o d ) ;
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r l ,  " \ n \ n " ) ;
r e c + + ;
}
/ ♦ p r i n t  r e s u l t  t o  s c r e e n  a n d  t o  f i l e s  r e s u l t _ 3 . d a t  a n d  r e s u l t _ 4 . d a t * /  
p r i n t f ( " T h e  A c c _ d u t y _ p e r i o d  f o r  r e g i s t e r  %s i s :  % x \ n " , R e g i s t e r , A c c _ d u t y _ p e r i o d ) ; 
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r 2 , " T h e  A c c _ d u t y _ p e r i o d  f o r  r e g i s t e r  %s i s : % x \ n " , R e g i s t e r , A c c _ d u t y _ p e r  
i o d )  ;
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r l , " T h e  D u t y _ c y c l e  f o r  r e g i s t e r  %s i s :  % . 2 f \ n " , R e g i s t e r ,  d u t y _ c y c l e ) ; 
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r 2 , " T h e  D u t y _ c y c l e  f o r  r e g i s t e r  %s i s :  % . 2 f \ n " ,  R e g i s t e r ,  d u t y _ c y c l e ) ;
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r 2 ,  " \ n \ n " ) ;
D u t y _ p e r i o d _ t o t a l  + =  A c c _ d u t y _ p e r i o d ;  
f c l o s e  ( f i l e P t r ) ;
}
/ * R e g i s t e r _ c h e c k . C :  C h e c k  f o r  u s a g e  o f  r e g i s t e r  a s  e a c h  i n s t r u c t i o n  i s  e x e c u t e d .
T h e  v a r i o u s  a d d r e s s i n g  m o d e s  a n d  a l l  i n s t r u c t i o n  t y p e s  a r e  c o n s i d e r e d . * /
v o i d  R e g i s t e r _ c h e c k  ()
{
i n t  c o n d i t i o n s ,  c o n d i t i o n b ,  c o n d i t i o n c ,  c o n d i t i o n d ,  c o n d i t i o n e ;  
c h a r  s t r i n g [ 8 0 ] ;
i f ( s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r , i n s t r 2 _ l ) = = H I T | | s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  i n s t r 2 _ 2 ) = = H I T )
{ c o n d i t i o n s  =  1 ;  }
e l s e
{ c o n d i t i o n s  = 0 ;  }
/ ♦ C h e c k s  f o r  A  o r  B i n  i n s t r u c t i o n s  s u c h  a s  MUL A B ,  MOV A ,  B ( O F ) H ) ,  e t c . * /  
i f  ( s t r c m p  ( R e g i s t e r ,  " A " )  “ H I T  I I s t r c m p  ( R e g i s t e r ,  " B  ( 0 F 0 H )  " )  = =  H I T )
{
i f  ( ( s t r c m p ( " A B " , i n s t r 2 _ l ) = = H I T )  | | ( s t r c m p ( " A B " , i n s t r 2 _ 2 ) = = H I T ) )
{ c o n d i t i o n b  = 1 ;  }
e l s e
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{ c o n d i t io n b  *= 0 ; }
}
i f  ( s t r c m p  ( R e g i s t e r ,  " A " ) = = H I T |  I s t r c m p  ( R e g i s t e r , '  " D P T R "  )«==HIT I I s t r c m p  ( R e g i s t e r ,  " P C " )  =  
= H I T )
{
i f ( ( s t r c m p ( " G A + D P T R " , i n s t r 2 _ l ) = = H I T ) I  I ( s t r c m p  ( " G A + D P T R " , i n s t r 2 _ 2 ) = = H I T )
I I ( s t r c m p ( " G A + P C " , i n s t r 2 _ l ) = = H I T ) I  I ( s t r c m p ( " G A + P C " , i n s t r 2 _ 2 ) = = H I T ) )
{ c o n d i t i o n c  = 1 ;  }
e l s e
{ c o n d i t i o n c  = 0 ;  }
}
s t r c p y ( s t r i n g ,  " G "  ) ;  
s t r c a t ( s t r i n g ,  R e g i s t e r  ) ;
i f ( s t r c m p ( s t r i n g ,  i n s t r 2 _ l ) = = H I T  I I s t r c m p ( s t r i n g , i n s t r 2 _ 2 ) = = H I T )
{ c o n d i t i o n d  = 1 ;  }
e l s e
{ c o n d i t i o n d  = 0 ;  }
i f ( s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " P C " ) = = H I T I  I s t r c m p  ( R e g i s t e r ,  " S P " ) = = H I T
I I s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r , " P S W " ) = = H I T | | s t r c m p  ( R e g i s t e r ,  " A L U " ) = =  H I T )
( c o n d i t i o n e  = 1 ;  }
e l s e
( c o n d i t i o n e  = 0 ;  }
i f ( ( c o n d i t i o n s  = =  1 ) I I ( c o n d i t i o n b  = =  1 ) I | ( c o n d i t i o n c  = =  1 ) I I ( c o n d i t i o n d  = =  1 )
I I ( c o n d i t i o n e = = l ) ) 
c o n d i t i o n l  = 1 ;
e l s e
c o n d i t i o n l  = 0 ;
}
/ * B i t _ C h e c k l . C ,  B i t _ C h e c k 2 . C , C h e c k _ B i t _ _ R e g i s t e r . C :  C h e c k s  f o r  u s a g e  o f  b i t s  
i n  b i t  a d d r e s s a b l e  r e g i s t e r s  a s  e a c h  i n s t r u c t i o n  i s  e x e c u t e d  * /
v o i d  B i t _ C h e c k l ( )
{ i n t  c o n d i t i o n s ,  c o n d i t i o n b ,  c o n d i t i o n c ;
i f ( s t r c m p ( " M O V " , d p . i n s t r u c t i o n l ) * = = H I T | I s t r c m p ( " A N L " , d p . i n s t r u c t i o n l ) = = H I T  
I I s t r c m p  ( " O R L " ,  d p . i n s t r u c t i o n l )  = =  H I T )
c o n d i t i o n a l ;
e l s e
c o n d i t i o n a l ;
i f  ( s t r c m p  ( " C " ,  i n s t r 2 _ l )  = =  H I T )
{ c o n d i t i o n b  = 1 ;  }
e l s e
{ s t r c p y  ( B i t _ s t r i n g ,  " 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 " ) ;  / * C o p y  r u b b i s h  i n t o  B i t _ s t r i n g  * /  
c o n d i t i o n b  ~ 0;
}
i f  ( s t r c m p  ( " C " ,  i n s t r 2 _ 2 )  = =  H I T )
{ c o n d i t i o n a l ; }
e l s e
{ s t r c p y  ( B i t _ s t r i n g ,  " 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 " ) ;  
c o n d i t i o n c = 0 ;  }
i f ( c o n d i t i o n s  = = 1  && c o n d i t i o n b  = = 1 )
( s t r c p y  ( B i t _ s t r i n g ,  i n s t r 2 _ 2 ) ;  }
i f ( c o n d i t i o n s  = = 1  && c o n d i t i o n c  = = 1 )
( s t r c p y  ( B i t _ s t r i n g ,  i n s t r 2 _ l ) ;  }
}
v o i d  B i t _ C h e c k 2 ( )
{ / * C h e c k s  i f  i n s t r u c t i o n  i s  B o o l e a n  a n d  o p e r a t i n g  o n  a  s i n g l e  b i t  o n l y  e . g .  S E T B  
R S I * /
i n t  c o n d i t i o n s ,  c o n d i t i o n b ;
i f ( s t r c m p ( " C L R " , d p . i n s t r u c t i o n l ) = = H I T | I s t r c m p ( " S E T B " , d p . i n s t r u c t i o n l ) = = H I T  
l l s t r c m p  ( " C P L " ,  d p . i n s t r u c t i o n l )  = =  H I T )
c o n d i t i o n a l ;
e l s e
c o n d i t i o n a l ;
/ *  I f  " A "  i s  n o t  f o u n d ,  t h e n  o p e r a t i o n  i s  B o o l e a n .  T h i s  i s  b e c a s u e  CRL a n d  
C P L  c a n  o n l y  b e  c a r r i e d  o u t  i n  t h e  a c c u m u l a t o r  o r  o n  b i t  v a r i a b l e s .  * /
i f  ( ( s t r c m p  ( " A " ,  d p . i n s t r u c t i o n 2 )  ! =  H I T ) )
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{ c o n d i t i o n a l ;  }
e l s e
{ c o n d i t i o n b = 0 ;  }
i f  ( c o n d i t i o n a = = l  && c o n d i t i o n b = = l )
{ s t r c p y  ( B i t _ s t r i n g ,  d p . i n s t r u c t i o n 2 ) ; }
e l s e
{ s t r c p y  ( B i t _ s t r i n g ,  " 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 " ) ;  }
}
v o i d  C h e c k _ B i t _ R e g i s t e r ( )
{ / * C h e c k s  f o r  t h e  u s a g e  o f  b i t s  i n  b i t - a d d r e s s a b l e  r e g i s t e r s  * /
c h a r  B i t O _ l [ 2 0 ] ,  B i t l _ l [ 2 0 ] ,  B i t 2 _ l [ 2 0 ] ,  B i t 3 _ l [ 2 0 ] ,  B i t 4 _ l [ 2 0 ] ,  B i t 5 _ l [ 2 0 ] ;
c h a r  B i t 6 _ l  [ 2 0 ] ,  B i t 7 _ l [ 2 0 ] ;
i f ( s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " T C O N ( 8 8 H ) " )  —  H I T )
(
s t r c p y ( B i t 0 _ 1 ,  " 8 8 H " ) ; s t r c p y ( B i t 1 _ 1 ,  " 8 9 H " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t 2 _ 1 ,  " 8 A H " ) ;  
s t r c p y ( B i t 3 _ 1 ,  " 8 B H " ) ; s t r c p y ( B i t 4 _ l ,  " 8 C H " ) ; s t r c p y ( B i t 5 _ 1 ,  " 8 D H " ) ;  
s t r c p y ( B i t 6 _ l ,  " 8 E H " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t 7 _ l ,  " 8 F H " ) ;
}
i f ( s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " S C O N ( 9 8 H ) " )  = =  H I T )
{
s t r c p y ( B i t 0 _ l , " R l ( 9 8 H ) " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t  1 _ 1 ,  " T I ( 9 9 H ) " ) ; s t r c p y ( B i t 2 _ l , " T I + 1 ( 9 A H ) " ) ;  
s t r c p y ( B i t 3 _ l , " T I + 2 ( 9 B H ) " ) ; s t r c p y ( B i t 4 _ l , " T I + 3 ( 9 C H ) " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t 5 _ l , " T I + 4 ( 9 D H ) "
) ;
s t r c p y ( B i t 6 _ 1 ,  " T I + 5 ( 9 E H ) " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t 7 _ l , " T I + 6 ( 9 F H ) " ) ;
}
i f ( s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " A " )  = =  H I T )
{
s t r c p y ( B i t 0 _ l , " C Y + 9 ( 0 E 0 H ) " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t 1 _ 1 , " C Y + 1 0 ( 0 E 1 H ) " ) ;  
s t r c p y ( B i t 2 _ l , " C Y + 1 1 ( 0 E 2 H ) " ) ; s t r c p y ( B i t 3 _ l ,  " C Y + 1 2 ( 0 E 3 H ) " ) ;  
s t r c p y ( B i t 4 _ 1 , " C Y + 1 3 ( 0 E 4 H ) " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t 5 _ 1 , " C Y + 1 4 ( 0 E 5 H ) " ) ;  
s t r c p y ( B i t 6 _ l ,  " C Y + 1 5 ( 0 E 6 H ) " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t 7 _ l , " C Y + 1 6 ( 0 E 7 H ) " ) ;
}
i f  ( s t r c m p  ( R e g i s t e r ,  " B ( 0 F 0 H ) " )  *== H I T )
{
s t r c p y ( B i t 0 _ 1 , " C Y + 2 5 ( 0 F 0 H ) " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t l _ l , " C Y + 2 6 ( 0 F 1 H ) " ) ;  
s t r c p y ( B i t 2 _ l , " C Y + 2 7 ( 0 F 2 H ) " ) ; s t r c p y ( B i t 3 _ l , " C Y + 2 8 ( 0 F 3 H ) " ) ;  
s t r c p y ( B i t 4 _ l , " C Y + 2 9 ( 0 F 4 H ) " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t 5 _ l ,  " C Y + 3 0 ( 0 F 5 H ) " ) ;  
s t r c p y ( B i t 6 _ l ,  " C Y + 3 1 ( 0 F 6 H ) " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t 7 _ l , " C Y + 3 2 ( 0 F 7 H ) " ) ;
}
i f ( s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " P S W ( O D O H ) " )  = =  H I T )
{
s t r c p y ( B i t 0 _ 1 , " T l + 5 5 ( O D O H ) " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t l _ l , " T 1 + 5 6 ( 0 D 1 H ) " ) ;  
s t r c p y ( B i t 2 _ l , " O V ( O D 2 H ) " ) ; s t r c p y ( B i t 3 _ l , " R S 0 ( 0 D 3 H ) " ) ;  
s t r c p y ( B i t 4 _ 1 , " R S I ( 0 D 4 H ) " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t 5 _ l , " R S 1 + 1 ( 0 D 5 H ) ” ) ;  
s t r c p y ( B i t 6 _ 1 ,  ” A C ( 0 D 6 H ) " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t 7 _ l , " C Y ( 0 D 7 H ) " ) ;
}
i f ( s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " P 0 ( 8 0 H ) " )  = =  H I T )
{
s t r c p y ( B i t O _ l ,  " 8 0 H " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t 1 _ 1 ,  " 8 1 H " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t 2 _ 1 ,  " 8 2 H " ) ;
s t r c p y ( B i t 3 _ l ,  " 8 3 H " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t 4  1 ,  " 8 4 H " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t 5 _ l ,  " 8 5 H " ) ;
s t r c p y ( B i t 6 _ 1 ,  " 8 6 H " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t 7 ~ l ,  " 8 7 H " ) ;
}
i f ( s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " P 1 ( 9 0 H ) " )  = =  H I T )
{
s t r c p y ( B i t O _ l ,  " 9 0 H " ) ; s t r c p y ( B i t 1 _ 1 ,  " 9 1 H " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t 2 _ l ,  " 9 2 H " ) ;
s t r c p y ( B i t 3 _ l ,  " 9 3 H " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t 4 _ 1 ,  " 9 4 H " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t 5 _ l ,  " 9 5 H " ) ;
s t r c p y ( B i t 6 _ 1 ,  " 9 6 H " ) ; s t r c p y ( B i t 7 _ l ,  " 9 7 H " ) ;
}
i f ( s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " P 2 ( 0 A 0 H ) " )  = =  H I T )
{
s t r c p y ( B i t 0 _ 1 ,  " T l + 7 ( O A O H ) " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t l _ l ,  " T l + 8 ( 0 A 1 H ) " ) ;  
s t r c p y ( B i t 2 _ l , " T 1 + 9 ( 0 A 2 H ) " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t 3 _ l , " T l + 1 0 ( 0 A 3 H ) " ) ;  
s t r c p y ( B i t 4 _ l ,  " T l + 1 1 ( 0 A 4 H ) " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t 5 _ l ,  " T l + 1 2 ( 0 A 5 H ) " ) ;  
s t r c p y ( B i t 6 _ 1 , " T 1 + 1 3 ( 0 A 6 H ) " ) ; s t r c p y ( B i t 7 _ l ,  " T l + 1 4 ( 0 A 7 H ) " ) ;
}
i f ( s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " P 3 ( 0 B 0 H ) " )  = =  H I T )
{
s t r c p y ( B i t 0 _ 1 ,  " T l + 2 3 ( O B O H ) " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t l _ l ,  " T l + 2 4 ( 0 B 1 H ) " ) ;  
s t r c p y ( B i t 2 _ l ,  " T l + 2 5 ( 0 B 2 H ) " ) ; s t r c p y ( B i t 3 _ l ,  " T l + 2 6 ( 0 B 3 H ) " ) ;  
s t r c p y ( B i t 4 _ l ,  " T l + 2 7 ( 0 B 4 H ) " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t 5 _ l ,  " T l + 2 8 ( 0 B 5 H ) " ) ;  
s t r c p y ( B i t 6 _ 1 ,  " T l + 2 9 ( 0 B 6 H ) " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t 7 _ l ,  " T l + 3 0 ( 0 B 7 H ) " ) ;
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}i f ( s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " I E ( 0 A 8 H ) " )  = =  H I T )
{
s t r c p y ( B i t 0 _ 1 , " T l + 1 5 ( 0 A 8 H ) " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t l _ l , " T 1 + 1 6 ( 0 A 9 H ) " ) ;  
s t r c p y ( B i t 2 _ l , " T l + 1 7 ( O A A H ) " ) ; s t r c p y ( B i t 3 _ 1 , " T l + 1 8 ( O A B H ) " ) ;  
s t r c p y ( B i t 4 _ l , " T 1 + 1 9 ( 0 A C H ) " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t 5 _ l , " T 1 + 2 0 ( 0 A D H ) " ) ;  
s t r c p y ( B i t 6 _ l ,  " T l + 2 1 ( O A E H ) " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t 7 _ 1 , " T l + 2 2 ( O A F H ) " ) ;
}
i f ( s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  n I P ( O B 8 H ) " )  = =  H I T )
{
s t r c p y ( B i t O _ l , " T l + 3 1 ( 0 B 8 H ) " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t l _ l , " T l + 3 2 ( 0 B 9 H ) " ) ;  
s t r c p y ( B i t 2 _ 1 , " T l + 3 3 ( O B A H ) " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t 3 _ l , " T l + 3 4 ( O B B H ) " ) ;  
s t r c p y ( B i t 4 _ l , " T l + 3 5 ( O B C H ) " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t 5 _ l , " T 1 + 3 6 ( 0 B D H ) " ) ;  
s t r c p y ( B i t 6 _ 1 ,  " T l + 3 7 ( O B E H ) " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t 7 _ l , " T l + 3 8 ( O B F H ) " ) ;
}
i f ( s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " R O " )  *»*= H I T  | I s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " R l " )  = =  H I T  | |
s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " R 2 " ) = =  H I T  I I s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " R 3 " )  = =  H I T  I I
s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " R 4 " )  = =  H I T  I I s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " R 5 " ) = =  H I T  I I
s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " R 6 " )  = =  H I T  I I s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " R 7 " ) = =  H I T  I I
s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " T M O D ( 8 9 H ) " ) = =  H I T  I I s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  " P C O N ( 8 7 H ) " )  = =  H I T  
I I  s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r , " D P T R " ) = =  H I T  I | s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r , " T L O ( 8 A H ) " )  = =  H I T  I I 
s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r , " T L l ( 8 B H ) " ) = =  H I T | | s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r , " T H O ( 8 C H ) " ) = =  H I T | |  
s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r , " T H 1 ( 8 D H ) " )  = =  H I T )
/ * I f  r e g i s t e r  i s  n o t  b i t  a d d r e s s a b l e ,  c o p y  r u b b i s n  i n t o  c h a r a c t e r  b i t  s t r i n g s * /  
{
s t r c p y ( B i t O _ l , " 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t l _ l , " 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t 2 _ l , " 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 " ) ;  
s t r c p y ( B i t 3 _ l , " 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 " ) ; s t r c p y ( B i t 4 _ l , " 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t 5 _ l , " 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 " ) ;  
s t r c p y ( B i t 6 _ 1 ,  " 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 " ) ;  s t r c p y ( B i t 7 _ l , " 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 " ) ;
}
i f  ( s t r c m p  ( B i t O _ l ,  B i t _ s t r i n g )  = =  H I T  I |  s t r c m p  ( B i t l _ l ,  B i t _ s t r i n g )  = =  H I T  
I I s t r c m p  ( B i t 2 _ l ,  B i t _ s t r i n g )  = =  H I T  | |  s t r c m p  ( B i t 3 _ l ,  B i t _ s t r i n g )  = =  H I T
I I s t r c m p  ( B i t 4 _ l ,  B i t _ s t r i n g )  = =  H I T  | |  s t r c m p  ( B i t 5 _ l ,  B i t _ s t r i n g )  = =  H I T
I I s t r c m p  ( B i t 6 _ l ,  B i t _ s t r i n g )  = =  H I T  I I s t r c m p  ( B i t 7 _ l ,  B i t _ s t r i n g )  = =  H I T )
{ c o n d i t i o n 2  = 1 ;  }
e l s e
( c o n d i t i o n 2  =  0 ; }
}
/ * C a l c u l a t e _ D u t y _ C y c l e l . C ,  C a l c u l a t e _ D u t y _ C y c l e 2 . C , C a l c u l a t e _ D u t y _ C y c l e 3 . C : 
c a l c u l a t e s  d u t y  c y c l e  f r o m  a c c u m u l a t i v e _ d u t y _ p e r i o d  * /
v o i d  C a l c u l a t e _ D u t y _ C y c l e l ()
{
i f ( c o n d i t i o n l = = l  I I  c o n d i t i o n 2  = = 1 )
{ A c c _ d u t y _ p e r i o d  =  d p . c y c l e  -  c y c l e _ p r e v l ;  
d u t y _ c y c l e  =  0 ;
}
}
v o i d  C a l c u l a t e _ D u t y _ C y c l e 2 ()  
{
c h a r * MOV " M O V \ 0 " ;
c h a r * MOVX - " M O V X \ 0 " ;
c h a r * MOVC = "M OVCXO";
c h a r * SE T B  = " S E T B X O " ;
c h a r * CLR " C L R \ 0 " ;
/ * c o n d i t i o n l & 2  t e l l s  m e  i f  a  r e g i s t e r  o r  a  r e g i s t e r  b i t  i s  b e i n g  a c t e d  u p o n .
T o  c a l c u l a t e  t h e  d u t y  c y c l e ,  I  n e e d  t o  k n o w  i f  d a t a  i s  b e i n g  w r i t t e n  i n t o  o r  
r e a d  f r o m  t h e  r e g i s t e r .  T h e  f i r s t  t h i n g  i s  t o  c h e c k  i f  d p . i n s t r u c t i o n l  i s  a  m o v ,  
m o v x  o r  m o v e ,  S E T B ,  C L R .  I f  t r u e ,  t h e n  d a t a  i s  b e i n g  m o v e d  i n t o  t h e  r e g i s t e r ,
( d u t y  c y c l e  m o d i f i c a t i o n  i n s t r u c t i o n .  * /
i f ( ( c o n d i t i o n l  = = 1 )  I I  ( c o n d i t i o n 2  *== 1 ) )  / *  t r u e  i f  r e g i s t e r  o r  b i t  i s  f o u n d  *
/
{ c o n d i t i o n 3  = 1 ;  }
e l s e
{ c o n d i t i o n 3  =  0 ;  } ,
/ *  t r u e  i f  d a t a  i s  b e e n  r e a d  f o m  a  r e g i s t e r  o r  r e g i s t e r  b i t * /
i f  ( s t r c m p  (_MOV, d p . i n s t r u c t i o n l ) = = H I T I  I s t r c m p  (_MOVX, d p . i n s t r u c t i o n l ) = = H I T  
I I s t r c m p  (_MOVC, d p . i n s t r u c t i o n l ) = = H I T I  I s t r c m p  ( _ S E T B ,  d p . i n s t r u c t i o n l ) = = H I T  
l l s t r c m p  ( _ C L R ,  d p . i n s t r u c t i o n l )  = =  H I T )
{ c o n d i t i o n 4  = 1 ;  } 
e l s e
{ c o n d i t i o n 4  = 0 ;  }
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/ ♦ T r u e ,  i f  d a t a  i s  b e i n g  w r i t t e n  i n t o  a  r e g i s t e r  o r  r e g i s t e r  b i t  * /  
i f  ( s t r c m p  ( B i t _ s t r i n g ,  i n s t r 2 _ l )  *== H I T  I I s t r c m p ( R e g i s t e r ,  i n s t r 2 _ l )  = =  H I T )
{ c o n d i t i o n 5  = 1 ;  }
e l s e
{ c o n d i t i o n s  =  0 ;  }
i f ( ( ( c o n d i t i o n 3  = = 1 )  && ( c o n d i t i o n 4  ! = 1 )  && ( c o n d i t i o n s  ! *=1) ) | | ( ( c o n d i t i o n 3 = = l )  
&& ( c o n d i t i o n 4  ! = 1 )  && ( c o n d i t i o n s  = = 1 ) ) | | ( ( c o n d i t i o n 3  = = 1 )  && ( c o n d i t i o n 4  = = 1 )  
&& ( c o n d i t i o n s  ! = 1 ) ) )
{
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r l ,  " c y c l e _ p r e v l = % x  c y c l e _ p r e v 2 = % x  " , c y c l e _ p r e v l ,  c y c l e _ p r e v 2 ) ;
A c c _ d u t y _ p e r i o d  + =  ( d p . c y c l e - c y c l e _ p r e v 2 ) ; 
c y c l e _ p r e v l  =  d p . c y c l e ;  
c y c l e _ p r e v 2  =  d p . c y c l e ;
}
i f ( ( c o n d i t i o n 3  = =  1 )  && ( c o n d i t i o n 4  = = 1 )  && ( c o n d i t i o n s  = = 1 ) )
{
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r l , " c y c l e _ p r e v l = % x  c y c l e _ p r e v 2 = % x " , c y c l e _ p r e v l ,  c y c l e _ p r e v 2 ) ; 
A c c _ d u t y _ p e r i o d  + =  ( d p . c y c l e  -  c y c l e _ p r e v l ) ;  
c y c l e _ p r e v l  =  d p . c y c l e ;  
c y c l e _ p r e v 2  =  d p . c y c l e ;
}
i f ( c o n d i t i o n 3  ! =  1 )
{
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r l , " c y c l e _ p r e v l = % x  c y c l e _ p r e v 2 = % x  " , c y c l e _ p r e v l ,  c y c l e _ p r e v 2 ) ;
c y c l e _ p r e v l  =  d p . c y c l e ;
s t r c p y ( B i t _ s t r i n g ,  " N o  B i t _ s t r i n g " ) ;
}
d u t y _ c y c l e  =  ( f l o a t ) A c c _ d u t y _ p e r i o d / ( f l o a t ) d p . c y c l e ;
}
v o i d  C a l c u l a t e _ _ D u t y _ C y c l e 3  ( )
{
n u m b e r  =  r e c * R E C O R D _ S I Z E ;
f s e e k  ( f i l e P t r , n u m b e r  ,  S E E K _ S E T ) ;
f r e a d  ( & d p ,  s i z e o f ( s t r u c t  D A T A _ P A C K E T ) , 1 ,  f i l e P t r ) ;  
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r l ,  " % d  %x %x " ,  r e c ,  d p . c y c l e ,  d p . c o n t e n t ) ;  
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r l ,  " % s  % s \ n  " ,  d p . i n s t r u c t i o n l ,  d p . i n s t r u c t i o n 2 ) ;
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r l ,  " c o n d i t i o n l  =  % d,  c o n d i t i o n 2  =  %d, c o n d i t i o n 3  =  % d \ n  " ,  
c o n d i t i o n l ,  c o n d i t i o n 2 ,  c o n d i t i o n 3 ) ;
A c c _ d u t y _ p e r i o d  + =  ( d p . c y c l e - c y c l e _ p r e v 2 ) ;
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r l ,  " d p . c y c l e = % x  c y c l e _ _ p r e v 2 = % x  c y c l e _ p r e v l = % x  d u t y _ c y c l e = % x \ n
•I
, d p . c y c l e , c y c l e _ p r e v 2 , c y c l e _ p r e v l , d u t y _ c y c l e ) ;  
c y c l e _ p r e v l  =  d p . c y c l e ;  
c y c l e _ p r e v 2  =  d p . c y c l e ;
}
v o i d  P e r c _ D C l  ( )
{ ' / ♦ C a l c u l a t e s  t h e  a v e r a g e  u p s e t  r a t e  p e r  r e g i s t e r  a n d  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  o b s e r v a b l e  SE U
i n d u c e d  e r r o r  o f  t h e  w o r s t  c a s e  r a t e * /
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r 2 ,  " D u t y  p e r i o d  t o t a l  =  % x \ n " ,  D u t y _ p e r i o d _ t o t a l ) ;
R e s u l t 2 1  = ( ( f l o a t ) D u t y _ p e r i o d _ t o t a l / ( f l o a t ) 3 1 ) ;
A v _ p e r c _ u p s e t _ r a t e  = ( R e s u l t 2 1 / ( f l o a t ) d p . c y c l e ) * ( f l o a t ) 1 0 0 ;
p r i n t f ( " R e s u l t 2 1  =  % . 2 f ,  A v _ p e r c _ u p s e t _ r a t e  =  % . 2 f \ n " ,  R e s u l t 2 1 ,  A v _ p e r c _ u p s e t _ r a t e )
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r 2 , " \ n \ n W i t h  t h e  m i c r o c o n t r o l l e r  e x e c u t i n g  t h i s  s o f t w a r e ,  
t h e  a v e r a g e  u p s e t _ r a t e  f o r  \ n " ) ;
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r 2 , " e a c h  r e g i s t e r  w i l l  b e  % .2 f% %  o f  i t s  w o r s t  c a s e  r a t e . \ n \ n " ,
A v _ p e r c _ u p s e t _ r a t e ) ;
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r 2 , " T h e  p r o g r a m  a c c u m u l a t i v e  r u n  t i m e  ( A c c _ r u n _ t i m e )  w a s  %d c y c l e s .  
\ n \ n " ,  d p . c y c l e ) ;
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r 2 , " D u t y _ c y c l e  =  A c c _ d u t y _ p e r i o d / A c c _ r u n _ t i m e . \ n " ) ;
p r i n t f ( " \ n \ n W i t h  t h e  m i c r o c o n t r o l l e r  e x e c u t i n g  t h i s  s o f t w a r e ,  t h e  a v e r a g e  u p s e t _ r a t e  
\ n " )  ;
p r i n t f ( " f o r  e a c h  r e g i s t e r  w i l l  b e  % .2f% %  o f  i t s  w o r s t  c a s e  r a t e . \ n " , A v _ p e r c _ u p s e t _ r a  
t e )  ;
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r 2 ,  " \n T C O N = % x  SCON=%x PCON=%x TMOD=%x T H 0 = % x \ n . " , T C O N ,S C O N , P C O N ,  TMOD, 
THO) ;
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r 2 ,  " T H l = % x  I E = % x  I P = % x  T L 0 = % x  T L l = % x \ n " ,  T H 1 ,  I E ,  I P ,  T L O ,  T L l ) ;
DC C o n t  t o t a l  =  T C O N + S C O N + P C O N + T M O D + T H O + T H 1 + IE + IP + T L O + T L 1 + S P _ 0 + P S W  0 ;
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f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r 2 ,  " \ n T o t a l  d u t y  p e r i o d  f o r  f a t a l  e r r o r s  =  % x \ n " ,  D C _ C o n t _ t o t a l ) ; 
p r i n t f ( " T o t a l  d u t y  p e r i o d  f o r  f a t a l  e r r o r s  =  % x \ n " ,  D C _ C o n t _ t o t a l ) ; 
P e r c e n t a g e _ o f _ f a t a l _ e r r o r s  =  ( D C _ C o n t _ t o t a l / ( f l o a t ) D u t y _ p e r i o d _ t o t a l ) * ( f l o a t ) 1 0 0 ;  
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r 2 , " T h e  P e r c e n t a g e  o f  f a t a l  e r r o r s  =  %, 2 f % % \ n " , P e r c e n t a g e _ o f _ f a t a l _ e r r  
o r s ) ;
p r i n t f ( " T h e  P e r c e n t a g e  o f  f a t a l  e r r o r s  =  % . 2 f % % \ n " ,  P e r c e n t a g e _ o f _ f a t a l _ e r r o r s ) /
}
/******************************-*****************************************/ 
v o i d  P e r c _ D C 2  ( )
{ / * C a l c u l a t e s  t h e  u p s e t  r a t e  o f  a  r e g i s t e r  a n d  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  o b s e r v a b l e  SEU 
i n d u c e d  e r r o r  o f  t h e  w o r s t  c a s e  r a t e * /
A v _ p e r c _ u p s e t _ _ r a t e  =  ( ( f l o a t )  D u t y _ c y c l e _ _ t o t a l /  ( f l o a t )  d p . c y c l e )  * 1 0 0 ;  
p r i n t f ( " A v _ p e r c _ u p s e t _ r a t e  =  % . 2 f % % \ n " ,  A v _ p e r c _ u p s e t _ r a t e ) ; 
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r 2 , " \ n \ n W i t h  t h e  m i c r o c o n t r o l l e r  e x e c u t i n g  t h i s  s o f t w a r e ,  
t h e  a v e r a g e  u p s e t _ r a t e  f o r  \ n " ) ;  
f p r i n t f ( f i l e P t r 2 , " % s  w i l l  b e  % .2 f% %  o f  i t s  w o r s t  c a s e  r a t e . X n " ,
R e g i s t e r ,  A v _ p e r c _ u p s e t _ r a t e ) ; 
p r i n t f ( " \ n \ n W i t h  t h e  m i c r o c o n t r o l l e r  e x e c u t i n g  t h i s  s o f t w a r e ,  
t h e  a v e r a g e  u p s e t _ r a t e  f o r  \ n " ) ;  
p r i n t f ( " % s  w i l l  b e  % .2 f% %  o f  i t s  w o r s t  c a s e  r a t e . \ n " , R e g i s t e r ,  A v _ p e r c _ u p s e t _ r a t e ) ;
}
C y c l e  P r e d i c t i o n  M o d e l  - P r o g r a m - 1 :  0 4 / 9 7 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
FUNC v o i d  m y f i l e _ l  ( v o i d )
{
w h i l e ( 1 )
(
w h i l e ( $  ! =  0 0 8 7 H )
{
e x e c ( " T " ) ;
p r i n t f ( " \ n \ n C y c l e = % d " ,  c y c l e s ) ;
p r i n t f ( " \ n P C O N = % 0 2 X H  TCON=%02XH SCON=%02XH " ,  P C O N ,T C O N , S C O N ) ; 
p r i n t f ( " T M O D = % 0 2 X H  SB U F= % 02X H  IE = % 0 2 X H  I P = % 0 2 X H " , T M O D , S B U F , I E , I P ) ; 
p r i n t f ( " \ n T L 0 = % 0 2 X H  T L 1 = % 0 2 X H  TH 0= % 02X H  TH 1= % 02X H  " ,  T L 0 ,  T L l ,  T H 0 ,  T H 1 ) ; 
p r i n t f ( " D P L = % 0 2 X H  D P H = % 0 2 X H \ n " ,  D P L ,  D P H ) ;
}
B r e a k ;
}
}
/ * * * * * * * S E U  S i m u l a t i o n  F u n c t i o n :  C o d e * * * * * * * /  /******************************************/
/ * * * * S E U  I n j e c t i o n  F u n c t i o n  f o r  A c c u m u l a t o r  a n d  B R e g i s t e r * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  
* * * * • /
i i i **j
S IG N A L  v o i d  d i g i t a l l  ( v o i d )
{
l o n g  i ,  j ;  / * R a n d o m  v a r i a b l e  f o r  s e l e c t i n g  a  r e g i s t e r  a n d  a  b i t * /
w h i l e ( 1 )
(
t w a t c h  ( 4 0 ) ;  / * d e f i n e s  n u m b e r  o f  c l o c k  c y c l e s  b e f o r e  n e x t  SEU i s  i n j e c t e d  * /  
i  =  r a n d ( c y c l e s ) ; / * S e e d  r a n d o m  f u n c t i o n  w i t h  c o n t e n t  o f  c y c l e  c o u n t e r  * /
I F  ( ( 0 < = i )  && ( i < 1 0 9 2 ) )
{ p r i n t f ( " \ n A  =  %02XH ; " ,  ACC); 
j  =  r a n d ( c y c l e s ) ;  
p r i n t f ( " j  =  %d ; " ,  j ) ;
i f ( ( 0 < = j ) && ( j < 4 0 9 6 ) )
{ A =  A  * 0 1 H ;  }
i f ( ( 4 0 9 6 < = j ) && ( j < 8 1 9 2 ) )
{ A =  A A 0 2 H ;  }
i f  ( ( 8 1 9 2 < = j ) && ( j < 1 2 2 8 8 ) )
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{ A =  A A 0 4 H ;  }
i f ( ( 1 2 2 8 8 < = j ) && ( j < 1 6 3 8 4 ) )
{ A =  A A 0 8 H ;  }
i f ( { 1 € 3 8 4 < = j ) && ( j < 2 0 4 8 0 ) )
{ A  -  A A 1 0 H ;  }
i f ( ( 2 0 4 8 0 < = j ) && ( j < 2 4 5 7 6 ) )
{ A =  A  A 2 OH; }
i f ( ( 2 4 5 7 6 < = j ) && ( j < 2 8 6 7 2 ) )
{ A =  A A 4 0 H ;  }
i f ( ( 2 8 6 7 2 < = j ) && ( j < 3 2 7 6 7 ) )
{ A  =  A  A 8 0 H ;  }
p r i n t f ( " A  =  % 02X H ; PC =  % 0 4 X H \ n " ,  A C C,  $ ) ;  }
I F ( ( 1 0 9 2 < = i )  && ( i < 2 1 8 4 ) )
{ p r i n t f ( " B  «* %02XH ; " ,  B )  ;  
j  =  r a n d ( c y c l e s ) ;  
p r i n t f ( " j  -  %d ; " ,  j ) ;
i f  ( ( 0 < = j ) && ( j < 4 0 9 6 ) )
{ B =  B A 0 1 H ;  }
i f ( ( 4 0 9 6 < = j ) && ( j < 8 1 9 2 ) )
{ B =  B A 0 2 H ;  }
i f ( ( 8 1 9 2 < = j ) && ( j < 1 2 2 8 8 ) )
{ B =  B A 0 4 H ;  }
i f ( ( 1 2 2 8 8 < = j ) && ( j < 1 6 3 8 4 ) )
{ B =  B A 0 8 H ;  }
i f { ( 1 6 3 8 4 < = j ) && ( j < 2 0 4 8 0 ) )
{ B =  B A 1 0 H ;  }
i f ( ( 2 0 4 8 0 < = j ) && ( j < 2 4 5 7 6 ) )
{ B =  B A 2 0 H ;  }
i f ( ( 2 4 5 7 6 < = j )  && ( j < 2 8 6 7 2 ) )
{ B =  B A 4 OH; }
i f ( ( 2 8 6 7 2 < = j )  && ( j < 3 2 7 6 7 ) )
{ B =  B A 8 0 H ;  }
p r i n t f  ( " B  =  %02XH B) ;
p r i n t f  ( " P r o g r a m  C o u n t e r :  % 0 4 X H \ n " ,  $ ) ;
}
/ * W i t h  t h e  e x c e p t i o n  o f  t h e  s e r i a l  b u f f e r  (S B U F )  w h i c h  c o u l d  n o t  b e  i n c l u d e d  
i n  t h e  s i m u l a t i o n s ,  t h e  SE U  i n j e c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  i s  s i m i l a r  i n  f o r m a t  f o r  t h e  o t h e r  
r e g i s t e r s  a s  i n  t h e  e x a m p l e s  a b o v e  * /
**** I
*^ i i©  S t c i t u s  F u n c t i o n * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
***** ^  ^
FUNC v o i d  s t a t u s  ( v o i d )
{
w h i l e ( 1 )
{
w h i l e  ( $  ! =  0 0 8 7 )  / * W h i l e  p r o g r a m  i s  n o t  w a i t i n g  f o r  e x t e r n a l  r e s p o n s e * /
{
e x e c ( " T " ) ;
p r i n t f ( " \ n C y c l e = % 0 2 X H " ,  c y c l e s ) ;  
p r i n t f  ( "  P r o g r a m  C o u n t e r :  %04XH " ,  $ ) ;
p r i n t f ( " \ n A = % 0 2 X H  B=%02XH R 0= % 02X H  R 1= % 02X H  R 2 « = % 0 2 X H " , A C C , B , R 0 , R l , R 2 ) ; 
p r i n t f ( " R 3 = % 0 2 X H  R 4=% 02X H  R 5=% 02X H  R 6=% 02X H  R 7 = % 0 2 X H " , r 3 ,  r 4 ,  r 5 , r 6 , r 7 ) ; 
p r i n t f ( " \ n P 0 = % 0 2 X H  P 1= % 02X H  P 2 = % 0 2 X H  P 3 = % 0 2 X H  " ,  P 0 , P I , P 2 , P 3 ) ; 
p r i n t f ( " P C O N = % 0 2 X H  TCON=%02XH SCON=%02XH " ,  PCON, TCON, S C O N ) ; 
p r i n t f ( " \ n T M O D = % 0 2 X H  SBUF=%02XH IE = % 0 2 X H  I P = % 0 2 X H " ,  TMOD, S B U F ,  I E ,  I P )  ; 
p r i n t f ( " T L 0 = % 0 2 X H  T L 1= % 02X H  T H 0= % 02X H  T H 1 = % 0 2 X H " ,  T L O ,  T L l ,  THO, T H 1 ) ; 
p r i n t f ( " \ n D P L = % 0 2 X H  DPH=%02XH S P = % 0 2 X H  P S W = % 02X H ",  D P L ,  DPH, S P ,  P S W ) ;
}
}
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